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Suzanne Fiederlein, Ph.D.
Welcome to our twenty-fifth edition of The Journal. Sometimes it’s a good 
idea to know where you’ve been to know where you’re going. With this in mind, our 
team spent considerable time reviewing all sixty-four issues of The Journal and 
what an informative, humbling, and rewarding exercise it’s been. With over 1,700 
articles published over the course of twenty-five years, The Journal is a historical 
narrative and timeline of the evolution of mine action within the context of the 
global world in which it operates, reflecting the growth and decline of key trends and topics, highlighting 
successes and challenges, and bringing attention to ever-evolving programs and technology. Familiar 
personalities in mine action as well as new contributors working outside of the field have all shared their 
unique perspectives, insights, and experiences, expanding the breadth of knowledge of our community 
as we prepare for the future.
We’re proud of the pertinent, timely, and valuable information the community of action has 
contributed in this edition, with articles highlighting the history of mine action; successful 
completion of clearance in the Falkland Islands; continuing evolution of explosive ordnance risk 
education; the use of virtual reality to aid survivors and demining programs; mine action in Ukraine 
and the Middle East; and innovative programs in data analysis, machine learning, and small arms and 
weapons destruction. Additionally, ref lecting broader global trends and their effects on mine action, 
we feature articles on mental health and mine action; the ongoing effects of the global COVID-19 
pandemic on operations; environmental concerns of clearance; and how we can reframe stereotypical 
gender narratives in the realm of mine action reporting.
One of the benefits of this pandemic has been our ability to virtually communicate with one another: 
from attending meetings, symposia, workshops, and seminars, to chatting virtually with our authors, the 
mine action community has been able to meet despite isolation and separation from one another. With 
this in mind, we hope that Journal contributors will join us in a new initiative we’re calling the “CISR 
Exchange”, as we engage with authors in ways that both highlight their work and discuss its broader 
implications within the field of practice. By talking with experts and sharing these conversations online, 
we hope the Exchange can help contextualize the challenges that mine action practitioners face today 
while showcasing how the free exchange of information can spark new ideas and potential solutions, 
something which we believe is the very crux of The Journal. 
The Journal is only possible through the generous support of the U.S. Department of State and the 
contributions made by the community. We are continuously impressed by and grateful for the field’s 
commitment to collaboration to achieve a world free from the dangers of explosive weapons and other 
legacies of war. As the sector now faces the effects of an ongoing pandemic and increasingly unstable 
operating environments, we encourage readers to look back over Journal articles published throughout 
the years, finding encouragement in how far the mine action sector has come and the many voices, 
individuals, and organizations that have brought us thus far. And finally, I commend The Journal 
publications staff for its success in providing a consistent quality space for sharing the stories and 
lessons of this remarkable community.
Stay safe,
Suzanne1996–2021
Celebrating 25 Years of Improving Lives!
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Letter from the Editor: 
THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL 
WEAPONS DESTRUCTION
Celebrates 25 Years!
By Steven Costner [ Deputy Director, Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement, 
Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State ] 
The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction is the leading publication in the fields of humanitarian mine action (HMA) and munitions destruction and security. Since 1997, experts in these fields have shared their critical thinking and innovative ideas on how to make their practical work safer and more efficient at the same time. For 
this 25th edition of The Journal, I invite you to join me in celebrating all the present and past authors who have shared their 
ideas, inventions, and perspectives to improve the lives of countless communities around the world. 
When I joined the Department of State over thirty years ago, human-
itarian demining was a radical occupation not given much international 
attention. Then Princess Diana thrust the dangerous work of demin-
ers into the spotlight in 1997 when visiting minefields in Angola and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The United States first funded a humanitarian 
demining program in Afghanistan in 1988, planting the seed for what 
has been the most robust conventional weapons destruction (CWD) 
program globally. Since establishing a dedicated HMA program in 1993 
(and then expanding it in 2001 to include small arms and light weap-
ons [SA/LW] and ammunition destruction and security), the United 
States has provided more than US$4 billion to support HMA, weapons 
and ammunition destruction, physical security and stockpile manage-
ment (PSSM), and associated activities in more than 100 countries. But 
funding totals don’t reveal how much has been accomplished, so let 
me give you a few examples: From 2016 to 2020 alone, these programs 
have resulted in the destruction of more than 139,316 SA/LW and over 
67,000 tons of ammunition, making it harder for terrorists and drug 
traffickers to get weapons. We have cleared more than 1.4 million land-
mines and explosive hazards, and returned 225.87 sq mi to post-conflict 
communities for safe and productive use, promoting stability, security, 
and prosperity in the process. 
My personal visits to the fields of Cambodia, Chile, and Zimbabwe 
impressed on me the dangerous work deminers undertake in some-
times very harsh conditions. Heat, rocky terrain, thick brush, and 
steep hills are just a few examples. I quickly appreciated the vast back-
grounds these deminers came from, all joined by the common desire to 
provide safety and economic growth for their communities and their 
children. As the horrendous attack on a HALO Trust camp on 8 June 
2021 in Afghanistan demonstrated, the work of deminers in countries 
still experiencing conflict sometimes brings with it the ultimate sac-
rifice. The use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) by adversaries 
has added an additional layer of risk for many organizations and has 
required additional training to detect and render safe such items. Of 
course, the threat is not limited only to deminers. All too often a civil-
ian stepping on a decades-long hidden landmine or a child picking up 
a brightly colored piece of unexploded ordnance results in life-altering 
injuries or death.
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The Journal has managed over the years to illustrate how the work of 
demining has evolved and the skills required to render communities 
safe can be honed through up-to-date training. The articles published 
in The Journal have introduced or explained bright ideas to reduce this 
suffering. Authors have demonstrated that dogs, rats, drones, LiDAR 
technology, excavation, and simple tedious inch-by-inch manual land-
mine discovery and extraction are all viable methods to render land 
safe for travel, agriculture, and development. 
I have advocated first-hand as head of delegation to many negotia-
tions and conferences on SA/LW and ammunition for destruction and 
other PSSM measures as an effective way to reduce both illicit prolif-
eration and the risk of catastrophic explosions at arms depots that 
threaten civilians. Many technologies are available to destroy, secure, 
and mark these weapons. I witnessed in Ukraine that SA/LW ammu-
nition can safely be destroyed with varying methods. We applauded 
The Journal’s decision to expand its scope in 2016 to cover this impor-
tant set of issues. 
The year 2020 presented all of us with exceptional challenges 
professionally and personally due to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
The United States has remained committed to HMA and weap-
ons destruction and security, with funding reaching more than 
$259 million in 2020 alone, despite the significant and constantly 
evolving logistical challenges. In many places, our implementers 
have unmatched logistics capabilities that can enhance life-saving 
efforts. National and local authorities, the mine action sector, and 
various actors in the protection space have delivered countless risk 
education (RE) sessions around the world. However, geography, 
conf lict, local cultural dynamics, and, most recently, the global 
pandemic continue to present obstacles to presenting traditional RE 
to at-risk communities. Over the past year-and-a-half in particular, 
The Journal has published articles on innovative RE methods that 
are vital to helping such communities thrive and live safely.
Congratulations to all those that have contributed to making The 
Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction the premier publica-
tion in its field that it is today—and congratulations in particular 
to the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery at James 
Madison University. I hope you enjoy this special 25th edition of 
The Journal. 
Steven Costner on a field visit to Zimbabwe.
Photo courtesy of the U.S. Department of State.
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 Over the last three decades, the sector has come to realize the para-
mount importance of national ownership. National mine action 
programs in countries such as Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Lebanon 
have evolved from being heavily supported or led by international tech-
nical advisors to assuming complete responsibility for programmatic 
decision-making, with only limited support from the United Nations 
or other international stakeholders. National ownership has been 
decisive in ensuring that mine action be increasingly mainstreamed 
into governmental structures and programs, allowing synergies with 
ministries dealing with issues such as economic development, disabil-
ity, and education. Thanks to the hard work of committed local actors 
and support from international technical advisors, local expertise and 
technical capacity have developed over the years.
 The process of strategic planning has played a significant role 
in supporting this evolution towards increased national ownership. 
Developing comprehensive national strategies, under the leadership 
of the national authorities, is instrumental to ensuring that all actors 
involved pull in the same direction and mobilize the resources needed 
for operational activities. In the same vein, the Anti-Personnel Mine 
Ban Convention (APMBC) and the Convention on Cluster Munitions 
(CMM have promoted in recent years multistakeholder approaches 
that foster better planning, cooperation, and coordination at national 
levels: the so-called individualized and country-coalition approaches. 
 At a technical level, the sector has managed to agree on, establish, 
and codify all of the key areas of mine action operations through the 
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS). The development 
of these global guidelines that outline good practice for mine action is 
unique within conventional disarmament—both in terms of the sophis-
tication of their governance and in their uptake at the operational level 
within the sector. The IMAS have evolved to integrate learning; new 
policies, structures, and methodologies are adopted within a common, 
transparent, and accountable framework. The IMAS are integral to the 
high level of confidence enjoyed by the sector, an aspect of great signifi-
cance given its particular role in helping to render communities safe 
from explosive hazards. 
The evolution of land release within the IMAS stands out as an 
example of the role that standards have played in moving mine action 
forward within a humanitarian framework. Land release represents the 
evolution of the pillar formerly called demining and an initial focus on 
removing (and counting) mines to a new approach that focuses on con-
taminated land and the socioeconomic consequences resulting from 
it. Land release also recognizes that removing contamination relies on 
both analytical and technical processes: non-technical survey (NTS), 
technical survey (TS), and clearance were developed as a system based 
on sound and transparent risk management and enhanced efficiency 
over an approach that required all land suspected of contamination to 
be demined or fully cleared. Millions of square meters of contaminated 
land have been cancelled from national databases as a result of better 
analysis and information gathering during NTS. This has saved mil-
lions of dollars in mine action resources, allowing for more meaning-
ful investments and ultimately helping to save countless lives. 
The mainstreaming of gender and diversity (G&D) consider-
ations at the strategic and operational levels has gained considerable 
traction in recent years, out of the imperative to ensure that mine 
action interventions include and benefit all. The sector has improved 
its ability to integrate G&D in its work and to ensure that the issue 
is addressed from both the ethical and technical dimensions. Today, 
operational teams routinely collect data on how different target groups 
are affected by explosive contamination and tailor resources to address 
these needs so that more people benefit from mine action. In addition, 
the transformative role of mine action toward empowering women is 
by now fully acknowledged. 
Mine Action in Motion 
By Ambassador Stefano Toscano, Ph.D. [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]
 
Highlighting Key Mine Action Developments
 
The story of mine action is one of an adaptive and solution-oriented sector. Time and again, mine action has developed new approaches, tools, and standards to meet evolving challenges and circumstances at the field level. A strong partnership among all key actors has characterized 
the sector since its early years and has been instrumental to its agility and evolution. 
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 As the mine action sector has 
matured, innovation has continued 
to shape and reshape approaches. To 
be sure, this has not happened in iso-
lation: new ideas and methods have 
often been the result of partner-
ships, bringing together experts from 
different backgrounds, civil society, 
academia, and commercial companies, 
but also relying heavily on contextual knowledge gathered though inter-
action with beneficiary communities. Promoting innovation through 
such channels as the biennial Technology Workshops has proven to be a 
good way of bringing product developers and potential users together to 
exchange experiences and opinions. 
The importance of sound information management to allow 
for evidence-based decision-making is now undisputed. Our ability 
to accurately understand and depict the problem, including the type 
and location of explosive ordnance (EO) contamination in a given 
working context, is a fundamental pre-requisite to the design of effec-
tive responses at all levels. Information management systems have 
improved continuously, not least thanks to the ability of the sector to 
harness the potential of new and evolving technologies—particularly 
geographic information systems. 
The evolution of modern land release processes combined with 
technological advances in mapping facilitated a shift from early 
“big hand, small map” approaches, whereby rapid survey processes 
led at times to the inclusion of large suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) 
in national databases, thus complicating the task of turning them into 
confirmed hazard areas (CHAs) afterward. It might appear straight-
forward from today’s perspective; however, countries such as Angola 
and Sri Lanka benefitted significantly from progress in information 
management in the early 2000s, when accurate polygon mapping was 
made possible by a combination of improved survey techniques and 
the possibility to equip survey and risk education teams with handheld 
GDP devices, accurate to a matter of meters. Further improvements 
in the way that practitioners understand evidence and engage with 
communities are also ensuring that the location of contamination is 
judged far more accurately today than ever before. Recent successes 
in Sri Lanka are testament to this, where 19 sq km—approximately 
50 percent of the recorded mined prob-
lem—were cancelled during a 2016/2017 
baseline survey. 
Early hopes that emerging detection 
technology would provide some sort of 
silver bullet for the sector might have been 
dashed; however, significant progress 
has been made. The range of tools avail-
able continues to expand, and the sector 
is finding new and innovative ways to harness technology. Countries 
like Cambodia and Zimbabwe have benefitted from the deployment of 
new dual sensor technology, combining magnetic and GPR detection to 
reduce time spent investigating false signals. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
the sector is exploring new methods to train, equip, and deploy animals 
in survey and detection roles, such as the SMART mine detection dog 
(MDD) system. Globally, innovative ways of deploying machines of dif-
ferent shapes and sizes have emerged, from the handheld strimmers that 
have sped up manual clearance, helping Mozambique move toward com-
pletion, to the bespoke demining machines that use heavy tillers capable 
of quickly processing large areas under the right conditions. And we are 
only beginning to see the potential of more recent innovations in remote 
sensing and artificial intelligence. 
Innovation is not limited to new tools, equipment, and operational 
methods: the sector is finding more sophisticated ways of looking at the 
bigger picture such as measuring progress in terms of outcomes and 
impact. In 2017, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining (GICHD) and the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) produced a joint study articulating the linkages between mine 
action and the sustainable development goals (SDGs), pointing to the 
latter as a perfectly adequate framework to measure the broader trans-
formational impact of mine action. Several affected states now include 
the SDGs in their national mine action strategies, such as Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, which included mine action achievements in its national 
reports on SDG implementation for the first time in 2020, illustrating 
the direct contribution of mine action in achieving sustainable devel-
opment. The APMBC Oslo Action Plan, approved at the Fourth Review 
Conference in 2019, is the first of its kind to include measurable actions 
associated with clear indicators that can be used to track progress at 
the global level. 
 
The Role of Innovation
 
Innovation is not limited to new tools, equipment, and operational methods: the sector is finding more 
sophisticated ways of looking at the 
bigger picture such as measuring prog-
ress in terms of outcomes and impact.
Next Steps: The Way Ahead 
Mine action is and will remain first and foremost a response to a 
humanitarian imperative generated by EO contamination, and as 
such, part of broader humanitarian endeavors. Looking ahead, the 
sector will be increasingly called upon to work in or close to conflict 
zones, environments often characterized by instability, weak state 
institutions, and the presence of armed groups. Regrettably, humani-
tarian actors face a shrinking operational space in these environments, 
with less room to maneuver and more security threats. Mine action 
will need to find new ways to operate in these environments, and to 
cooperate and coordinate with the broader humanitarian community. 
Conflicts are increasingly urbanized, as is the damage they cause. 
This has created tremendous human misery and displaced millions 
of people. Urban settings with dense infrastructural EO contamina-
tion makes it difficult to locate it safely. EO being buried under rubble 
9
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in many cases, and in an environment where metal contamination 
negates the use of metal detection, new procedures and equipment are 
needed and under development. Further, refugees, internally displaced 
persons, and returnees are particularly vulnerable to risks from EO, 
emphasizing the importance of developing new methods and technol-
ogies in the field of explosive ordnance risk education (EORE). 
Victim-operated improvised explosive devices (IEDs), especially 
those located in complex urban environments, provide yet another 
challenge that mine action operators are called to address. Due to their 
varying composition, detection that does not focus on metal but on 
some of the common attributes of IEDs such as “crush wires” (these can 
be concealed in urban dwellings under carpets or other imperceptible 
locations) are enhancing the speed of operations and the safety of staff. 
However, further work on how to address IEDs is required. 
Mine action has an enabling role towards reconstruction and devel-
opment and, more broadly, the achievement of the SDGs—it’s overall 
relevance. It is therefore essential for mine action to be placed firmly 
within the so-called triple nexus. More work is needed on this front to 
ensure and document mine action’s transformative impact on humani-
tarian, developmental, and peace-building efforts. Sound information 
management can play an integral part in this. The recent standard-
ization of IMAS global minimum data requirements combined with a 
shift towards fully GIS-based information management systems such 
as Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core 
will make it possible for comparable data to be aggregated and analyzed 
to support sound prioritization and operational decision-making. 
The current COVID-19 global pandemic represents both a challenge 
and an opportunity to increase our efforts toward stronger national 
ownership and the localization of responses. Mine action should, 
indeed, be “as local as possible and as international as necessary,” to 
quote UN Secretary General, António Guterres. The sector has shown 
great resilience and adaptability in adjusting to the new realities pre-
sented by the pandemic. The increased use of modern technologies 
such as digital tools and platforms has been an integral component, 
as was the remarkable flexibility and support shown by donors. The 
pandemic also illustrated the importance and wealth of on-site/local 
expertise and local partners that can assume key responsibilities in 
the implementation of mine action programs. This is true especially in 
contexts where a solid mine action architecture is in place, delineating 
clear roles and responsibilities among different governmental agen-
cies and nongovernmental, international partners. In these contexts, 
mine action might serve as an inspiration for other sectors regarding 
the delivery of public services. 
Mine action was and is in motion. It has evolved significantly over 
the past three decades and will continue to do so as new challenges 
emerge. Finding the right balance, timing, and sequencing between 
the necessary humanitarian support to provide in immediate, post-
conflict situations and the longer-term imperative to help strengthen 
national and local institutions will be paramount. As Desmond Tutu 
said “we need to stop just pulling people out of the river, we need to go 
upstream and find out why they are falling in.” In so doing, the sector 
will continue to work towards making itself redundant. As it should. 
See endnotes page 146
The current COVID-19 global pandemic represents both a challenge and an opportunity to increase our efforts toward stronger national ownership and the localization of responses.Mine action should, indeed, be “as local as possible and as international as necessary,” to quote UN Secretary General, António Guterres. 
Ambassador Stefano Toscano, Ph.D.
Director
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining
Ambassador Stefano Toscano has been the Director of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining (GICHD) since January 2014, bringing extensive experience in multilateral diplomacy and human secu-
rity affairs following a rich career with the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As diplomatic collaborator in Bern
(1998–2002), Ambassador Toscano was in charge of the small arms portfolio and thereby grew familiar with 
the importance and potential of the humanitarian disarmament agenda. As a Counselor at the Swiss Mission to 
the United Nations in New York (2002–2006), he was in charge of humanitarian, environmental, and migration 
affairs before serving as Vice Chairman of the 2nd Committee of the U.N. General Assembly. After returning to 
Switzerland in 2006, Mr. Toscano was Head of Section, Humanitarian Policy and Migration, at the Human Security 
Division of the Political Directorate, then Deputy Head of Division. In the-three-and-a-half years before joining the GICHD, he was the 
Deputy Chief of Mission at the Swiss Embassy in Cairo. Ambassador Toscano holds a Ph.D. in natural science from the Swiss Federal 
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By Ian Mansfield [ Mine Action Consultant ]
At the global level, the year 1997 was undoubtably the pinnacle of interest in mine action. This was the year that saw the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Jody Williams and the International Campaign to Ban Land Mines (ICBL), the tragic death of Diana, Princess of Wales, the opening 
of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC) for signature in Ottawa, the establishment of the 
United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) as the UN focal point for mine action, the formation of the 
Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), the genesis of the Mine Action Support 
Group (MASG), and the first publication of this Journal. However, these events did not just happen over-
night; there was a full decade of work and commitment leading up to these significant achievements. This 
article looks at the challenges and successes of the early days of humanitarian mine action (HMA), particu-
larly in the areas of coordination, standardization, and information sharing.
The Early Days
After the two world wars and other smaller-scale conventional wars, 
it was generally accepted that when hostilities finished, the military 
would be responsible for the clearance of landmines and explosive 
remnants of war (ERW). In guerrilla wars or irregular conflicts, the 
minefields were not marked and the landmines were not recorded, they 
were simply abandoned after the fighting ended. 
Afghanistan. However, this situation changed dramatically after 
the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan at the end of the 1980s. There 
were millions of landmines in Afghanistan and, with millions of refu-
gees in neighboring Pakistan and Iran expected to quickly return home, 
a humanitarian catastrophe was looming. In October 1988, the United 
Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to 
Afghanistan (UNOCHA) launched a humanitarian appeal for funding 
to train and equip Afghan civilians to clear landmines. The response 
to the appeal was not great, with only Germany, Japan, and the United 
States pledging money. Other countries still viewed the issue as a “mil-
itary” activity and instead offered military advisers to assist. 
UNOCHA, under the leadership of Martin Barber, made the best of 
what was offered, and in 1989, seven countries provided teams of mili-
tary engineers and bomb disposal experts. The contributing countries 
The Early Years
were Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Norway, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. The initial concept was to train large 
numbers of Afghan refugees in basic mine clearance techniques at 
camps near Peshawar and Quetta, and then when they went home to 
their towns and villages, they would clear mines—an early form of the 
“village demining” concept. However, it was quickly realized that mine 
clearance needed to be undertaken on a more organized and controlled 
basis, and that other activities like survey and risk education also 
needed to be undertaken. UNOCHA looked for civilian implement-
ing partners but there were none, so the United Nations oversaw the 
creation of specialist Afghan nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) 
to undertake survey, clearance, and risk education tasks. A number of 
international organizations also were established at this time. 
Cambodia. The next HMA program to be established was in 
1992, when the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) 
peacekeeping mission oversaw elections in Cambodia. Included in 
their mission was a requirement to address the landmine problem, so 
UNTAC established a Mine Clearance and Training Unit (MCTU). 
Once the newly elected Cambodian government was formed, a Royal 
Decree1 redefined the national mine action structure, which was now 
FOA Sweden/UN Demining Workshop June 1994.
Image courtesy of the author.
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led by an inter-ministerial governing council. 
This body was chaired at a senior level by the 
then Minister for Information, Ieng Mouly. 
The coordination level body was called the 
Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC), and 
while it was civilian in nature, the initial stages 
of its setup relied on foreign military advisers 
from Canada, as well as Australia, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, and New Zealand, along with 
some civilian advisers from Handicap International (now Humanity 
and Inclusion) and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA). Soon after it was 
formed, and after some interim arrangements including Pan Sothy act-
ing as the director for a time, the Cambodian government appointed 
the mercurial Sam Sotha as the Director-General of CMAC, who in 
effect became the first formally-appointed national mine action direc-
tor in the world, and who oversaw the establishment of a completely 
nationally-owned mine action program. 
It is interesting to note that the name CMAC was the first formal 
use of the term “mine action.” The term was not precisely defined but 
was used to project a positive approach to dealing with landmines and 
reflect that the sector was now involved in more activities than just 
mine clearance. The other UN programs to begin in the early-1990s 
were in Angola and Mozambique. In both these cases, the mine action 
programs started as part of the peacekeeping missions: the United 
Nations Verification Mission to Angola (UNAVEM) and the United 
Nations Operations in Mozambique (ONUMOZ). Due to the man-
dates of both peacekeeping missions, it took some years before nation-
ally-owned programs could evolve.
Kuwait. Another significant mine clearance activity also took place 
around the same time. At the end of the First Gulf War in February 
1991, Kuwait was littered with landmines and other ERW. The gov-
ernment of Kuwait had money, so they divided the country into seven 
sectors and offered commercial contracts worth about US$100 million 
per sector. Within two years the country was cleared. While this was 
not regarded as a humanitarian mine clearance program, it did offer 
up some important lessons to the emerging humanitarian programs 
overseen or supported by the United Nations. The first was that mine 
clearance was not mission impossible, and that large areas of land or 
huge quantities of ordnance could be cleared—it just took time or 
money, and Kuwait had the money. Unfortunately, the commercial 
companies involved were not allowed to share information with each 
other, and valuable information on types of ordnance, clearance tech-
niques, safety, costs, etc., was not readily available. Sadly, over eighty 
deaths were estimated to have occurred during these clearance efforts. 
Also, the Kuwait Government kept changing the clearance criteria 
and many organizations had to go over the same ground two or three 
times, until the government was satisfied that the ground was cleared. 
The experience of Kuwait highlighted the need for a precise elabora-
tion of the desired end-state, good coordination, common operating 
and safety standards, and the importance of information sharing.
The sector grows quickly. By the end of the 1990’s, the United 
Nations was assisting a growing number of countries with funding, 
technical support, training, and the provision of equipment. These 
included Bosnia and Herzegovina, Chad, Croatia, Jordan, Laos, 
Thailand, and Yemen, with many more mine-affected countries 
requesting UN support. The donor response was also growing rapidly 
and in 1999, for example, the United States provided US$79 million 
dollars to thirty-five countries for mine action.2
National Level Coordination
The first four HMA programs in Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, 
and Mozambique were all supported by the United Nations. However, 
they began independently at the country level and were overseen by 
different parts of the United Nations. As a result, different organiza-
tional and coordination models emerged, with the two most different 
being in Afghanistan and Cambodia.
 In Afghanistan, due to the absence of a recognized government 
from 1989 onwards, UNOCHA was responsible for policy decisions, 
liaison with neighboring countries and other international agencies, 
dealing with emerging Afghan authorities, resource mobilization, 
setting of priorities and standards, etc., effectively playing the role of 
what today we term the national authority. A separate office within 
UNOCHA oversaw the day-to-day tasking and operations of the 
implementing partners, undertaking quality management functions, 
collecting and storing data—the functions of a mine action center. 
The specialist Afghan and international NGOs were the operators, 
and they implemented tasks like risk education, survey, battle area 
clearance, and mine clearance. The first national level strategic plan 
for the Mine Clearance Programme – Afghanistan was issued in 1992, 
and this drew together all components of the program and listed the 
common goals and objectives to be achieved in that year.
In contrast, CMAC initially performed all functions and was estab-
lished to be the government policy-advising agency and the operational 
coordinator. However, CMAC also had its own mine clearance teams, 
which they funded, tasked, and managed. Coordination by CMAC 
was reasonably effective in the early years, but as time went by, CMAC 
became focused on their own operations and funding needs. Because 
international NGOs like Mines Advisory Group (MAG), The HALO 
Trust (HALO), and NPA were also operating in-country, leading to 
competition for funding, confusion about roles, and some duplication 
of effort, a separate national authority and regulatory agency was later 
created to resolve the inherent conflict of interest at CMAC.
By the mid-1990s, as a lead actor, the United Nations saw that these 
different national coordination models had emerged with varying 
degrees of success. In response, the then Department of Humanitarian 
Affairs (DHA) commissioned an ambitious four-country study in 
1996. The study team was led by Bob Eaton, and the team undertook 
visits to Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, and Mozambique to look at 
Sam Sotha. 
Image courtesy of 
Phnom Penh Post.
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The first national mine action plan for 
Afghanistan, 1992.
Image courtesy of the author.
how the programs were organized and what coordination measures 
were used. The results of the study were published in four country 
booklets and one summary edition. The study noted the shift within 
the international community from viewing mine action primarily as 
a military problem to that of a humanitarian and development situa-
tion, with an emphasis on developing a strong national capacity. On 
coordination arrangements, the study found that “the Afghan institu-
tional architecture, involving a strong central coordination and over-
sight mechanism, and autonomous but affiliated mine action NGOs, 
helps secure the viability, sustainability and accountability of the pro-
gram, while maximizing flexibility, plurality of methodologies, and a 
keen sense of competitiveness and productivity.”4
Unfortunately, the study was issued just as DHA was transferring 
its responsibility for mine action to the newly formed UNMAS and 
the study did not receive the recognition it deserved. However, the 
key findings from the study have become the accepted way that most 
national mine action programs are now organized: a central national 
authority deals with policy and regulatory issues, a mine action cen-
ter is responsible for the day-to-day coordination of activities, and 
a range of mine action operators are responsible for undertaking a 
range of tasks.
Global Level Coordination
Whereas it took some years for an agreed model for national level 
coordination to evolve, global coordination is still a work in progress. 
Because of its involvement in setting up the early mine action programs, 
along with its global reach, the United Nations has played a key role in 
improving global coordination. In 1993, the United Nations General 
Assembly included in the agenda of its 48th session, for the first time, 
a separate item on “Assistance in mine clearance.” Following an exten-
sive discussion, the General Assembly asked the Secretary-General to 
prepare a compressive report on the problems caused by landmines and 
on the measures needed to strengthen UN efforts relating to mine clear-
ance. The Secretary-General’s report was presented to the 49th session 
of the General Assembly in 1994 and outlined the situation with regards 
to landmine contamination around the world and the measures needed 
to address the problem.5 The resolution also welcomed the establish-
ment of a United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund (UN VTF) for mine 
clearance and requested the Secretary-General to consider “convening 
an international meeting on mine clearance, to include a meeting of 
experts and a meeting of potential donors, in order to promote the work 
of the UN and international cooperation in this field.”6 
An international meeting was subsequently held in Geneva from 
5–7 July, 1995. The meeting was attended by many member States, 
international organizations, national authorities, and NGOs, and was 
opened by Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. For the first 
time, the international community could see the human face of the 
landmine tragedy through twelve-year-old amputee, Ms. Song Kosal, 
a Cambodian landmine survivor who spoke quietly but powerfully at 
the opening session. The meeting had a wide-ranging agenda includ-
ing general statements and the announcement of contributions to the 
UN VTF, along with expert panels that discussed technical aspects of 
mine clearance.
At the operational or field level, different UN headquarters and agen-
cies had varying degrees of responsibilities and commitment to mine 
action. In 1997, UNMAS was formed, located within the Department 
of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). As the focal point within the UN 
system for all mine action matters, UNMAS has coordinated the work 
of the fourteen involved UN funds, programs, and agencies. The first 
UN policy document was issued in 1998,7 which clearly set out the roles 
and responsibilities of all UN actors. An Inter-Agency Coordination 
Group – Mine Action (IACG-MA) was established at the principals 
level and various other working-level committees were formed. The 
United Nations has also played a role in organizing international meet-
ings, such as the annual meeting of National Mine Action Directors 
and UN Advisers (NDM-UN) that have served both as an information 
sharing platform as well as enhancing global coordination.
Although not a coordination mechanism per se, the mine action 
community has benefited from the focus provided by the International 
Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). The civil society Campaign had 
its origins in October 1992 when six international NGOs formalized 
their anti-landmine efforts. The ICBL’s work has helped draw atten-
tion to the global landmine issue by identifying priority countries, 
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providing factual data about the land-
mine crisis, and drawing donor sup-
port to the issue. One of the first major 
activities of the Campaign was the 
preparation by the Vietnam Veterans 
of America Foundation (VVAF) of a 
major study published in 1995 called 
After the Guns Fall Silent; The Enduring 
Legacy of Landmines by Jody Williams 
and Shawn Roberts.8 This ambitious 
project attempted to quantify land-
mine contamination in what was then 
being recognized as a growing prob-
lem. Even at this stage, the report was 
able to document landmine or ERW 
accidents in sixty-four countries. 
While it was difficult to draw a lot of 
conclusions from the report because 
all the data was collected differently, it 
was the inspiration for the Landmine 
Monitor report. Today, the Landmine 
and Cluster Munition Monitor is the 
accepted source of all landmine and 
ERW factual data. Of course, with the 
entry into force of the APMBC in 1999, 
the annual meetings of States Parties are now one of the most effective 
mechanisms for enhanced global coordination in the sector. 
The mine action sector has been 
heavily dependent on support from 
aid donors. Over the years, significant 
amounts of donor money have been pro-
vided to national authorities, UN agen-
cies, and NGOs. Donor coordination 
has been difficult, because all donors 
have their own set of priorities, based on 
historical links, geographical consider-
ations, and domestic politics, all over-
laid onto humanitarian or development 
needs. However, all donors agree that 
mine action covers the nexus of peace-
building, humanitarian assistance, and 
development. In the late 1990s, donors 
again saw the need to promote a coor-
dinated response to mine action. As an 
initiative of Norway, the Mine Action 
Support Group (MASG) was formed in 
New York in 1998. MASG “endeavors 
to coordinate the humanitarian mine 
action programs of the world’s major 
donor states, harmonize the prioritiza-
tion of their respective mine action pro-
grams, and increase donor support for 
mine action where it is most needed.”9 The MASG now meets twice 
per year, once in Geneva and once in New York.10
Standardization
This call was heeded in July 1996 when the United Nations, with 
support from the government of Denmark, arranged a meeting on the 
outskirts of Copenhagen to develop a set of international standards 
for mine action. After five days of discussion, a draft framework set of 
standard topics titled the “International Standards for Humanitarian 
Mine Clearance Operations” were developed. A smaller group of 
experts met in December 1996 in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, to finalize 
the standards. Subsequently, a first edition of the standards was pub-
lished by UNMAS in March 1997. These standards were later further 
developed by UNMAS and the GICHD to include other components 
of mine action and were renamed to become the International Mine 
Action Standards (IMAS), with the first edition produced in October 
2001.11 Credit is due to Bill van Ree for the foresight to adopt an 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO) approach for the 
standards, and subsequently to Noel Mulliner and Alastair McAslan 
who managed the detailed drafting and preparation of the IMAS. 
The first global UN mine action meeting, 
held in Geneva from 5-7 July, 1995.
Image courtesy of the author.
As mentioned previously, the initial mine clearance programs 
evolved in isolation and originally received technical advice from for-
eign military advisers. As these programs were operating in isolation, 
the various military contingents adapted their own military training, 
procedures, techniques, and often equipment to meet the new require-
ment of humanitarian demining. This led to the adoption of differ-
ent standards of work in each country. In addition, there were many 
animated discussions at the growing number of international meet-
ings about the various techniques for manual demining, the utility of 
machines, along with heated debates about the use of dogs for mine 
detection. As a result and because they were unfamiliar with mine 
action, many donors said that they were receiving conflicting advice 
from partners seeking funding and often asked, “what is the way for-
ward?” Donors encouraged the United Nations and others to devise an 
agreed set of standards for mine action operations. 
Information Sharing
International or national staff working in the four original country 
programs did not have the opportunity to meet with each other, to share 
information, or to travel and visit other programs. Each program devel-
oped its own structure, procedures, and techniques quite independently. 
The only cross pollination came from visits by people like Alister Craib 
or Phil Bean, who were engaged by donors to undertake evaluations of 
the various projects they were funding around the world. These visits 
were a great opportunity to hear what was happening in other countries, 
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share information, and to consider the applicability of new ideas. In 
response to the growing call for programs to meet and interact, the first 
international meeting for HMA programs was held in Vienna, Austria, 
in May 1993 and was organized by the Scheibel mine detector company. 
Representatives from the four UN programs attended (Afghanistan, 
Angola, Cambodia, and Mozambique), along with some commercial 
companies that had been involved in Kuwait. The meeting provided the 
first real opportunity for national and international staff from the various 
programs to discuss issues of common concern.
 In June 1994, the Swedish National Defence Research Institute 
(FOA) organized a meeting in Stockholm, where attendees included a 
diverse range of people, including those who designed and made land-
mines, sellers of military equipment, UN officials, military officers, 
national representatives from mine-affected countries, and campaign-
ers against landmines. Needless to say, there were many active and 
heated discussions among this group. One simple exchange highlighted 
the changing nature of mine action. During his presentation, an NGO 
deminer showed a photo of a landmine. An earnest young military offi-
cer jumped and said, “you cannot show that, it is classified informa-
tion,” to which the NGO deminer said “I dug this landmine up last week 
with my own bare hands, and I will show it to whomever I like.” After 
the Stockholm meeting, numerous international meetings were held; 
however, they divided naturally into two categories: those held to pro-
mote the ban on landmines and others designed to allow field programs 
to share their experiences with other countries and operators. 
In the pre-internet age, written publications were an important 
method of disseminating information. Many publications have come 
and gone, but some have endured. The UN launched a publication 
called The Landmine in 1997. This booklet was published quarterly and 
National coordination meeting, Jalalabad, 
Afghanistan, 1994. From left: Dave Edwards (technical 
advisor), Bill van Ree (technical advisor), Ian Mansfield 
(program manager), Ian Bullpitt (technical advisor).
Image courtesy of the author.
detailed the work of UN agencies in mine action, although the publica-
tion only lasted a few years. Since 1999, the United States has published 
To Walk the Earth in Safety, which outlines the conventional weapons 
destruction work funded by the United States. In 1997, the Mine Action 
Information Center (now the Center for International Stabilization 
and Recovery) first published the Journal of Humanitarian Demining. 
In 2016, the publication name changed to The Journal of Conventional 
Weapons Destruction, funded by the U.S. Department of State, to 
expand its scope to include the destruction of small arms and light 
weapons.
Looking Forward?
The evolution and success of mine action has been rapid and dra-
matic, not just because of the dire consequences of getting it wrong, 
but because at all stages the individuals and organizations that guided 
the sector did the best that they could at the time within the limitations 
of available technology and resources. Lessons learned with the ben-
efit of hindsight, the application of emerging technology, and particu-
larly the wider use of management information and communication 
systems, point to ways where improvements have and can continue to 
be made across the spectrum of the mine action pillars. Recalling the 
Ian Mansfield
Mine Action Consultant 
Ian Mansfield works as a mine action consultant and has been the secretariat of the Mine Action Support Group 
since 2011. Previously he was the Deputy Director of the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining and the team leader of the United Nations Development Programme Mine Action Team in New York. 
Earlier, he was the UN mine action program manager in Afghanistan, Laos, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. In 2017, 
he published a memoir, Stepping into a Minefield.
history and the lessons (sometimes painfully learned) should not be 
forgotten. Active researchers would do well to review the last twenty-
five-years’ worth of Journal articles, as they illustrate the evolution of 
mine action, the topics of concern in their day, and the successes in 
terms of best practice that could be shared. Moving forward, seeking 
improvements to efficiency and safety in challenging environments is 
not a choice; it must happen in concert with ongoing humanitarian, 
development, and peace-building needs if we are ever to succeed and 
rid the world of the impact of mines and many other ERW. 
See endnotes page 146
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By David Hewitson and Guy Marot [ Fenix Insight Ltd. ]
The Falkland Islands Mine Clearance Programme (FI MCP) ran from 2009 to 2020, through five operational phases, some lasting only a few months, some extending across several years. A core objective was to release land as efficiently as possible, only applying technical assets to 
those specific areas of land that justified such attention. This article describes the approach that was 
adopted to determine whether all reasonable effort (ARE) had been applied to each task in such a way 
that current (and future) stakeholders would have confid nce in that decision so as to manage the fear 
of mines being missed.
Two organizations were contracted by the UK government to 
deliver the FI MCP: the land release contractor (LRC), most recently 
SafeLane Global; and the demining program office (DPO) provided 
by Fenix Insight Ltd.1 Additionally, a strategic adviser (Alistair 
Craib) provided advice, oversight, and contracting input. Around 
20,000 anti-personnel (AP) and 5,000 anti-vehicle (AV) mines were 
declared as laid at the time of the 1982 conf lict. In addition to explo-
sive remnants of war (ERW) resulting from ground fighting, naval 
Encouraging Efficient, Confident, and 
Timely Evidence-Based Land Release 
Decision Making 
bombardment, and the abandonment of ammunition, a submuni-
tion threat was also present. Some military clearance took place in 
the immediate aftermath of the conf lict but was stopped following a 
number of accidents to clearance personnel. From 2009 to the dec-
laration of completion at the end of 2020, the FI MCP released over 
23 million m2 from 127 hazardous areas, clearing over 11,000 land-
mines within 2.3 million m2 of cleared ground.
Contractual and Stakeholder Expectations
When the program started in 2009, there was both a contractual 
requirement to exceed the International Mine Action Standards 
(IMAS) and a high level of uncertainty among local stakeholders who 
feared that mines would be missed, deminers would die, and the envi-
ronment would be unacceptably damaged by clearance operations. 
All three fears expressed by locals were addressed during the first 
phase of operations through a combination of thorough processes and 
procedures, a high level of transparency, engagement of local environ-
mental stakeholders, and a program of public visits to working sites to 
demonstrate the quality and reliability of the work.
Every clearance program faces an identical fear: that mines might be 
missed. How this is addressed has huge implications for the cost, dura-
tion, and efficiency of program operations. The project efficiency risk is 
that the risk of missing mines will be addressed through the clearance of 
areas that don’t need it just in case. Such an approach imposes avoidable 
costs (often at significant levels) as well as delays, combined with stake-
holder dissatisfaction, impatience, and implications for international 
treaty compliance. Professional, reputational, and contractual fears 
about missing mines are further compounded when there is additional 
uncertainty about legal liability. The FI MCP was contracted under 
English Law in a context in which criminal and civil liability, includ-
ing corporate manslaughter cases, are established and often publicized.
The stated objective of the program was to release designated land 
by “applying all reasonable effort to … remove all suspicion of mines/
ERW … and to reduce the remaining risk from explosive hazards to as 
low as reasonably practicable (ALARP).”2 
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ALARP and ARE are distinct but closely-related terms. They sit 
either side of the decision to release point in the land release process: 
the application of ARE to an area confirmed or suspected of contain-
ing explosive ordnance (EO) hazards should result in a residual risk 
that is ALARP. There are no recognized, defined criteria for what con-
stitutes either ARE or ALARP, although guidance exists in a number 
of areas, including in IMAS and in UK Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE) publications.3 
The approach adopted in the Falkland Islands was based on a num-
ber of basic principles:
• The word reasonable in both ARE and ALARP indicates an 
expectation of logical, transparent reasoning based upon reli-
able evidence to support decision-making.
• The effort encapsulated in ARE is not just the physical effort of 
clearing land but includes enabling effort in training people, 
selecting and using appropriate equipment, establish-
ing and implementing effective quality and information 
management systems, and using evidence to support 
decisions (Figure 1).
• The decision to declare that ARE has been applied and 
that no further activity is required before releasing the 
site only has value if other stakeholders agree.
The challenge, implicit within the concept of ARE, is to rec-
ognize that ARE has been applied at the earliest point in a land 
release task without undershooting the decision (i.e., releasing 
land before it is completely clear of EO hazards). The inevita-
ble natural inclination is to overshoot—processing more land 
than is absolutely necessary, just to be on the safe side. In most 
Figure 1. Conceptual illustration of the enabling and task level 
approach to all reasonable effort (ARE). 
Developed by David Hewitson for the GICHD.
real-world cases there is at least some uncertainty. That means that 
some overshoot will be unavoidable if all stakeholders are to agree with 
the decision. There were some sites in the Falkland Islands where large 
numbers of mines were present, regularly laid out, undisturbed, and 
fully recorded, taking the ARE decision as close to the theoretical ear-
liest point as is realistically possible (with fewer than 10 m2 cleared per 
mine found). Alternatively, there were others sites where there was no 
record, substantial changes had occurred since the conflict, and only 
one or two mines remained in large areas, making it much harder to 
assess ARE (resulting in over 15,000 m2 per mine).
The Falkland Islands were physically and 
logistically challenging for clearance operations.
All graphics courtesy of the authors.
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 General Approach and Background
A lack of stakeholder confidence in released land often arises from 
uncertainty about why key land-release decisions were taken. Task doc-
umentation frequently consists of a disparate collection of paperwork 
that can be hard for an individual reader, especially one not familiar 
with the task, to understand holistically. Even an expert will often have 
significant questions when reviewing such documents about what hap-
pened and why. While everything may have made complete sense to 
managers on the ground at the time of the work, if the task documen-
tation does not provide clear and accessible explanations, then later 
readers are left feeling unsure about what went on and why, and IMAS 
07.14 defines risk as “the effect of uncertainty on objectives.”4 A future 
developer looking to use the land for a public project may determine 
that further technical activity is necessary just in case. Any such action 
diminishes, and in some cases wholly destroys the worth of the origi-
nal work, with all its costs, use of resources, and physical risk.
In 2010, co-author David Hewitson worked with Bob Eaton of the 
Survey Action Centre to develop a process-driven approach to land 
release for the Tajikistan Mine Action Centre. The project included 
development of a core document that would tell the story of the site. 
The document aimed to explain:
• what EO to expect at the site (and why);
• how these expectations were reflected in the operational plan;
• what was actually found during operations; and
• what decisions were taken during operations in light of what was 
actually found.
Readers of the completed document should understand the task 
process from start to finish as a connected narrative that makes sense 
and leaves them confident in the decision to release the land as safe for 
use. Other associated documents, such as daily narrative logs, detailed 
mapping, quality management records, and certificates should also be 
available for reference where necessary. However, the site implementa-
tion plan (SIP) would be the heart of the documented explanation of 
what happened. The process (Figure 2) and associated documentation 
developed during that work was adopted in the FI MCP.
Stage 1: Tasking
In accordance with broader contractual requirements, a task order 
specifies the hazardous area to be processed but does not specify land 
release methods or any other technical details.
Stage 2: Information Collection
A fundamental part of the ARE process is identifying, access-
ing, and making use of all available information—not just informa-
tion about the intended task site but also about the wider context of 
operations and contamination, including evidence from previously 
completed tasks. In the FI MCP, information was available from a 
number of sources:
• original Argentine records in Spanish created by the minelay-
ing organizations and available for many (but not all) sites, 
including sketch maps, number and types of mines, among 
other details 
• translated UK military records in English; essentially the same 
as the original records (although with occasional transcription 
errors), including additional, limited details from 1982 at those 
sites where UK military clearance took place, and informa-
tion about clearance (usually of individual visible mines) that 
occurred over subsequent years
• information in published historical accounts
• information from interviews with veterans
• interviews with local people who were present before, during, 
and after the conflict
Further information became available as the clearance program 
progressed:
• comparison of what was actually found on the ground during 
previous clearance operations versus information in mine-
field records, allowing a general assessment of the reliability 
of records as well as results of detailed analysis (such as error 
brackets for distances and bearings recorded on maps)
• other lessons learned during operations
• real-world operational key performance indicators (KPIs)
Significant effort to identify and access potentially relevant infor-
mation was applied by the LRC throughout the program, recog-
nizing the importance of doing so to drive confident and credible 
decision-making.
Stage 3: Analysis and Planning 
In addition to analysis of the expected threat type, detectability, and 
distribution, planning included geometric analysis of the expected 
arrangement of mines: in rows and panels, orientation, and separa-
tion. A key concept was that of the minimum survey target (MST): 
the smallest associated packet of mines defined in terms of numbers of 
mines, numbers of rows, separation of rows, and separation of panels. 
In some cases, planners might have confidence that they were looking 
for a combination of multiple rows of mines in several panels. In oth-
ers there might be no record but evidence that, if mines were present, 
they would be in at least a certain quantity and arrangement (based on 
evidence that mines had never been laid in less than a given arrange-
ment). On other occasions, particularly in areas that had been subject 
to partial historical clearance, the MST might be a single mine.
The analysis of the MST drove decisions about the width and sepa-
ration of targeted technical survey (TS) lanes as well as those cases 
(where the MST was one or a very small number of mines) when tar-
geted block clearance would be employed. Geometric analysis of the 
MST was applied to ensure confidence that any targeted TS could not 
go through a contaminated area without encountering at least one 
piece of evidence of mines present, nor could adjacent lanes go either 
side of a contaminated area (bracketing). In many areas the third 
dimension of depth was also important, reflecting the effects of peat or 
sand accumulation on top of the original mine contamination layer.5 
Further analysis was conducted to identify the most appropriate 
areas to target during TS. Where present, records often used paces or 
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Figure 2. The overall SIP process.
The deep peat of the Falkland 
Islands made working conditions 
difficult.
double paces as units of distance, bearings were taken using handheld 
compasses, and reference points had often disappeared or were hard to 
identify. Part of the ARE approach included analysis effort using reverse 
engineering on completion of site operations to compare the locations 
of actual finds, with distances and directions, against details in records. 
This allowed pool of error assessments during planning for subsequent 
tasks of where mines might be (if they were still in undisturbed rows) 
or had originally been (if identifying areas requiring block clearance). 
Moreover, the closing the loop effort was an important part of the overall 
approach to demonstrating the reasoning aspect of ARE decisions.
The resulting plan provided program managers, as well as those who 
would sign clearance certificates, with confidence that if no evidence of 
mines was found in an area, then it could reasonably be concluded that 
no mines were present. In doing so, the analysis laid the foundation 
for the decision-making that would take place during the operational 
phase to identify when ARE had been applied and when it was justified 
to stop operations and declare the area safe for release.
Stage 4: Initial Review
The draft plan, prepared by the LRC, was reviewed by the DPO. Any 
comments or questions were resolved before sign-off by both parties. 
The process was both transparent and represented clear liability risk 
sharing throughout.
Stage 5: Implementation
Implementation followed the agreed plan but with a constant 
review process considering the implications of new information, 
whether it was the discovery of mines where predicted or the absence 
of mines where expected. New information could reinforce confidence 
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Figure 3. Example of key decisions in the field review and change log (Site SA 077). Note inclusion of environmental remediation in 
the effort applied at the task site.
Figure 4. Logging of a technical response to newly discovered information (SA 059).
in the planning assumptions or call them into question. Whenever 
the unfolding situation allowed refinement of the plan, or where it 
demanded a rethink, such considerations were documented in the 
Field Review and Change Log section of the SIP (Figures 3 and 4). 
In each case the LRC would discuss their thinking with the DPO, 
and (once accepted) the decision log in the SIP would be signed by 
both parties. The relationship was one of cooperative independence. 
The DPO was prepared to ask for and review any evidence, and to 
question the reasoning behind decisions to ensure that whatever was 
captured in the record would make sense to future readers without 
prior knowledge of the task.
Through the logs, key decisions were captured about when it was 
appropriate to declare the site mine free, allowing a switch to battle 
area clearance (BAC) methods, as well as the point at which ARE had 
been applied in full. In every case, the countersignature by the DPO 
helped both the general credibility of the decisions and ensured that 
any perception of liability risk was shared between the DPO and the 
LRC, reducing the risk of conducting extended clearance just in case, 
while encouraging early and efficient completion of operations. 
The LRC’s high-quality survey and mapping was a key component 
of the decision-making process, allowing LRC managers and DPO 
reviewers to see the evidence on site in a clear geographical context. 
Review and comparison of what was found against information in 
records, as well as evidence gained at previous sites, helped identify 
areas where missing mine drills (MMDs) were required. The SIP pro-
vided a collaborative approach to looking at what had been found, 
where definite or potential gaps might be present, why those gaps exist, 
and what the extent of any additional clearance would be to show that 
ARE had been applied. 
Stage 6: Final Review
At the end of every task a post-completion analysis and management 
review were carried out and captured in the SIP. Their purpose was to 
close the loop between the experience gained on the specific task and 
the wider body of accumulated evidence-based knowledge that would 
feed into planning of future tasks. 
The analysis and review addressed:
• results of quality assurance and quality control inspections
• results of any nonconformities, accidents, or complaints
• how reliably planning information related to what was actually 
found
• efficiency of switching between TS, mine clearance, and BAC 
activities
• identification of any new information that might call into ques-
tion wider planning assumptions
• recommendations for improvement, including follow-up actions
• KPI results
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Heavy machinery was required to work in extreme weather.
Figure 5. Extract from SIP for site SA 053, including standardized KPIs.
Observations, conclusions, actions required
• Results of quality-assurance and quality-control inspections.  
There were no QA observations. Post clearance quality control sampling 
revealed no non-conformities.
• Land release process performance (key performance indicators/rations).
• Average demining rate 11.12 m2/deminer/day (6hr)
• Average efficiency 9.492/mine
• Average deminer day/mine 0.85 deminer days/mine
• BAC rate 656.21 m2/deminer/day
• Quality non-conformances, complaints, accidents. Nil
• Recommendations for improvement. Nil
• Follow-up actions arising from the review. Nil
Conclusions
the umbrella of ARE. The performance indicators captured at the end 
of every task provided a solid basis for the planning of both individual 
sites and projections for overall program progress.
Most importantly, the completed SIP provides a transparent, com-
prehensive record of the decisions taken and evidence associated, 
all the way through the task life cycle: from initial planning, to in-
progress operational decision-making, to the final decision to declare 
Some suggest that the FI MCP was easy because of the availability of 
records for which many other programs don’t have comparable, avail-
able information sources. Although certainly true that records are help-
ful, for many sites in the Falkland Islands they were either unavailable 
or of limited use. Additionally, partial clearance immediately after the 
conflict left a situation of utter uncertainty. Even where records are reli-
able, there is still a responsibility on mine action operators to make best 
use of those records to drive efficiency, achieve safe 
release of land at the earliest possible opportunity, 
reduce the demands on public money, and make 
resources available for other work.
Throughout the FI MCP, both the LRC and DPO 
placed constant, rigorous emphasis on the collec-
tion and use of information to drive decision-mak-
ing about when ARE had been applied in such a 
way that other stakeholders would understand and 
accept those decisions. The SIP helped program 
planners and monitors to focus on the task at hand. 
It helped them to think about what they were doing 
and why, and encouraged them to consider all rel-
evant factors (enabling and on-site) that fell under 
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Penguins are not heavy enough to detonate 
landmines and roamed freely among the 
minefields.
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that ARE had been applied and the land was safe to release, to (equally 
importantly) the feedback loop to support improved ARE decision-
making at later sites. 
At every stage, and in every respect, the common thread in the way 
that FI MCP program managers approached their task was through 
relentless, comprehensive, and careful collection and use of opera-
tional contextual and performance data, constantly reducing uncer-
tainty, and by extension risk, in every aspect of the program—from 
technical procedures to prioritization and planning at both task and 
strategic levels. The methods used, in particular the SIP, were founded 
on original work carried out in Tajikistan and refined for the needs of 
the FI MCP, but are applicable to any mine action program. 
One experienced and knowledgeable mine action practitioner who 
visited the Falkland Islands’ program said that, before they arrived, 
they thought that the FI MCP’s approach to documenting land release 
planning and decision-making would prove excessive. By the time they 
left they were firmly of the opinion that the SIP approach should actu-
ally be the minimum applied in any mine action program. 
See endnotes page 146
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Falkland Islands
By Colin King [ Fenix Insight Ltd. ]
Background
Throughout the eleven-year mine clearance program in the Falkland 
Islands, the exploitation (disassembly, detailed analysis, and testing) of 
live mines was a regular feature. In addition to assessing the condi-
tion of the mines in order to optimize the safety and efficiency of the 
clearance process, there was intense interest in the subject of long-term 
residual risk. 
The rigorous demining program was highly successful, and the 
Falkland Islands have now been declared clear. However, a mine 
recently washed up on the shore near the Capital, Stanley, and it’s pos-
sible that others will do so over the next few years. It is also clear that 
findings from exploitation work in the Falkland Islands can make a 
significant contribution to the understanding of residual risk in other 
mine-affected regions.
During the final phases of the program, the discovery of Israeli 
No. 4 anti-personnel (AP) mines triggered a request from SafeLane 
Global, the land release contractor (LRC) and Demining Programme 
Office (DPO) for a technical assessment of their condition. Initially, 
this took the form of a remote desktop study based on images of 
recovered mines, which were compared to inert examples and techni-
cal data held by Fenix Insight Ltd. The aim was to consider the likely 
effects of ageing and their implications for the handling and disposal 
of the mines.
Soon after, the LRC also began to encounter Argentinian M1 and 
Israeli No. 6 anti-tank (AT) mines, as well as Argentinian FMK-1 AP 
mines. Once again, as the clearance program entered its final phase, 
questions of residual risk, handling, and disposal were raised, and an 
exploitation visit was planned in order to assess
• the general condition of the mines
• the functionality of fuzing mechanisms
• the viability of energetic materials
• the implications of changes for risk
The work was conducted in March 2019 by Colin King, Technical 
Director of Fenix Insight Ltd, assisted by Max Grace, Fenix Operations 
Assistant, and supported by Guy Marot, who ran the DPO. 
Risk Assessment
Risk assessment is always a fundamental part of the planning pro-
cess and follows a well-established Fenix protocol. It considers the like-
lihood and potential consequence of each hazard in order to allocate a 
combined risk score, often involving multiple team members in order 
to capture technical and procedural considerations across a range of 
Logistics
scenarios. Where appropriate, controls are then applied to manage the 
risk to make it as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). 
Previous deployments have illustrated the value of this process 
when, for example, the worst-case scenario of a firing pin remaining 
lodged in a live detonator was found to have occurred in several mines.
A temporary ammunition processing building (APB) was set up at 
Yorke Bay, outside Stanley, in a shipping container with a workbench 
and vice, a generator, and lighting. A specialist tool kit was brought 
from the United Kingdom to supplement the tools and equipment 
retained from previous exploitation phases; this included jigs built 
by Fenix for the disassembly of machine-assembled mines. The only 
power tools were a large commercial band saw and a cordless drill.
Image 1. An open bunker 
area containing a variety of 
live AP and AT mines. 
All graphics courtesy of the author.
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Image 2. The APB was established in a shipping container, 
placed among the sand dunes of Yorke Bay, near the capital, 
Stanley.
Image 3. A simple work station was set up, with specialist tools 
and disassembly jigs brought from the United Kingdom. 
Mines, recovered by the LRC during clearance operations were 
retained in open sandbag bunkers within the minefield fences and 
therefore well away from public access. Their continued exposure to 
the weather meant that mines were not subjected to artificially dry 
Methodology
The workflow followed a standard Fenix process map for exploita-
tion activity. For each mine type, this involved full disassembly and 
examination of critical components. In order to assess the capability 
of a mine to operate as designed, the three main areas of interest were:
•  the integrity of the casing
• the functionality of the fuzing mechanism 
• the viability of the explosive compositions
It is well established that secondary high explosives such as TNT 
remain capable of detonation for many years; this is illustrated by the 
continuing viability of ammunition from World War I after more than 
a century. Since the main charge is almost always found intact, the 
key element in the explosive train is the detonator. No matter what 
Findings
Throughout the studies on the ageing of mines, the ingress of water 
has been established as the greatest single influence on the degradation 
of internal components. This in turn means that the integrity of the 
casing (its ability to remain waterproof) is important. The mines that 
were present in the Falkland Islands included significantly different 
designs and materials. Some of the plastic casings proved extremely 
robust, yet others had degraded badly. Some steel casings had thick 
external rust but still retained their integrity beneath, while a well-
sealed fuze body effectively acts as a separate casing within a casing. 
The vulnerability of internal components also varies substantially. 
Some fuzing mechanisms incorporate virtually impervious plastics 
and stainless steels, while others contain components made from 
rust-prone iron and mild steel. Explosive initiators also vary in design 
and vulnerability, some being seriously degraded by small amounts 
of salt water. 
Previous phases of exploitation focused mainly on the plastic-
cased mines encountered inland (SB-33, SB-81, P4B, and C3B), 
with findings suggesting that the entire population of mines in the 
Falkland Islands might be nearing the end of its operational life. 
However, the examination of four additional mine types (FMK-1, 
M1, No. 4, and No. 6) from coastal areas casts doubt on that conclu-
sion, with all of these found to pose a continuing risk during the 
final stages of clearance. Additionally, unlike those seen previously, 
the SB-33 mines examined here showed no indication that they were 
nearing the ends of their operational lives.
A constant worry in old munitions is the interaction of primary 
explosives with some metals to form highly sensitive compounds. 
Fortunately, most mines of the types that were present in the Falkland 
Islands use aluminum or plastic detonator capsules, and there is no 
evidence that this is a problem.
conditions that might have altered their state. The M1, No. 6, and No. 
4 mines had been dug up in sand and processed through the sifting 
system; they had therefore been subjected to significant disturbance, 
possibly including substantial pressure and vibration.
the condition of the body, the fuze mechanism, or the main charge, 
a mine is incapable of functioning as designed unless the detonator 
is serviceable. The testing of detonators was therefore critical to the 
real-world evaluation of the risk posed by these mines during the final 
stages of clearance, and for the prediction of long-term residual risk 
in other regions. 
A simple rig was improvised to allow a spring-loaded striker to be 
released from behind the cover of the shipping container, while the 
test was captured on video. The initiation mechanism was improvised 
from a recovered No. 4 mine fuze, with the components restored to 
full functionality and checked before each operation. 
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Image 6. The heavily rusted casing of the Israeli No. 6 AT mine.
Image 7. A section through the No. 6 mine reveals that, much 
like the No. 4, the fuze is partially seized but the explosive train 
remains functional.
Image 8. A disassembled Italian SB-33 mine, showing most 
components in good condition. 
Image 9. Most of the M1 mines were heavily rusted.
Image 5. A section through the Israeli No. 4 mine. The 
fuze striker is partially seized, but the explosive train is still 
functional. 
Image 4. A section through the Argentinian FMK-1 shows that 
the casing, charge, and fuzing components are in excellent 
condition. 
The only consistent theme is the condition of the secondary explo-
sive where, as expected, all of the main charges and boosters remained 
functional. In general, the risk from this bulk energetic material is 
only significant if an operational initiation train is also present. It’s 
not that this secondary explosive is safe, since it clearly retains the 
potential to cause accidents if mistreated, but detonation requires a 
level of energy input well beyond those involved in everyday events, 
such as bonfires or digging.
Quite often with aged ammunition, what you see is what you get; if 
it looks badly degraded then generally it is. But nothing better illus-
trates the need for exploitation, or the potential for counter-intuitive 
findings, than the Italian SB-81 and Argentinian M1 AT mines. Most 
of the SB-81 mines looked almost factory-fresh, while the M1 mines 
were heavily rusted and sometimes barely recognizable. However, the 
SB-81 striker springs were heavily corroded, and the detonators’ stab-
receptors were non-functional, rendering the mines incapable of oper-
ating as designed. 
Meanwhile, underneath layers of rust, the M1 casings were largely 
intact, firmly encapsulating robust TNT charges. The M1 fuze has a 
heavy brass body, offering complete protection to the mechanical 
and energetic components within. Testing the detonator established 
beyond doubt that these mines were fully capable of functioning.
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Key Conclusions on Residual Risk
The variety of designs and materials means that each mine compo-
nent has its own level of vulnerability, combining to incline the entire 
mine towards resilience or susceptibility. The failure of one key com-
ponent will usually prevent the mine from functioning as designed; 
however, the simultaneous failure of two key features adds a signifi-
cant level of confidence, particularly if one failure relates to the fuzing 
mechanism, and the other is within the explosive train. This is the case 
for the SB-81 and C3B AT mines, which are the only two types that 
have washed ashore. Should this occur again, there is a high degree of 
confidence that these mines would not be operational.
The nature of the environmental influences is also important, 
accepting that the micro-climate in which mines are located may vary 
significantly, even if they are close together. For example, one mine 
may be partially buried in very wet ground, while another nearby may 
rest on the surface of well-drained soil but be exposed to sunlight.
Image 10. Detonators from the SB-33 mines appeared 
virtually as-new, and were fully functional.
Image 11. Externally, most SB-81 mines appeared to be in 
excellent condition. 
Image 12. The SB-81 striker springs had rusted away.
Image 13. The stab-receptors of the SB-81 detonators were no 
longer functional.
The presence of sand and salt water added further ageing influences 
to those present inland, with sand having abrasive effects and block-
ing mechanisms, and salt water being more corrosive. This means that 
mines in coastal areas should deteriorate faster than similar types 
located inland, but this was not always found to be the case. P4B and 
SB-81 mines were definitely in worse condition than those recovered 
inland, yet the Italian SB-33 AP mines were better, possibly reflecting 
tighter insertion of the detonator plug to seal the mines. 
Table 1 summarizes the findings and conclusions from the exploita-
tion of mines recovered in and around coastal areas in the Falkland 
Islands as the clearance program neared conclusion. The findings 
might apply to these mine types in similar environments, if they were 
to be encountered in other regions.
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Recommendations
The results of the exploitation work were briefed to the demining 
team leaders and management, and a number of recommendations 
were made. In particular, it was recommended that the LRC consider 
the potential risk of initiation during the excavation or sifting process 
with the M1 and No. 6 AT mines. They were also warned of the pos-
sibility of sensitization during these processes, which could substan-
tially lower the operating threshold, and to therefore apply appropriate 
Conclusion
Designation Technical findings Conclusion
FMK-1 Resilient casing resulting in the fuzing mechanism and 
explosive train being well preserved.
These mines could have remained functional for many 
years.
“M1” Fuzing mechanism and explosive train remain well pre-
served, despite heavily degraded external appearance.
Some mines were still fully functional.
SB-33 Mines in good condition, with fuzing mechanism and 
explosive train (particularly detonators) very well pre-
served.
These mines could have remained functional for many 
years.
No. 4 Fuzing mechanisms complete but seized. Explosive 
trains intact, with some detonators found to be func-
tional.
Incapable of operating as designed. However, the pres-
ence of complete mechanical and explosive systems 
carried the risk of unintended initiation mechanisms.
No. 6 Fuzing mechanisms complete but seized. Explosive 
trains intact, with the possibility that some detonators 
may remain functional.
Potentially capable of operation if subjected to sub-
stantial pressure or shock—could have been sensitized 
during extraction.
P4B Loss of structural integrity, allowing ingress of water. 
Fuzing mechanisms incomplete due to rusting of the 
striker spring. Detonators unlikely to function.
Two or more points of failure mean that these mines 
were unlikely to operate.
SB-81 Fuzing mechanisms incomplete due to rusting of the 
striker spring. Detonators unlikely to function.
Two points of failure mean that these mines were 
unlikely to operate. 
Table 1.
additional control measures. As a result of these findings, appropriate 
adjustments to operating procedures were implemented.
Following the end of the clearance program, it was also recom-
mended that awareness messages and education on residual risks 
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Inevitably, mine populations will continue to degrade to the point 
where all eventually become safe. However, where previous studies 
indicated that this state might be achieved relatively soon, findings 
from this recent work suggest that some mine types can remain func-
tional for many years, even in the harshest environments.
This conclusion, along with some of the surprising and counter-
intuitive technical findings, reinforces the need for exploitation work 
to provide a sound foundation for evidence-based decision-making. 
The global issue of residual risk from landmines is simply too impor-
tant to be based on assumption or myth. 
Quite often with aged ammunition, what you see is what you get; 
if it looks badly degraded then generally it is.
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By Nick Vovk [ Danish Refugee Council-Danish Demining Group ]
The protracted crisis in Ukraine raises many developmental, humanitarian, and mine action chal-lenges, and while these are interconnected, the response to them continues to be dichotomous. In part perpetuated by donor preferences and reinforced by technical specialty, humanitarian 
mine action (HMA) organizations often run parallel to the rest, leaving much of the potential for 
integration untapped. At the onset of the conflict in 2014, Danish Refugee Council-Danish Demining 
Group (DRC-DDG) returned to Ukraine and became the first international nongovernmental organiza-
tion (INGO) to initiate a response to the acute need for HMA in its eastern regions. Throughout, DRC-
DDG has been leveraging its diverse expertise in humanitarian, development, and HMA programming. 
This article presents a case study from a project funded by the European Union on DRC-DDG’s latest 
iteration of linking HMA and development.
Integration Explained. Case studies are key to building collec-
tive knowledge but are futile if not positioned within the broader 
body of work. When compared to the rich tradition of the discourse 
on development,1 HMA is indeed more novel.2 But it is the integra-
tion between and within the two that is more recent, conceptually 
dating to the start of the millennium.3 HMA has since focused on 
activities that aim to “reduce the social, economic, and environ-
mental impact” of explosive ordnance (EO).4 However, little has 
been done on classifying the linkages between HMA and develop-
ment, or providing an overview of their entire spectrum. Many have 
fallen trap to the existing ambiguity, especially since integration 
has become something of a buzzword,5 making it difficult—albeit 
not impossible—for practitioners to learn from or contribute to the 
efforts of integrated HMA and development. 
We can compare and contrast HMA-development integrations 
along the lines of dimension, level, degree, time, and type. The Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining’s (GICHD) guide-
lines make the dimensional distinction: integrated mine action and 
linking mine action and development (LMAD).6 The former is dedi-
cated solely to the integration between HMA pillars; the latter refers 
to integrating HMA with development per se. Moreover, several lev-
els of LMAD are mentioned—communal, subnational, national, and 
international—with integration ideally present at all. In his article 
in The Journal of ERW and Mine Action, “Linking Mine Action and 
Development: Local-level Benefits and Challenges,” Russell Gasser 
also proposed five possible degrees of connectivity within LMAD: 
no relationship, leader-follower, coordination, support/promote, and 
integration.7 Yet another crucial clarification is offered by Ted Paterson 
Direct EORE session to repairmen in the marked area of the 
communal borehole in Komyshuvakha, Luhansk region, Ukraine.
Image courtesy of DRC-DDG / 2020 / Sychak.
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and Eric Filippino in their article, “The Road to Mine Action and 
Development: The Life-Cycle Perspective of Mine Action,” where they 
describe that relationships between HMA and development change 
over time, gradually shifting from conflict and stabilization to recon-
struction and traditional development.8 Lastly, authors have written 
on their country-specific experiences with LMAD, linking HMA 
either more broadly within Millennium9 and Sustainable Development 
Goals10 or with particular spheres of development, with economic 
being one of the oft-quoted examples.11,12 Where does this leave DRC-
DDG’s experience in Komyshuvakha? 
Currently limited in the measurement of its actual efficacy, the 
case of Komyshuvakha primarily seeks to contribute to the collec-
tive implementational know-how of the HMA community. Following 
the previously mentioned classification, this case study is classified 
as both integrated HMA and LMAD. DRC-DDG routinely links all 
HMA-pillar activities in Ukraine. In this article, an integration of 
humanitarian demining (including non-technical survey [NTS] and 
marking) and explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) will be 
described. However, Komyshuvakha is also an example of LMAD, 
showing the link between integrated HMA on one side, as well as 
livelihoods, protection (i.e., infrastructural reconstruction), and legal 
assistance on the development side. Both took place at the community 
level during a time when the ongoing conflict in Ukraine is steadily 
transitioning toward stabilization. According to Gasser’s degrees, 
this case study would, indeed, represent an integration due to the fact 
that the development impact took precedence over the mine action 
aspect. The present case study will provide insights into DRC-DDG’s 
approach to LMAD and the lessons learned thus far—but not the 
final impact of the interventions. Given that most activities occurred 
between autumn 2020 and summer 2021 during the COVID-19 pan-
demic, DRC-DDG will only be able to unveil the measurable impact 
of the interventions pending the final project evaluation in autumn 
2021. Having positioned the case study, an introduction to its theo-
retical and operational framework follows. 
Due to the complexity of integrating several programs, tried and 
tested tools crucially support LMAD projects. DRC-DDG utilized the 
area-based development (ABD) approach, given its proven applicability 
in countries with similar backgrounds. Studies from Serbia,13 Montene-
gro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina14 illustrate the successes of the ABD 
in marginalized rural locations of post-conflict, post-socialist countries 
with development situations similar to Ukraine’s. Alternatives such as 
the International Humanitarian Demining Development (IHDD) con-
cept were deemed outdated and contextually unsuitable.15 Admittedly, 
the ABD is not without its limitations: it is most suited to emergency 
response rather than fully-fledged development; limited in promoting 
large-scale reforms, it favors decentralized governance; and financially 
constrained, it fits best to community development. The ABD thus 
targets “specific geographical areas in a country, characterized by a 
DRC-DDG’s gender-balanced demining team installing 
mine signs in Komyshuvakha, Luhansk region, Ukraine.
Image courtesy of DRC-DDG / 2020 / Ratushniak.
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particular complex development problem, through an integrated, inclu-
sive, participatory, and flexible approach.”16 Its first two steps assess the 
developmental situation as well as define the target areas.
Demining and Development in Donbas. As categorized in the 
ABD, conflict (and the consequent EO contamination) continues 
to be a major developmental and humanitarian problem for eastern 
Ukraine. Entering its seventh year, the “forgotten crisis”17 in Ukraine 
is far from being over, as the armed conflict continues in the eastern 
regions of Luhansk and Donetsk. Consequent to the conflict between 
the Government of Ukraine and the so-called de facto authorities in 
2014, massive EO contamination (from 100 to 7,000 sq km)18 is now 
assessed to exist, keeping Ukraine among the top five countries in 
the world per EO casualties in 2019.19 DRC-DDG’s internal database 
recorded 2,197 casualties (resulting from 1,206 incidents) from June 
Figure 1. LMAD project in Komyshuvakha, Ukraine, 2020–2021.
Image courtesy of DRC-DDG / 2021 / Holodniak and Shapovalov.
2014 to July 2021 in government-controlled 
areas (GCA) and non-government-controlled 
areas (NGCA).20 Major deterrents to under-
standing the full scope of the issue are the lack 
of systematic survey and inhibited access to the 
NGCA.21 The most prevalent types of encoun-
tered EO are the TM-62M, TM-62P, OZM-
72s, and MON series mines—placed by both 
conventional and nuisance mine-laying—as 
well as tripwire-initiated hand grenades and 
unexploded ordnance (UXO).22 With safety 
and access concerns preventing humanitar-
ian clearance operations in the 5-km buffer 
zone, the 427-km long contact line is especially 
EO-ridden. The costs of the conflict, however, 
worsened an already decaying economy.23
The second ABD-listed developmental prob-
lem affecting Luhansk and Donetsk regions 
is poverty. The 2021 Humanitarian Needs 
Overview in Ukraine estimated 1.5 million 
people (particularly the elderly) need assis-
tance related to poor living standards, high 
unemployment or loss of livelihoods, and food 
insecurity.24 Isolated settlements close to the 
contact line are especially affected given long 
distances to industrial centers, the lack of large 
businesses, and significant safety concerns 
related to the cultivation of land.25 Exacerbated 
by the COVID-19 pandemic and massive 
wildfires in 2020,26 economic insecurity per-
sists as the most pressing issue.27 The Luhansk 
regional development strategy (2021–2027) 
also listed an inefficient economy as one of 
seven barriers to its development, recognizing 
that it currently represents one of the poorest 
regions in Ukraine.28 Of the two mentioned 
regions, DRC-DDG preferred Luhansk due to 
the location of its HMA operational base there 
and thus the practicality for day-to-day dem-
ining operations. DRC-DDG then analyzed the intersectionality of 
both conflict- and poverty-affectedness, and identified six target areas: 
Hirske, Muratove, Novotoshkivske, Triokhizbenka, Troitske, and 
Komyshuvakha.
The Case of Komyshuvakha. Despite many unique traits, 
Komyshuvakha is typical for the conflict-affected Popasna district, 
Luhansk region, and thereby much of Donbas, Ukraine. This urban vil-
lage is home to a 3,200-strong community of various national, socio-
economic, and age groups.29 Many citizens have lived here all their 
lives, while others settled upon displacement (two percent). As the 
administrative center to six dispersed settlements—Druzhba, Nyrkove, 
Oleksandropillia, Pryvilla, Viktorivka, and Vyskryva— Komyshuvakha 
serves as a place of congregation for commerce, schooling, celebration, 
and the like. Seventeen shops, two schools and kindergartens, as well as 
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post offices, a pharmacy, a clinic, and a cemetery provide some of the 
essential services to the residents. Agricultural fields are used as the pri-
mary source of sustenance, supplemented by foraging in the surround-
ing forests. The linear pattern of the village follows the railway tracks 
and central road, connecting Komyshuvakha to the city of Popasna and 
onward to the NGCA.30 However, Komyshuvakha faces many chal-
lenges, and DRC-DDG employed the first instance of the LMAD to 
assess these comprehensively.
Integrating needs assessments between (and within) HMA and 
developmental programs has increased efficiency and inclusivity, and 
has improved the capacities of staff. Within the scope of this project, 
DRC-DDG had four specialized fact-finding teams available—NTS, 
EORE, livelihoods, and protection—whose assessments were corre-
lated. For example, protection and livelihoods asked beneficiaries care-
fully-selected, HMA-related questions and, upon learning of potential 
contamination, conveyed information to the NTS team. Similarly, NTS 
and EORE teams were able to seek and share information on livelihood 
and protection-related topics. Having four integrated teams on the 
ground expanded the outreach, especially in terms of accessing a larger 
pool of people from different socioeconomic statuses. Lastly, given that 
each team held specialized knowledge, terminology, and methodolo-
gies, short trainings and frequent coordination meetings were initiated 
for cross-training. This reinforced EO awareness among the livelihoods 
and protection teams and further mainstreamed protection principles 
among HMA teams. As per the ABD approach, DRC-DDG was able to 
holistically discern the most pressing needs in Komyshuvakha:
• Four confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) of 508,703 sq m of 
contamination were identified (see Figure 1): two designated 
as minefields and two as former battle areas. They were all 
agricultural areas bordering on two entry-exit roads with key 
Figure 2. Results chain of DRC-DDG LMAD project in Komyshuvakha, Ukraine.
Image courtesy of DRC-DDG / 2020 / Vovk.
communal and infrastructural objects (borehole, cemetery, rail-
road tracks, and forest belts).
• Agriculture and animal husbandry were found to be key entry 
points for economic reinvigoration (with most beneficiaries 
seeking either micro-business or value-chain livelihood grants 
for milking or fodder machines, mini-cultivators, barns, hay 
cutters, seeders, corn grinders, press pikers, harvesters, cattle, 
poultry, and the like).
• Fourteen renovations of social infrastructure were proposed 
by active citizen groups around three recurring themes: 
improving access to water, renovating roads, and equipping 
spaces for youth. 31
No matter how comprehensive LMAD projects are, they will inevi-
tably require concessions, compromises, and cooperation. For six 
priority communities, DRC-DDG had three demining teams (with 
NTS capacities) as well as EORE, livelihoods, and protection teams 
at its disposal; discounting middle management and support staff, 
thirty people were directly engaged. Moreover, it had approximately 
EUR 260,000 available for its livelihood and community-based initia-
tive (CBI) grants. Aware of its limitations, DRC-DDG reached out to 
a number of international organizations as well as to local, district, 
and regional authorities to find external support. For Komyshuvakha 
alone, regional authorities decided to renovate the central road. One 
of the polygons (SES-MF-0067a) was delegated to the State Emergency 
Services of Ukraine under a different DRC-DDG project. Then, DRC-
DDG designed the results chain (see Figure 2) in line with the available 
project inputs:
• Three (and later four) demining teams were deployed using a 
combination of NTS, technical survey, manual mine clearance, 
and battle area clearance.32
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• One EORE team conducted a variety of door-to-door and 
school- and community-based EORE direct sessions (including 
the distribution of informational leaflets).33 It also set up three 
custom-made community EORE informational boards.
• Two CBIs (repairing a borehole and establishing a youth center) 
were initiated, totaling nearly EUR 35,000. The village council 
in Komyshuvakha co-invested an additional EUR 2,500.
• Twenty-six micro-business and value-chain grants were also 
distributed by DRC-DDG.
A results chain also served as the basis for a diversified, contextual-
ized, longitudinal, and summative monitoring and evaluation (M&E) 
system.34 Measurable links between HMA and development have his-
torically been missing.35 Dr. Lewis Rasmussen calls for new demon-
strable impact analytics as to how HMA serves development goals36 
(and arguably vice versa), a claim that has gained increasing focus 
among the international community.37 But to anyone pursuing LMAD 
projects, this still represents a pioneering exercise. DRC-DDG devel-
oped a two-fold M&E system that measures (1) the impacts of indi-
vidual activities (e.g., EORE continues being measured with pre- and 
post-tests) and (2) links between HMA and livelihoods and protection 
(i.e., diversified). The M&E of (1) followed established standard operat-
ing procedures but also represented an important fail-safe mechanism 
for the second, innovative one. Testing new M&E approaches is peril-
ous, as all organizations remain accountable to both donors and ben-
eficiaries, neither of which can afford failure. Alternatively, the M&E 
of (2) cannot be a one-fit-for-all system, and each community ought to 
have unique, responsive results chains and corresponding M&E (i.e., 
contextualized). Moreover, anyone measuring effects on development 
must appreciate its steady pace. More equipment and access to land 
and water might be all an individual needs, but the impact on com-
munal prosperity will take a few harvests to materialize. This means 
that LMAD projects ought to allow for longitudinal M&E. Finally, a 
successful LMAD for DRC-DDG will achieve a context-specific devel-
opmental goal to which HMA as well as livelihoods and protection 
activities contribute. In Komyshuvakha, only substantiated beneficial 
changes to income, access to social infrastructure, and physical safety 
will achieve an LMAD. Said differently, the whole integration equals 
the sum of its HMA and development parts (i.e., summative). This 
brings us to the final ABD step: management and implementation.
LMAD projects will benefit from a centralized management 
arrangement and flexible implementation. Because LMAD usually 
contains several specialized programs managed by different people, 
the tendency to split responsibilities between them rarely fosters the 
required cooperation and patience for integration. It is not uncom-
mon for different managers to try and assert sometimes contradictory 
timelines and activities for fear of underachieving their specific pro-
gram targets. For DRC-DDG, it thus worked better for a coordinator 
to hold the sole responsibility over the LMAD project while receiving 
technical guidance from the operations, protection, and livelihoods 
managers. To further minimize the risks of detrimental clashes, proj-
ects should seek the most flexible activities to integrate with HMA. 
Individual financial grants are one example of flexibility, meeting 
almost any justifiable livelihood need. CBIs are another instance given 
that the community can identify and prioritize any and all pressing 
social necessities. While DRC-DDG worked across Komyshuvakha 
(and its adjacent settlements), one example stands out. 
From Mines to Milk. The intersection of the needs for liveli-
hoods support, access to water, legal assistance, and clearance of EO 
DRC-DDG EORE officer inspecting a borehole 
between hazardous areas in Komyshuvakha, 
Luhansk region, Ukraine.
Image courtesy of DRC-DDG / 2019 / Velshyna.
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contamination exemplifies that multifaceted crises call for multi-
faceted solutions. As mentioned earlier, the priority entry point for 
improving the economic wellbeing of the people in Komyshuvakha 
were agriculture and animal husbandry. Yet, the farmers and other 
residents faced major issues with access to water: they only had it avail-
able for fifteen minutes, four times a day. In such circumstances, finan-
cial co-investments alone would not have sufficed for the revitalization 
of livelihoods, as both animals and field crops require reliable access to 
water to flourish. The lack of water was a consequence of a key commu-
nal borehole (supplying drinking water to some 600 households) being 
broken, having reduced hydraulic discharge due to silting, and its loca-
tion situated between two EO-contaminated fields. In fear of the lat-
ter, the community was unable to carry out the necessary repairs. To 
make matters worse, the ownership of the land around the borehole 
was further complicated by the conflict. The land originally belonged 
to a private railway company that became separated from the GCA 
once the contact line with the NGCA was established. For years, this 
impasse seemed insurmountable. Amidst the COVID-19 pandemic in 
2020, DRC-DDG took on the challenge.
LMAD projects do not exclude the concurrent integration of 
HMA pillars; in fact, they additionally benefit from them. Before any 
work on the borehole could start, DRC-DDG had to first ensure that 
the area was safe from EO contamination. NTS was conducted, and 
markings delineated the safe zone. EORE direct sessions were then 
provided to the repairmen, increasing their knowledge of safe behav-
ior. Subsequently, DRC-DDG demining teams marked the rest of the 
polygons with mine signs, followed by door-to-door and community- 
and school-based EORE direct sessions across Komyshuvakha and 
connected settlements. However, DRC-DDG noticed that the mine 
signs were repeatedly stolen overnight. This is not rare in poverty-
stricken communities where mine signs can be sold for scrap metal in 
exchange for additional income. Daily briefings between HMA teams 
raised the issue, and the demining and EORE teams decided to com-
plement the mine signs with community EORE informational boards. 
Several participatory sessions were organized with the residents to 
stimulate the ownership. The boards were produced from durable plas-
tic to avoid further looting and placed at strategic points across the 
community (at the polygons, school, and village council).
HMA organizations should not forget that development activities 
also require special care and expertise. Three (and later four) demining 
teams continued with clearance on the outside of the safe zone,38 leav-
ing the space for livelihoods, protection, and legal assistance teams39 
to proceed. DRC-DDG CBI methodology was uniquely designed to 
facilitate participatory, inclusive, and integrated developmental pro-
cesses. It began with joint consultations between the Komyshuvakha 
village council, local nongovernmental organization (NGO) Komroz, 
as well as vested farmers and other residents, whom the legal assistance 
team supported in resolving the housing, land, and property (HLP) 
rights issue around the borehole. Furthermore, the protection team 
conducted specialized trainings on budgeting, management, imple-
mentation, reporting, monitoring, etc. for the local NGO, which took 
on the responsibility for the CBI. Ownership of developmental pro-
cesses often secures their sustainability and builds local capacities. The 
village council co-invested in the borehole repairs, the residents pro-
vided in-kind work contributions, and the NGO utilized DRC-DDG’s 
grant to contract and oversee a specialized company for repairs of the 
DRC-DDG EORE officer installing the 
community EORE informational board in 
Komyshuvakha, Luhansk region, Ukraine.
Image courtesy of DRC-DDG / 2021 / Ratushniak.
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borehole. Simultaneously, the livelihoods team connected the farmers 
with this process and its stakeholders, providing grants to those able to 
capitalize from the improved access to water either by strengthening 
local value chains, expanding and offering additional employment, or 
replenishing their diminished livelihood capacities. 
Conclusion. The case study of Komyshuvakha highlighted a num-
ber of lessons learned on implementing projects linking HMA and 
development. However, a gap in the initial literature/desk reviews 
prevented further knowledge-creation within the HMA commu-
nity. A potential classification for LMAD case studies was proposed, 
encouraging future authors to clarify the dimensions, levels, degrees, 
types, and timing of their LMAD initiatives. The ABD approach was 
then introduced as one example of a guiding (theoretical and practical) 
tool. Through the case study of Komyshuvakha, the following LMAD 
lessons were elaborated:
• Theoretical guidance supports LMAD projects with a tried and 
tested vision.
• No matter how comprehensive LMAD projects are, they will 
require external support (either financial or in expertise).
• Integrated needs assessments are more efficient, inclusive, and 
improve staff capacities.
• LMAD M&E systems should be diversified, contextualized, 
longitudinal, and summative.
• LMAD benefit from a centralized management arrangement 
and flexible implementation.
• LMAD stand to gain from concurrent integration of HMA 
pillars.
• HMA and development activities require special care and 
expertise. 
Disclaimer. This document covers the issues of humanitarian assis-
tance activities, which are carried out with the financial support of 
the European Union. The views expressed in this document shall in no 
way be construed as the official position of the European Union. The 
European Commission is not responsible for any use of the information 
it contains. 
See endnotes page 146
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The mine action sector in Ukraine has seen significant growth and progression since the out-break of hostilities along the eastern border in 2014. Continued development of government capacity is required to respond to the scale of landmine and explosive remnants of war (ERW) 
contamination. The HALO Trust (HALO) has supported the Ukrainian authorities to address mine con-
tamination since 2015, through survey and large-scale mine clearance, as well as by assisting state enti-
ties such as the State Emergency Services (SES) to strengthen humanitarian mine clearance practices 
and procedures. HALO’s ongoing capacity-development efforts aim to enhance existing resources in 
order to establish a multifaceted, sustainable, and independent mine action sector capable of dealing 
with current and future challenges. This article explores the obstacles and opportunities in national 
capacity building in Ukraine, lessons from HALO’s ongoing demining training, and key priorities for 
Ukraine to deal with operational challenges of mine clearance.
Since the outbreak of the conflict in 2014, eastern Ukraine has 
become severely contaminated with landmines and ERW, with the 
fifth highest annual mine/ERW casualty rate in the world.1 Ukrainian 
authorities have responded with a range of efforts, building on previ-
ous experience in clearing ERW from World Wars I and II. However, 
humanitarian demining is relatively new in Ukraine, where national 
coordination efforts, clearance operations, and legislation are still 
being developed.
The HALO Trust (HALO) started operations in eastern Ukraine in 
2015. The organization has grown into the largest humanitarian mine 
action (HMA) operator in Ukraine, employing 450 Ukrainian staff (350 
men and 100 women). Although more surveying is needed to reveal the 
true scale of the contamination, non-technical survey (NTS) has so far 
identified over 300 hazardous areas (234 confirmed, 75 suspected haz-
ardous areas) covering a surface area of twenty-six million sq m with 
a variety of explosive threats, including anti-personnel mines, anti-
vehicle mines, other unexploded ordnance (UXO), and abandoned 
ordnance (AXO). To date, HALO’s deminers have cleared over 7.5 mil-
lion sq m of previously contaminated land across Donetsk and Luhansk 
regions, and work is ongoing.
HALO supports the efforts of Ukrainian authorities to assume 
national ownership of mine action in line with the International Mine 
Action Standards (IMAS). Ongoing capacity-development efforts have 
focused on all aspects of the HMA process, including accreditation, 
survey, data management, clearance, explosive ordnance disposal 
(EOD), explosive ordnance risk education (EORE), and quality con-
trol (QC). In addition to providing technical support to strengthen 
national coordinating bodies, HALO provides training courses to the 
authorities, building on HALO’s globally tried and tested training 
model. Since early 2020, this has focused on support and the long-term 
mentorship of the SES, which is the Ukrainian government’s main 
HMA entity. 
Recent legislative developments have outlined an upcoming restruc-
turing of the Ukrainian mine action sector. The Law ‘On Mine Action 
in Ukraine’ was adopted in December 2018 and came into force in 
January 2019. A subsequent amendment was passed in December 
2020, which enabled the establishment of a national mine action 
authority (NMAA) and two national mine action centers (NMAC). 
These institutions are expected to become operational and take over 
responsibility of coordinating the response of national and interna-
tional operators by the end of 2021. Since they will draw from the exist-
ing capacity present within the sector, it is crucial that current actors 
follow IMAS to ensure their continued success and sustainability. 
This article outlines HALO’s ongoing efforts to strengthen national 
mine action capacity in Ukraine, building on three decades of global 
expertise. Highlighting lessons learned from HALO’s training and 
mentorship, the article explores challenges and opportunities in mine 
clearance capacity building, priorities to overcome obstacles in the 
field, and recommendations for future capacity-building efforts to 
enable Ukraine to rid itself of its explosive legacy of war.
By Tobias Hewitt and Ronan Shenhav [ The HALO Trust ]
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The Ukrainian Mine Action Sector
Map of HALO areas surveyed in eastern Ukraine.
All figures courtesy of The HALO Trust.
The Legacy of the Second World War. At the time of publication 
(summer 2021), a functioning NMAA still needs to be established in 
Ukraine. However, Ukraine has a functional mine action sector with 
decades of experience in dealing with mines and ERW left behind by 
World Wars I and II. Between 1945 and 2000, an estimated three mil-
lion items of ERW were removed from Ukrainian soil with military 
engineers finishing clearance of most of the affected areas by the mid-
1970s. Although the extent of the remaining residue is unknown, by 
the year 2000 the Ukrainian authorities estimated that approximately 
one million items of ERW remained, mostly spread across unpopulated 
areas in central and southern Ukraine.2 
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A strong mine action response by the Ukrainian Armed Forces 
under the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and by the SES3 has emerged as 
a result of this deadly legacy. The National Police, Special Transport 
Service, and Border Guard Service also have EOD units to respond to 
explosive threats in their areas of operation in a more limited capacity. 
In 2001, the MOD set up a demining center aimed at training demin-
ers at the Military Engineering Institute in Kamyanets-Podilskyi in 
western Ukraine. The Demining Center has since become the main 
authority on national coordination and data-collection efforts to map 
explosive hazards. Since 2008, the center has also been the inspection 
authority for state operators conducting mine clearance.
The SES has a wide array of responsibilities for the protection of 
civilians, including emergency response, search and rescue, firefight-
ing, industrial safety, administration of the Chernobyl exclusion zone, 
as well as EOD response. While the MOD is not currently engaged in 
humanitarian demining and only focuses on military demining in 
areas of military presence, the SES covers EOD response in all other 
areas of the country where mines and ERW affect civilian lives or 
infrastructure.4 
Before the conflict began, the SES employed forty demining teams 
with a total of 490 personnel across the country. According to gov-
ernment data, the SES destroyed more than 220,000 items of ERW in 
2012, including 2,143 aircraft bombs, and cleared 18.4 sq km of previ-
ously contaminated land.5 Between 2014 and 2020, the SES cleared a 
further 372.6 sq km and removed a total of 202,555 explosive items.6 
National Mine Action Authority. The Ukrainian government 
has made several efforts to coordinate and regulate the national 
mine action response, and has undertaken steps to set up an NMAA 
since 2006.7 However, this process was put on hold 
as the conf lict created an unforeseen escalation 
in mine/ERW contamination between 2014 and 
2015. A wider response was required to address a 
broad new set of challenges, including NTS of vast 
tracts of contaminated land along the length of a 
467- km-long contact line, the provision of assis-
tance to hundreds of civilian mine survivors, as 
well as the regulation and oversight of national 
and international clearance operators to ensure 
adherence to IMAS.
Several attempts were made to draft in the years 
following the conflict. The main purpose of this 
law was to operationalize the national mine action 
response system and significantly enhance mine 
victim assistance and regulation for mine action 
operators. However, the law did not come into 
effect until January 2019. A further amendment was 
subsequently required to overcome constitutional 
1992–1998 2009 2012 2013 2014–2020
Explosive items destroyed 3,000 to 4,000/year 64,272 220,000 100,000 ± 30,000/year
Area cleared N/A 7.8 sq km 18.4 sq km 5.94 sq km ± 53 sq km/year
Table 1. Explosive items destroyed and area cleared by the SES (1992–2020)
QC team inspection.
obstacles, which was signed in December 2020. The latest amendment 
outlines the establishment of an NMAA (under the chairmanship of 
the MOD) as a regulatory body that oversees two NMACs: 
1. The Mine Action Center under the Ministry of Defence (over-
seen by the military Demining Center in Kamyanets-Podilskyi)
2. The Humanitarian Demining Center under the Ministry of 
Interior (overseen by the SES)
This development is a big step forward for the mine action sector 
and will further strengthen national efforts to regulate, coordinate, 
and prioritize survey and clearance operations. The NMAA will pro-
vide regulatory oversight for the two NMACs, who will be responsible 
for the accreditation of mine action operators, quality assurance (QA), 
and the adherence to international norms and standards. The two cen-
ters will be built on the basis of existing institutions and will draw 
from systems and knowledge already in place, which makes reinforc-
ing the capacity of the SES and MOD of paramount importance.
National Mine Action Standards. The Ukrainian government has 
aimed to follow and implement IMAS ever since taking the first steps 
to regulate the mine action sector. As in other countries that are deal-
ing with landmines, IMAS will need to be adapted to the local context 
and adjusted to the specific type of contamination through the devel-
opment of national standards. With support of leading experts in the 
field of HMA—GICHD, UNDP, OSCE, DDG, FSD, and HALO8—the 
Ukrainian MOD developed a provisionary set of national mine action 
standards (NMAS) in late 2018.However, at the time of writing, NMAS 
have not been formally adopted.9 Once an NMAA is established, 
national authorities and national mine action operators will presum-
ably adopt the NMAS and make them mandatory for all operators. 
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NTS training for SES.
Together with other international experts, HALO continues to pro-
vide recommendations to the authorities and participates in regular 
meetings to refine and adjust sections of the NMAS ahead of its full 
implementation.
Mine Action Capacity Development. Capacity development in 
mine action covers a litany of subjects and themes, including all vital 
aspects of the HMA process from initial survey to the final release of 
land. In order to develop the Ukrainian mine action sector in an effi-
cient and sustainable manner, HALO has implemented several capac-
ity-development projects, funded by the governments of the United 
States, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, and European Union. 
HALO’s approach has focused on three main aspects:
1. Technical assistance to develop NMAS
2. Support for administrative oversight and QA/QC procedures 
within mine action 
3. Operational capacity development for national mine action 
entities
Accreditation and Quality Management. An integral aspect 
of all mine clearance efforts is administrative oversight to ensure 
the quality of clearance methods and the safety of land released by 
operators. This is accomplished through the regulation of formal 
accreditation of national and international operators, and a set of 
QA/QC procedures by host states. In Ukraine, the MOD’s Demining 
Center has overseen this process. This system of checks and balances 
requires a thorough understanding of all procedures necessary to 
make land safe. To this end, HALO has helped the MOD align its 
existing expertise with IMAS and showcasing the procedures used 
by international operators. 
In 2017, HALO developed a syllabus for a four-week training course 
on quality management that was grounded in the principles of IMAS 
and covered all aspects of the HMA process. In cooperation with the 
Ukrainian Institute of Standardization, HALO also facilitated tech-
nical support for the Demining Center to become the licensing body 
for humanitarian demining operators. Following these trainings the 
Demining Center was formally certified to conduct accreditation and 
QC of nongovernmental HMA operators in 2018. 
Another major milestone was achieved in June 2019, when HALO 
became the first international mine action operator to successfully 
undergo external QA/QC inspection of cleared land by the MOD. The 
MOD’s inspection process involved selective sampling of cleared areas 
in line with the process established in IMAS. This was followed by the 
first ever formal handover of cleared land by an international operator 
in Ukraine. As a result, nineteen sites with an area of 710,000 sq m 
were officially handed over to local authorities. This process is ongoing 
and has greatly enhanced mutual learning between national authori-
ties and international mine action operators. 
Non-Technical Survey and Information Management. As the 
core component of the government’s HMA capacity in Ukraine, the 
SES teams respond to explosive devices found by local residents and 
conduct EOD spot tasks across eastern Ukraine to remove and destroy 
them. However, in order to strengthen an approach that goes beyond 
an EOD-only response, IMAS prescribes a process of humanitarian 
demining that includes NTS, technical survey, clearance, and QC. The 
foundation of any efficient clearance operation is therefore primarily 
reliant on the survey report indicating the specific threats, hazardous 
area parameters, and any other relevant considerations before clear-
ance work can begin. 
HALO uses a methodical approach to data collection that empha-
sizes due diligence and triangulates information from multiple 
sources. This information creates the starting point for (a) planning 
and prioritizing clearance tasks, (b) selecting appropriate clearance 
techniques, and (c) determining the size of the hazardous area. Survey 
information can also help outline what the intended humanitarian 
impact of clearance will be for the surrounding community, further-
ing the prioritization of clearance work. This data should further-
more feed into a national Information Management System for Mine 
HALO deminer training.
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Action (IMSMA), which needs to be regulated on a national level and 
overseen by the NMAA. 
In order to support this process, in 2018 HALO held comprehen-
sive courses on NTS and information management for twenty national 
IMSMA operators from across the country and two instructors from 
the SES training center. The training aimed to strengthen surveying 
capacity to ensure that SES teams are compatible with the IMSMA for-
mat and follow IMAS. As each operator oversees the data management 
system in their region, the objective was to improve understanding of 
how data is collected, processed, and utilized through survey on the 
ground. These trainings were continued into 2020, focusing on build-
ing the operational capacity of all aspects of the HMA process.
Deminer Training. The main focus of HALO’s support to the SES 
has been strengthening mine clearance knowledge and practices. In 
2020, closely mirroring the in-house training plan provided to all 
HALO demining staff, HALO implemented a five-week capacity 
development training program for fifty SES personnel from across the 
country at the SES Mariupol training center in southern Donetsk. The 
training generated understanding of—as well as showcased HALO’s 
application of—systematic mine clearance in line with IMAS.
Although the majority of SES participants had extensive prior 
experience responding to EOD threats, the training focused on 
building knowledge and skills around the basic principles of system-
atic humanitarian demining. All instructors were seasoned, senior 
Ukrainian HALO operations staff who had started their HALO 
careers as deminers. The outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic post-
poned the initial training schedule, but the training restarted in the 
second half of 2020, and was divided into three sessions to limit the 
number of participants attending at one time. Social distancing and 
enhanced hygiene measures were also put in place and strictly moni-
tored by senior HALO staff.
HALO’s Training Model. The demining training for the SES largely 
followed HALO’s tried and tested model for new, locally-recruited 
deminers. In Ukraine, HALO employs 450 local staff (350 men and 100 
women) from a wide variety of backgrounds, many of whom are from 
Deminer training for SES.
SES deminer mentorship.
mine-affected settlements in eastern Ukraine. They are not required to 
have a background in demining or EOD. 
HALO’s demining training consists of a one-week theory exer-
cise, three-weeks of practical training, and a one-week examination 
process, which cover all areas of manual mine clearance (aside from 
ordnance disposal, which HALO only provides for more senior staff). 
The theoretical component focuses on explaining current clearance 
techniques, which include a significant emphasis on the terminology 
and background of minefield equipment, marking, and humanitarian 
mine-clearance methodologies. During these sessions, trainees learn 
how to recognize different mine types, how devices and their internal 
components function, and how to identify certain markings or dis-
tinct features. Theory also provides an opportunity for new recruits 
to have a better understanding of HALO’s philosophy—the concept 
of humanitarian demining and the wider principles of mine action. 
For the SES, this component provided the added value of focusing on 
IMAS, signifying the need for a change in approach to demining and 
adoption of systematic mine-clearance methods.
The practical phase of the training was conducted on a training 
ground free from live explosives but that mimicked the look and con-
ditions of a real minefield. Trainees learn the standard operating pro-
cedures (SOPs) of mine clearance, from proper equipment handling to 
specific types of clearance techniques to how to respond to a minefield 
accident. Due to the wide variety of threat types found in Ukraine, 
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Activity Type Week 1 Week 2 Week 3 Week 4 Week 5 Total
Area cleared with 
linear method (m2) 22 408 476 456 190 1,552
Vegetation cutting 
with strimmer (m2) 200 100 10 370 180 860
Explosive devices 
found (#) 0 5 6 5 5 21
Table 2. Explosive items found and area cleared by the SES on Hnutove 
minefield (November–December 2020).
trainees are taught multiple clearance techniques. Training also imi-
tates minefield safety procedures including wearing personal protec-
tion equipment (PPE) and following a set working schedule. Unlike 
other HALO programs worldwide, deminer training in Ukraine places 
a large emphasis on tripwire clearance as this is one of the most com-
mon threat types found. 
Like HALO’s internal deminer training, the SES training concluded 
with two modules: medical training and final examinations. While 
HALO conducts an additional paramedic training for selected candi-
dates, and basic medical training is taught to all trainees and focuses 
on procedures for responding to a minefield accident, stabilizing a 
minefield casualty, and responding to minor non-demining injuries 
(e.g., heat stroke, snake bites, sprained ankle, etc.). Final examinations 
are a combination of written tests and appraisals of practical work 
conducted on the training ground. Senior staff examining the trainees 
evaluate how well a specific area is prepared, processed, and cleared of 
any metal signals or dummy items. The test also involves appropriate 
tool selection, PPE wearing, and SOP adherence (e.g., proper clearance 
depth for signal excavations). Written examinations cover all modules 
taught during the training, including explosive item recognition and 
hypothetical scenarios that test trainees’ responses and adherence to 
safety procedures.
Minefield Mentorship. A pivotal aspect of HALO’s ongoing 
capacity development is its commitment to SES teams following 
the completion of deminer training and to ensuring that SES teams 
receive on-site mentorship. This means a senior member of HALO’s 
operational staff is present every working day to 
provide assistance and advice to those conducting 
clearance. HALO’s mentorship involves not only 
the practical (e.g., minefield clearance techniques) 
but also advice on strategic or logistical consider-
ations for team deployment (i.e., location and acces-
sibility of medical support). While the deminer 
training given by HALO personnel is thorough and 
wide-ranging, every minefield presents specific 
challenges and peculiarities. Through mentorship, 
SES team leaders and supervisors can continue to grow within their 
respective roles.
To build on and sustain knowledge gained in their training, SES 
deminers were subsequently deployed to conduct clearance on a live 
minefield near the village of Hnutove, outside Mariupol in southern 
Donetsk region in November and December 2020. This was done under 
close supervision and mentorship from HALO, who worked alongside 
the SES personnel. HALO surveyed the area in 2017, and teams con-
firmed a threat of anti-vehicle mines and suspected a threat of ERW. 
Due to the presence of minimum-metal anti-vehicle mines, specifically 
the TM-62P3 variant, clearance required the use of the Minelab F3 
metal detector with a UXO head attachment. Although more time con-
suming, use of this detector ensures that even the smallest minimum-
metal signatures are found and properly excavated. To ensure the SES 
Mariupol detachment had the necessary tools, HALO provided four 
vehicles, PPE, and metal detectors purchased under an EU grant.
The participants included twenty-two staff, who were grouped in 
four teams of four deminers and one team leader, with a supervi-
sor overseeing all teams. An additional SES paramedic was present 
on stand-by. Over the course of twenty-two working days, the four 
teams cleared a total of 1,552 sq ms (an average of 70 sq ms per day) 
during which they found a total of twenty-one items of ERW, includ-
ing fifteen projectiles (23 mm and 30 mm), four rif le-projected gre-
nades (VOG-17 and VOG-25), and two rocket-propelled grenades 
(PG-7S). The results of the training can be found in Table 2.
Capacity-Building Challenges and Opportunities 
Training Outcomes. Although this was only the first of several 
planned practical deployments for the SES, some preliminary out-
comes shed light on the impact of this exercise. The main lessons 
learned for the SES staff deployed were three-fold. Firstly, by experi-
encing HALO’s clearance methodology, participants improved their 
understanding of the difference between targeted and systematic 
humanitarian mine clearance. Secondly, an important outcome of the 
training was increased awareness of safety standards, specifically in 
HALO’s extensive safety procedures, casualty evacuation procedures, 
and methods to calculate and maintain appropriate safety distances 
between deminers. Thirdly, participants’ exposure to HALO’s clear-
ance methods provided SES staff with examples of how to overcome 
obstacles and improve operational efficiency. One example is that 
clearance methods such as the linear method require an additional 
level of teamwork with a three-person team working on rotation to 
improve efficiency. Participants were also taught about HALO’s meth-
ods to overcome harsh weather conditions such as using a salt-water 
solution to defrost frozen soil in the winter. Moreover, training cov-
ered aspects specifically aimed at supervisors and team leaders, such 
as ways to accurately track clearance progress on a map. This also shed 
light on efforts to reassess NTS data before clearance, establish the 
correct boundaries, and mark minefields appropriately. These aspects 
of the training focused not only on ensuring that all activities were 
conducted in line with best practice and IMAS, but also developed 
the necessary critical thinking to deal with obstacles and find creative 
solutions to problems that arise in the field. 
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HALO-SES supervisor meetingReactive Versus Systematic Clearance. HALO 
expects the teams that were trained and mentored to 
further disseminate knowledge of humanitarian dem-
ining in Ukraine as they move back to their respective 
areas of operations. However, a fundamental shift in 
clearance approaches is often the hardest obstacle for 
mine action capacity development. One of the main 
challenges remaining for the SES is to fully grasp the 
difference between targeted and systematic humani-
tarian mine clearance, where the priority is to ensure 
the welfare of deminers through the strict adherence 
to safety standards and SOPs while simultaneously 
ensuring that 100 percent of a given area is made 
free from mines and ERW. In this regard, systematic clearance differs 
greatly from the more targeted reactive approach that is the default 
method used by the SES across Ukraine as part of their EOD response. 
A reactionary approach to clearing individual items is not enough to 
ensure that the land is safe for civilians to return to their homes and 
everyday routines. A systematic and thorough approach, carried out 
with a precise methodology and with several layers of QC, is required 
to be certain that no explosive hazards remain. Additional exposure 
to other aspects of the HMA process—including NTS, GIS and qual-
ity management—will support the paradigm shift towards systematic 
clearance in the future. 
Looking Ahead




Non-Technical Survey 12 Feb 2020 6
Medical/First Aid 10 Feb 2020 10
GIS/Information Management 5 Mar 2020 5
Explosive Ordnance Disposal 10 Mar 2020 12
Demining (Group 1) 18 Jul–Aug 2020 34
Demining (Group 2) 22 Aug–Sep 2020 34
Demining (Group 3) 10 Oct–Nov 2020 34
Minefield Deployment (Group 1) 22 Nov–Dec 2020 22
Planned
Minefield Deployment (Group 2) 22 March 2021 30+
Quality Management 2 Spring 2021 3
EORE Instructor Training 6 Spring 2021 5
Demining Instructor Training 15 2021–2024 TBD
Demining Refresher Training 50 2021–2024 TBD
NTS Team Deployment 10 2021–2022 TBD
Table 3. Training courses for the SES completed and planned by HALO.
radar in combination with a “rapid excavation” technique to increase 
clearance rates for minimum-metal anti-vehicle mines, and innova-
tions in NTS and information management. As clearance is always 
subject to change, deminer training for the SES should therefore not 
be considered a one-off exercise. New techniques can be taught as they 
evolve or when new equipment can be purchased in a cost-effective, 
sustainable manner. There will never be a silver bullet for mine clear-
ance, but innovation and refinement of current methodologies will 
play a key role in ongoing development.
Sustainability. An inherent concern with any form of capac-
ity building is a loss of knowledge due to staff rotation, and when 
trained people take knowledge and skills with them upon leaving. 
HALO’s next step is therefore to train up SES instructors who will 
be able to conduct their own deminer training for new SES person-
nel. Under an upcoming multi-year capacity-development project 
funded by the government of the Netherlands, HALO will provide 
long-term mentorship and guidance to these instructors. This will 
enable sustainable oversight to ensure that new deminers are taught 
to the highest standards when they join the SES or the new 
NMAC. The instructors will also hold annual refresher 
training for people who have already undergone training. 
Beyond the plans outlined previously, in order to 
deal with the scale and nature of the mine contamina-
tion in Ukraine, future national mine clearance training 
will need to focus on a set of approaches that address 
all operational challenges in the country. SES demin-
ing teams will benefit from more exposure to different 
types of hazardous areas, which require a wide range of 
clearance methods, including battlefield area clearance, 
mechanical clearance, as well as more traditional meth-
ods to clear minimum-metal anti-vehicle mines and 
devices laid with tripwires. 
For future training, HALO will continue to develop 
knowledge of these methods in future training courses 
and will constantly re-evaluate its techniques, equip-
ment, and practices in order to ensure maximum opera-
tional efficiency. To date, HALO has introduced the use of 
remote-controlled vegetation cutters to speed up tripwire 
clearance, hand-held detectors with ground-penetrating 
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Lastly, capacity development efforts will need to be coordi-
nated with other actors engaged in this activity. The syllabus 
provided to the SES will only be effective if all organizations have 
a common approach, standards, and principles. HALO contin-
ues to engage with other experts in the HMA field in Ukraine 
to ensure that a standardized training package is provided. This 
will not only allow for easier adjustment to HMA principles but 
also for a smoother shift toward the use of systematic mine clear-
ance, safety standards, and operational efficiency.
In the long-term, increased experience with conducting 
humanitarian clearance that goes beyond reactive, targeted 
EOD spot tasks will lead to an increased national capacity 
that is capable of independently addressing challenges and 
obstacles in Ukraine. This will enable Ukraine to adapt exist-
ing procedures to IMAS as well as local specificities. Future 
training should not simply focus on implementing a set of 
rules that need to be strictly followed but on teaching the 
adaptability needed to apply these rules and find solutions to 
overcome future obstacles. 
Future Training Objectives. HALO will continue to offer ongo-
ing mentoring to SES deminers, as a new rotation of twenty-two SES 
personnel are scheduled to continue clearance in Hnutove in the fall of 
2021. They will undergo similar exposure to HALO’s clearance meth-
ods as the previous group, and HALO will continue to oversee their 
work to ensure understanding and adherence to all standards and 
procedures. In addition to demining training, HALO plans to hold a 
number of additional training sessions for SES staff on quality man-
agement, EORE, and NTS.
The recently adopted legislation mandates a quality-management 
capacity for both NMACs. The new NMAC overseen by the SES (the 
Humanitarian Demining Center) will become responsible for accredi-
tation, quality management, and operational coordination of HMA 
in the near future. HALO will therefore extend its support to the SES 
in this field through comprehensive quality-management training. 
Handover of equipment to SES
Similarly, QA/QC training can be extended to cover using appropriate 
detector types, looking at site maps to determine exactly which meth-
ods were applied. 
In the longer term, HALO aims to support the SES with the forma-
tion of an NTS team by providing a full training package covering all 
practical and theoretical aspects of survey to a small group of SES per-
sonnel with previous mine-clearance experience. The four-week course 
would focus on NTS procedures, mine and ammunition recognition, 
GIS, and data management. After the training is complete, HALO 
would then oversee the deployment and mentorship of the survey 
team. With HALO mentorship, several SES survey teams could lay the 
groundwork for future clearance activity. By creating and fostering a 
multifaceted, mine-clearance apparatus, the SES’s internal capacity 
would thereby become a self-sustaining entity to conduct systematic 
humanitarian mine clearance. 
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Alternative EORE 
Approaches
By Olena Kryvova [ Swiss Foundation for Mine Action ] 
Armed conflict has been ongoing in the east of Ukraine since 2014 and continues to have a fundamentally devastating impact on children, women, and men. With continuing hostilities and the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbating the dire humanitarian situation in the region, 3.4 mil-
lion people are projected to be in need of humanitarian assistance in 2021. The elderly, persons with 
disabilities, female-headed households, and children are among the most vulnerable. Additionally, 
the large-scale population displacement from government and nongovernment controlled areas (GCA 
and NGCA respectively) of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, separated by the 427-km-long contact line, 
remains one of the highest concerns. 
 Unexploded ordnance (UXO) and landmines present a particular 
threat to the civilian population in this type of “frozen conf lict.” 
Many villages and towns on and near the contact line have not been 
evacuated as the occupants refuse to move or have no other place 
to relocate; and as a result, civilians carry on living and working 
near military installations. These civilians live alongside heavily 
fortified and mined checkpoints with daily artillery bombardments 
being commonplace. The population are exposed to mines and UXO 
as a part of daily life, and civilian casualties directly attributable to 
such hazards are growing. Mines and UXO also are denying citizens 
access to services such as water or, in the longer term, in the way in 
which they use the land: Many hectares of good farmland have been 
seeded with mines, impacting local livelihoods. Therefore, humani-
tarian mine action (HMA) remains one of the most important parts 
of the humanitarian response where, in certain areas, explosive ord-
nance risk education (EORE) is the only applicable HMA pillar for 
saving lives of civilians. 
Over the years, the majority of HMA interventions have been com-
pleted in the GCA rather than in the NGCA. Access by international 
nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), particularly HMA, to the 
NGCA has been problematic since the conflict began. The provision 
of EORE has been a challenge, and very little of the at-risk population 
in the NGCA have received information about explosive hazards. The 
provision of EORE via the more traditional methods of direct presenta-
tion sessions to children and adults in their communities or in schools 
is generally not permitted. This is due to a perception by NGCA de 
facto authorities that EORE is a potential threat to security and may 
be used as propaganda by Ukraine. In 2020, FSD, with funding from 
the U.S. Department of State, began a project with the express objec-
tive of developing methods to target residents living in the NGCA. 
One approach is to access workers and members of the public who are 
required to cross the contact line to attend to administrative or work-
related issues while they are in the GCA, and the second involves the 
use of social media applications to target the population that cannot 
travel to the GCA.
The Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD) is one of a small number of HMA INGOs operat-
ing in Ukraine. FSD began in late 2014 with mine risk education teams, then added community 
liaison and non-technical survey in 2015. Since 2016, FSD has conducted physical clearance projects and con-
tinued to expand its knowledge of the impact that explosive ordnance (EO) hazards have on the people living 
in the region.
EORE Team Leader 
Irina Mihei distributes 
information to an elderly 
man waiting to cross 
into the NGCA.
All graphics courtesy of FSD.
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EORE at Crossing Points
There are five entry/exit crossing points (EECPs) between the 
GCA and NGCA along the contact line in eastern Ukraine. Before 
the COVID-19 pandeminc, between 1 and 1.25 million people used 
these EECPs each month, with the vast majority (over 90 percent) of 
the crossings orginating in the NGCA. The majority of people cross-
ing the EECPs are over the age of sixty and are mostly doing so to 
attend to issues related to pensions/social payments or to withdraw 
cash. This results in a consistent opportunity to engage a signifi-
cant proportion of the NGCA population at the EECPs and at the 
various Ukraine government pension offices that are located close 
to the EECPs. Thus, FSD provides short, direct, and/or face-to-face 
EORE presentations and/or safety briefings at these locations, spe-
cifically targeting people visiting from the NGCA. Unfortunately, 
the COVID-19 pandemic has caused significant challenges to the 
implementation of this activity. On 21 March 2020, the contact line 
was sealed off to help curb the spread of the virus in the conf lict-
affected areas. Movement through the EECPs remains restricted 
and highly unstable due to the COVID-19 pandemic prevention 
measures adopted by the government of Ukraine and the NGCA 
de-facto authorities. As of May 2021, these restrictions are still 
enforced, and of the five EECPs, only two are operational. 
Thus, significant challenges revolve around the closure of the 
EECPs, and subsequent uncertainties surround the full reopening of 
the EECPs for normal use. Presently, very few people are permitted 
to cross through the two open EECPs into the GCA from the NGCA, 
and the crossing conditions for affected populations remains tense. In 
numerous cases, people were refused exit or were approved to exit but 
refused entry by the other “side.” In addition to COVID-19 restric-
tions, temporary closures and weather conditions also dramatically 
affected the number of crossings in 2020. The number of individual 
crossings from 21 March 2020 until the end of the year represented 
less than 3 percent of the level of crossings recorded in 2019 during the 
same period. 
However, FSD EORE teams have been at the operational EECPs 
(Stanytsia, Luhanska, and Novotroitske) from May 2020 until the 
present and able to conduct safety briefings for NGCA residents. The 
briefings normally take up to ten minutes and are provided to people 
as they wait in line. The key modules of a traditional EORE session 
are discussed with the affected population, including safe and unsafe 
behavior, reporting mechanisms, mine/UXO recognition, etc. The 
EORE team uses informational folders and posters containing pictures 
that help trainers promote safe behavior and provide visual briefings. 
Various types of education materials are also distributed. As the dis-
tribution of EORE materials is heavily regulated, each type of prod-
uct is designed in two languages (Russian and Ukrainian) to prevent 
any potential problems with authorities. While UNICEF approved 
FSD’s EORE materials for children, there is no functioning national 
authority at present to approve EORE materials for adults; however, 
all FSD EORE materials conform to IMAS standards. FSD teams use 
a variety of printed materials, including a pocket-sized brochure sum-
marizing key EORE messages, a coloring page designed for children, 
and an A5-sized leaflet describing safe/unsafe behavior and reporting 
mechanisms. The leaflet also contains a QR code that allows access to 
the project-dedicated social media landing page, which provides more 
EORE-specific information to those who are interested. 
EORE Team Leader Liudmila Kiyan explains the safe behavior 
rules for residents from the NGCA at the Stanytsia Luhanska 
EECP who are waiting to cross the contact line.
Digital EORE
FSD’s second approach to reach NGCA residents involves the use of 
social media to target those who cannot travel to the GCA. Inspired 
by a trial conducted in 2020 of the use of targeted social media adver-
tisements (i.e., Facebook [FB] ads) for delivery of EORE in Iraq, FSD 
is conducting a similar trial of the use of FB and Vkontakte (VK, the 
Russian version of FB) ads in eastern Ukraine, with an emphasis on 
reaching users living in the NGCA. The FSD conducted the trial over a 
six-month period in 2020 and decided to continue the trial project into 
2021. As there was a significant lack of EORE available via the social 
media sphere, especially in the NGCA, the media campaign objectives 
were to increase awareness about the explosive ordnance (EO) threat 
and introduce the consequences of risk-taking behavior. Moreover, the 
campaign sought to build a strong communication tool through posi-
tive dialogue in a constructive educational atmosphere. Therefore, FSD 
designed an online platform with fun and non-traditional formats to 
discuss the EO threat. The trial was divided into two modules: The first 
module focused on FB over the first three months of the trial (June–
August 2020), and the second focused on VK over three subsequent 
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months (October–December 2020). The methodology applied to both 
modules of the social media campaign and was divided into three key 
components: (1) the design of materials, (2) the development of the 
landing page, and (3) an interactive portion of the campaign. 
Together with a Ukrainian public relations company skilled in the 
design and employment of FB ads, FSD developed a project-specific 
landing page for targeting NGCA residents. FSD recycled some of the 
material developed for the FB module for the VK module. This allowed 
FSD to develop the second campaign significantly faster and start the 
VK trial shortly after the FB social media trial was completed. The 
ads were tailored to users based on their IP addresses. A new, project-
specific landing page, BezMin (Without Mines), was developed for FB 
and VK. By clicking on the link provided in the ad, users visited the 
BezMin page displaying appropriate EORE messaging, videos, and 
information on how to report suspected EO. 
Due to the sensitive nature of the content (particularly for NGCA 
residents), the page has neither donor nor FSD branding to promote 
the principle of neutrality in the posts and to attract a wider audience 
from the NGCA. 
A media content plan for the campaign consisted of various types 
of materials for at-risk communities. Comprising different types of 
material, each post covered one of several possible topics of the tra-
ditional EORE session: EO recognition, identifying potentially haz-
ardous areas, official marking (red warning sign with the message 
“Danger Mines”), unofficial marking (crossed sticks or home-made 
signs), unsafe behavior, safe behavior toward EO, what to do in case 
of an emergency, or reporting. Some posts contained images, which 
matched the various types of vegetation and weather conditions nor-
mally found in the region, and encouraged beneficiaries to identify the 
explosive hazards they found. 
Challenges during the interactive portion of the media campaign 
involved the use of specific terminology, and adherence to neutrality 
principles in posts and comments. Moreover, the Ukrainian govern-
ment currently restricts in-country access to VK. On the national level, 
Ukrainian-based internet service providers (ISPs) are not permitted to 
conduct any activities using VK. However, people in the NGCA can 
access VK through Russian infrastructure. Therefore, neither FSD nor 
Ukranian public relations specialists had practical experience or skills 
in conducting a targeted media campaign in Ukraine utilizing VK as a 
platform. However, FSD was able to find a method to conduct the VK 
media campaign using an independent PR company. The posting target 
was twenty-one posts per month. 
The first month of each module was used to develop brand aware-
ness. Over this period (the active phase), the target audience would 
become acquainted with the BezMin page. During the second and 
third months, the audience, now aware of the brand, began to show 
more interest in the posts and were keen to interact with and subscribe 
to the page. The highest number of followers was reached during the 
second and the thirds months of each module. 
Screenshot of a sample BezMin post on Vkontakte.
Screenshot of a sample post in Facebook.
Screenshot of a sample post in Facebook.
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As seen in Figure 1, 901 followers were attracted over the first three 
months of the FB module’s active phase, while only 101 new followers 
joined the FB page over the following three months where the FB cam-
paign was “dormant.” By comparison, the active phase of the VK cam-
paign had less than half the total number of followers when compared to 
FB during the same phase of the trial. Whereas the active phases reflect 
when the PR company was actively posting material to both FB and 
VK, the dormant phases reflect when no new posts were made to FB or 
VK. Demonstrating trends for both FB and VK, Figure 1 indicates that 
the most cost-effective use of available funding and beneficiary cover-
age for any social media campaign involves maintaining a high tempo 
of activity for at least six months. In order to maintain growth and 
reach a greater number of beneficiaries, the duration of future media 
campaigns was increased to six months. When measured by physical 
interactions with the ads, the FB module seemed significantly more 
successful across both the GCA and NGCA; however, an analysis of 
users’ locations indicated that for NGCA residents (the target audience 
for the trial), VK was more popular than FB. Moreover, the number of 
resident VK users in the NGCA is much higher than FB users, which led 
FSD to conclude VK was more popular in NGCA than FB.
Another distinct difference between VK and FB was audience age. 
VK permits children from the age of twelve to register, and children 
are its second largest demographic. Alternatively, FB requires users 
to be thirteen or older and is not as popular with children. Over 
the three months, the VK campaign 
reached 26,548 persons under the age 
of eighteen, compared to only 704 
children reached in the FB campaign. 
The VK network has a larger number 
of groups from educational institu-
tions compared to FB. One of the major 
achievements of the VK media cam-
paign trial is the fact that BezMin posts 
were reposted by various accounts and/
or groups managed by educational 
establishments. For example, FSD’s 
posts about unsafe behavior were 
reposted by a student group from the 
Civil Protection Institute in Luhansk 
People’s Republic, which had 179 fol-
lowers. BezMin was seen as a trust-
worthy source of information, and 
the method of delivery appeared to be 
appropriate and understandable.
More than half of BezMin users 
on FB (55 percent) are female, while 
the majority of interactions (reposts, 
clicks, and comments) were made by 
males; the major age group was in the 
35–44 range. On VK, 52 percent of 
active users of the BezMin page were 
males. The major age group is the same 
as in FB. The second largest age group 
were users under the age of eighteen. 
Geographically, 73 percent of VK ben-
eficiaries were from the NGCA; 5 per-
cent were based in the parts of Donetsk 
and Luhansk Oblasts in the GCA; and 
only 4 percent were located in other 
areas of Ukraine. The location of 18 
percent (or 34,979) of beneficiaries was 
not identified by VK social media; the 
use of a virtual private network (VPN) 
to enter the VK social media is likely to 
be the reason for this.
Map of eastern Ukraine 2021: GCA, NGCA, contact line and EECPs.
46
The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol25/iss1/1
25TH ANNIVERSARY ISSUE @ SUMMER 2021 47
During the social media campaign, there a number of NGCA cities 
that had beneficiaries covered by FB and VK. However, residents of 
Amvrosievka, Kadiyivka, Khartsyzsk, Kirovskoye, Lozove, Lutugino, 
Makeevka, Perevalsk, Pervomaysk, Rovenky, Sneznoe, Torez, and 
Vesëlaya Gora were covered by only one social media provider. 
Moreover, the FB campaign was able to reach internally displaced per-
sons (IDPs) all over Ukraine. When these IDPs do return home to the 
NGCA, they will have an increased knowledge about safe behavior and 
how to protect themselves from explosive threats. 
During the planning phase for the trial it was assumed that the 
target audience would use mobile devices rather then desktops or 
laptops. The campaign determined that the hardware (smartphone, 
tablet, etc.) used to access FB or VK has a significant influence on the 
overall success of the media campaign. To view published posts, 92 
percent of VK followers and 88 percent of FB followers used mobile 
devices. Therefore, all informational material was designed for mobile 
devices and included high-resolution pictures, appropriate format-
ing, and selective keywords. For wider coverage of the target audience, 
the Russian language was used in both the campaigns and associated 
material for the NGCA audience. Some GCA followers criticize this 
approach; however, it was stressed that BezMin is a non-political edu-
cational platform, which aims to increase the awareness about explo-
sive hazards. When there was a need to provide a link to a source of 
information, an international (not Russian/Ukrainian) source was 
used for this purpose. Quoting international sources prevents accusa-
tions of information being false or propaganda.
The feedback has been overwhelmingly positive. The posts were 
designed to encourage beneficiaries to engage in online discussions 
regarding explosive threats, to ask questions, and to share opinions. For 
this reason, FSD used its staff to monitor the interactions. Monitoring 
included follow-up responses to questions, giving professional feed-
back, sharing best practices of safe behavior, and amending the page 
content based on audience requests. FSD was able to ensure the posts 
were targeted to the specific needs and concerns of the affected popula-
tion. For example, posts might ask, “Have you ever seen a minefield?” 
Beneficiaries could respond by sharing pictures or locations of the con-
taminated areas in their respective communities. The page became a 
platform for the discussion of EO-related information, potential haz-
ardous areas, and unsafe behavior trends. 
Conclusion 
In the case when a newly-created platform (such as BezMin) is devel-
oped, a period of at least three months should be allowed to develop a 
regular audience, conduct the needs assessment, and design the most 
suitable ways of interacting with the audience. However, due to a vari-
ety of subject areas related to EORE, it is suggested that the length of 
this type of initiative should be at least six months. 
Social media has more flexibility when compared to the standard 
face-to face EORE session, as it is not impacted by weather, the time of 
day, or other force majeure factors (such as the closure of the EECPs). 
During the COVID-19 pandemic, when quarantine restrictions and 
lockdowns were in force, the online format was the only applicable 
method for delivering EORE messages to residents of the NGCA. 
However, current EORE-sector thinking is that digital EORE cam-
paigns seem to be most effective when complementing, not replacing, 
other EORE activities at an interpersonal or face-to-face level. In this 
way, digital EORE becomes a highly cost-effective force multiplier, 
increasing reach and coverage while reinforcing messages provided 
through non-digital means of delivery. 
The BezMin landing page was a platform that was well accepted in 
both VK and FB modules, and the information presented is important 
and relevant to the residents of the conflict-affected areas (both the 
GCA and NGCA) of eastern Ukraine. The campaign also had the wel-
come benefit of reaching IDPs who relocated to other parts of Ukraine 
away from the conflict area. 
MODULE/EVENT CLICKS REPOSTS LIKES OTHER INTERACTIONS AND COMMENTS
Facebook (Jun–Aug 2020) 6,331 418 2,316 3,883
Vkontakte (Sept–Nov 2020) 3,918 32 715 99
Table 1. Social media interactions.
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Figure 1. FB and VK followers June–November 2020.
EORE Team Leader 
Irina Mihei distributes 
information to an elderly 
man waiting to cross 
into the NGCA.
Moreover, the BezMin posts are acces-
sible at any time convenient to the ben-
eficiary. Large numbers of people can be 
reached in a specific area, overcoming 
obstacles posed by security, geography, 
and complex operating environments 
that limit the delivery of face-to-face 
EORE. The flexibility of a social media 
campaign allows the EORE provider 
to target specific age, gender, or demo-
graphic groups depending on the proj-
ect’s priorities. However, it is less effective 
when the target audience is the elderly or 
young children under the age of twelve. 
Moreover, immediately after an incident 
or accident involving EO and civilians 
occurs, posts can be made as a form of 
“emergency” EORE. 
This pilot project shows the potential 
of using social media for EORE in areas 
with a reasonable communications network. Digital tools are less 
effective in areas with poor internet connectivity or reduced mobile 
data coverage. Nevertheless, the ongoing success of a social media 
campaign relies on regular, new, and interesting content. A lack of new 
posts equates to a decrease of a beneficiary’s interest and leads to the 
decrease of EO-threat awareness. The social media campaign can have 
long-term benefits as long as it is maintained and operational. 
In the NGCA at present, where physical access is very difficult or not 
possible at all, the FSD social media campaign (a trial) is one of very 
few alternatives for residents to access information about EO and to 
interact with an EORE professional. While the conflict is ongoing, 
continuation of the social media campaigns is crucial for raising 
awareness and promoting safe behavior in the conflict-affected com-
munities in eastern Ukraine. As a result of additional funding from the 
U.S. Department of State, the social media campaign is continuing 
through 2021. 
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Ukraine
A ll modern conflicts bring dangers of explosive remnants of war (ERW), including unexploded ordnance (UXO), abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO), improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and/or landmines, and the conflict in eastern Ukraine is no exception. While the conflict is 
still ongoing, it is currently in a state of relative stalemate, limited to shelling, sniper fire, and small 
skirmishes along the 280-mile line of contact.¹ However, civilians are still directly at risk as a result of 
military actions but also indirectly as a result of ERW and landmines, which are scattered across the 
region due to the frequent shifting of the line of contact that occurred during the early stages of the 
conflict. Kicked-out munitions from unplanned explosions at ammunition stores also pose a threat to 
civilians across the country.
By Andro Mathewson and Asya Bolotova [ The HALO Trust ]
ERW contamination is now a major problem in the Donetsk and 
Luhansk regions of eastern Ukraine, and an estimated 3.4 million 
people are at risk of ERW and landmines, including over 490,000 
children.2 While an increasing number of government agencies and 
nongovernmental organizations have been addressing the issue since 
the beginning of the crisis, recent risk education (RE) efforts have 
been hampered by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, which has heav-
ily affected Ukraine.3 The HALO Trust (HALO) has been working in 
Ukraine since the end of 2015 and conducting RE sessions since 2016. 
With support from the United States, United Kingdom, European 
Union, the Netherlands, Finland, Switzerland, and the United Nations 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF), HALO has conducted over 6,600 RE ses-
sions over the past five years at schools, kindergartens, places of wor-
ship, workplaces, community centers, and individual households to 
raise awareness of the dangers of ERW and landmines. During the pan-
demic, HALO successfully transitioned to a hybrid approach to explo-
sive ordnance risk education (EORE), including continued in-person 
seminars, where permitted, and online educational sessions. HALO 
also successfully tested the viability of using virtual reality (VR) for 
this aspect of humanitarian mine action (HMA). This article explains 
the path HALO has taken to be able to continue to provide effective 
RE to civilians in eastern Ukraine despite the COVID-19 pandemic.
The Ukraine Context
HALO has identified 317 hazardous and contaminated sites, total-
ing over 28 sq km of contamination including mines, UXO, and IEDs 
in eastern Ukraine from the recent conflict. Non-technical survey is, 
however, still ongoing. As of 26 May 2021, HALO has recorded 2,419 
casualties from mines and ERW in eastern Ukraine, of which 1,040 
were civilians. The presence of mines and UXO not only presents a 
deadly threat to civilians but also restricts their freedom of move-
ment and limits economic and educational opportunities by inhibit-
ing access to cultivable land and educational institutions. While the 
majority of threats lie in Luhansk and Donetsk regions, the explosion 
of ammunition stores and warehouses in the neighboring Kharkiv, 
Zaporizhzhia, and Dnipropetrovsk regions have also contributed to 
the threat from UXO in Ukraine.
The COVID-19 pandemic has severely affected the populace of 
Ukraine and has impacted many areas of HALO’s efforts towards alle-
viating the second-order effects of the crisis on the civilian population. 
As of September 2021, Ukraine has recorded more than 2 million cases 
of COVID-19 with over 53,000 reported deaths.4 
At the time of writing, in Ukraine, masks are mandatory in commu-
nal indoor spaces, many educational institutes are on a remote learn-
ing basis, and the government has restricted gatherings to a maximum 
of fifty people provided there is sufficient space for social distancing 
measures. Different regions have imposed diverse sets of restrictions as 
well, further complicating responses to the pandemic and necessitat-
ing a more flexible approach to EORE.
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Risk Education in Ukraine Before the Pandemic
Map of HALO’s RE efforts in eastern Ukraine.
All graphics courtesy of The HALO Trust.
HALO has been conducting RE sessions across eastern Ukraine 
since 2016. In 2018, HALO received its first grant solely for conduct-
ing RE in Ukraine from the United Kingdom’s Conflict, Security, and 
Stability Fund (CSSF), allowing the program to continuously conduct 
RE activities on an ongoing basis. As of September 2021, HALO’s EORE 
team consists of twelve instructors divided into four teams that devote 
their time entirely to RE efforts. Before 2018, HALO focused primar-
ily on sessions at schools and community centers, but after the explo-
sion of an ammunition warehouse in Ichnya, Chernihiv Oblast in 2018, 
HALO redirected its RE approach 
to target each household within a 30 
km radius from the warehouse. As a 
result, HALO visited 2,436 households 
in 90 settlements, providing RE to a 
total of 11,146 individuals, reaching 
the maximum number of people pos-
sible within the contamination zone. 
HALO has since adapted this response 
to regions in the immediate vicinity to 
the line of contact where the risk from 
ERW is greatest. The RE teams then 
attempt to cover the entire territory of 
the regions by working their way out 
from the line of contact in a westward 
direction covering as many settle-
ments as possible. 
Before the global COVID-19 out-
break, HALO’s program in Ukraine 
implemented a more traditional 
approach to RE relying on face-to-
face group sessions. These sessions, 
as with all of HALO’s RE methods, 
were based on the United Nations 
Inter-Agency Coordination Group-
endorsed International Mine Action 
Standards (IMAS)5 known as EORE.6 
EORE plays a central role in long-term 
mine clearance and explosive ord-
nance disposal (EOD) projects and is 
one of the five pillars of HMA. One of 
the central elements of EORE is flex-
ibility, which allows EORE programs 
to react and adapt quickly to changes 
in circumstances, increased conflict 
severity, and pandemics. 
In practical terms, HALO’s EORE 
efforts primarily consist of providing 
RE sessions to at-risk communities. 
The main locations of EORE seminars 
tend to be schools, but workplaces, 
community centers, religious organizations, and individual house-
holds can be targeted as well and have become increasingly impor-
tant, allowing us to reach specific target groups within the population. 
However, the pandemic has restricted HALO’s ability to travel and pro-
vide community, workplace, and household sessions. While currently 
mainly focused on children who might be unaware of the dangers of 
ERW, adults also benefit from RE sessions but are a more challenging 
demographic to reach due to their work schedules and frequent reluc-
tance to attend sessions.
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HALO aims to reach all demographic groups in Ukraine, with 
slightly different to providing the same information to children and 
adults. While the most at-risk group is adult men, accounting for 67 
percent of all civilian accidents (in which the casualty is known), many 
incidents also occur when children come across an article of ordnance. 
In many of these cases, children tamper with the explosive object, 
which is the most frequent action leading to civilian mine and ERW 
casualties and accounts for 24 percent of all civilian casualties in gen-
eral recorded by HALO in Ukraine. In order to maximize the effective-
ness of the campaign, HALO’s approach includes teaching parents of 
children who have previously attended an RE session. This ensures that 
the adults receive the same safety training as their children. In addi-
tion, when conducting EORE, HALO limits class size to a maximum 
of thirty individuals. 
 
HALO’s Approach to Risk Education During the Pandemic
Initial stages of the COVID-19 pandemic. During the initial 
months of the pandemic in 2020, HALO benefited from UNICEF sup-
port, which provided a large supply of RE materials (leaflets, school 
notebooks, comic books, stickers, coloring books, and posters). Access 
to these materials enabled HALO to continue providing RE informa-
tion without personal contact. While no direct EORE sessions were 
given, HALO teams visited 310,000 households in the government-
controlled areas (GCA) of Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts, totaling 182 
settlements, distributing materials to over 740,000 individuals via post 
boxes and posters in communal locations. HALO used this oppor-
tunity to also distribute information related to the pandemic and to 
reduce general exposure to COVID-19.
While the pandemic limited indoor in-person interactions, HALO 
made use of larger indoor and outdoor locations in school grounds, 
summer camps, and community centers to provide RE to both chil-
dren and adults. While this allowed HALO to continue the provision of 
RE despite the pandemic, many school districts were understandably 
reluctant to allow in-person teaching despite the precautions taken. In 
early autumn 2020, HALO RE teams transitioned to a hybrid educa-
tion model to protect both children and employees from COVID-19 
exposure and the harsher winter temperatures, which created limita-
tions for holding outdoor sessions in schools that found themselves 
under restrictive COVID regulations. HALO held online sessions 
when certain school districts were under restrictions while continuing 
to provide in-person sessions, where permitted. 
Online education. While nothing can truly substitute in-person 
interaction, as of September 2021, HALO had con-
ducted over 362 sessions reaching 8,203 individuals 
since the beginning of the pandemic.4 
Besides reducing the risk of infection, this new 
approach has allowed EORE instructors to be more 
flexible, mobile, and to reach more students in more 
complicated situations, such as during the pandemic, 
as instructors can work throughout Ukraine with-
out requiring additional funding for travel. While 
distance learning requires more thoughtful plan-
ning, a reduction in travel time equals an increase 
in RE sessions delivered. Additionally, monitoring is 
now easier due to the ability to record each session, 
answer any questions retroactively, and detect any 
issues that need to be addressed. HALO predomi-
nantly uses Google Meet, as it requires no additional 
Delivering education leaflets.
Outdoor HALO RE seminar.
installation or funding but also uses Zoom and Microsoft Teams if 
schools use those software applications themselves.
The challenges of online education are mostly related to technologi-
cal hindrances, as many individuals and schools do not have the neces-
sary equipment or a reliable internet connection.7 Teachers are often not 
familiar with distance learning techniques, lack the technical knowledge 
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related to online learning, such as multimedia projector set up or soft-
ware installation, or have difficulty enforcing discipline and participation 
in class. In addition, due to the pandemic, many schools are reluctant to 
move classes around to access the multimedia equipment, which is sparse 
and often only in one or two rooms per school building.8
Despite the challenges, online education is a sufficient interim 
replacement for in-person RE sessions. By taking a proactive approach 
to the preparation, organization, and conducting of online sessions, 
HALO has seen positive results based on the children’s interest, disci-
pline, activity during online lessons, as well as feedback from teachers 
and parents.
 
Hybrid risk education. Looking ahead to post-pandemic times, 
the lessons learned from providing RE to the people of Ukraine dur-
ing the COVID-19 pandemic can provide opportunities for increased 
effectiveness of EORE projects globally.
Taking a hybrid approach utilizing both in-person and online RE 
sessions can involve students who are absent from in-person events 
due to illnesses, homeschooling, or remote locations, and can simulta-
neously engage their parents via online platforms. Intentionally target-
ing parents and their children simultaneously is a new approach to risk 
education, which can help consolidate knowledge in both age groups 
and may stimulate further discussion of the topic between adults and 
children. 
New technologies. The use of newer technologies may also help 
to improve the effectiveness of EORE delivery in the near future. In 
Ukraine, HALO acts as a technical advisor 
to UNICEF concerning the development and 
testing of EORE and the production of train-
ing materials. In spring 2021, UNICEF, with 
technical expertise from HALO, developed a 
virtual reality EORE software tool, and HALO 
began implementing it as a pilot scheme for 
the use of VR in the provision of RE. HALO’s 
VR program uses real locations from eastern 
Ukraine paired with real-life examples of ERW 
in conjunction with voiceovers giving instruc-
tional safety messages to create simulations of 
minefields and UXO located in buildings and 
fields. These simulations were different for each 
age category, taking into account the partici-
pants’ abilities to perceive and assimilate infor-
mation according to their age.
VR simulations have proved useful in 
schools to increase engagement and attention 
in children to highlight a variety of situations in which individuals 
might find themselves threatened by ERW. While VR sessions are 
unable to replace the effectiveness of traditional in-person events, they 
provide an effective tool for knowledge consolidation after RE sessions. 
VR users are mentally, emotionally, and physically immersed in a situ-
ation, which stimulates their senses, allowing them to interact with the 
environment and preparing them for real-world conditions.9 
As the pandemic continues, and its effects are likely to be felt for 
years to come, HALO’s new mobile and hybrid approach to EORE in 
Ukraine has shown potential. Depending on suitability, this approach 
can be adapted for other RE projects and programs across the world 
both during and after the COVID-19 pandemic. 
See endnotes page 147
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By Oliver Ford, Amasia Zargarian [ The HALO Trust ], and Eric Keefer [ Office of Weapons Removal and 
Abatement, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State ]
The HALO Trust (HALO) arrived in Colombia in 2009 and, once accredited, began operations in 2013. HALO is currently the largest civilian humanitarian demining organization in the coun-try, operating in twenty-five municipalities across eight departments.¹ The United States has 
supported HALO from the outset in Colombia and remains the single biggest donor for demining in 
the country. In 2019, through U.S. Department of State support, HALO began an innovative study to 
investigate the causal link between landmine clearance and socioeconomic development in Colombia. 
The study focused on two municipalities in the south of Antioquia Department—Nariño and La Unión—
both of which were declared landmine-free by HALO in 2016. The following article describes the meth-
odology behind this project, challenges faced during implementation, and the ultimate results of the 
study. It also seeks to demonstrate, more broadly, why such studies are vital for understanding the 
medium- to long-term effects of landmine removal in communities previously affected by explosive 
remnants of war (ERW).
Teams visit the landowner of the first minefield 
cleared by HALO in Nariño, El Morro, in the 
small town of Puerto Venus.
All images courtesy of The HALO Trust.
A Study in Colombia
Context 
Colombia has suffered over fifty years of internal conflict, principally 
between the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia–Ejército 
del Pueblo (FARC-EP) and the government of Colombia. A peace 
accord was ratified between the two sides in 2016. Improvised land-
mines first appeared in 1990 and were used by non-state armed groups 
to protect strategic locations, access routes, and guerrilla camps. Their 
widespread use left behind a deadly legacy of explosive contamination 
throughout the country. As of May 2021, over 12,000 landmine acci-
dents have been recorded across Colombia, with more than a fifth of 
those occurring in Antioquia, affording it the unfortunate accolade of 
the department with the most accidents nationally.2 In Nariño and La 
Unión, there have been thirty-five recorded accidents caused by ERW, 
twenty-nine of which occurred in Nariño and six in La Unión.
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In October 2016, thanks to continued funding from the United 
States, both Nariño and La Unión were declared landmine-free by 
the government of Colombia, making them the first municipalities 
in Colombia to be formally handed over by a civilian organization, a 
historic milestone made possible by HALO’s work. This intervention 
set the conditions for local rural communities to live in a landmine-
free environment, enabling socioeconomic development and the safe 
return of internally displaced persons (IDPs).
Project Goal and Key Areas of Investigation
In 2019, more than three years after the declaration of Nariño and 
La Unión as landmine-free, HALO secured US support to return to the 
municipalities to conduct the first in-depth post-clearance assessment 
of its kind in Colombia. HALO selected these municipalities for the 
study as they had been mine-free for longer than any other munici-
pality handed over by a civilian organization. The three-year period 
of being landmine free meant that a sufficient amount of time had 
passed to be able to measure the effects of landmine clearance on vari-
ous aspects of social and economic life. Although it was widely under-
stood that the clearance of landmines brought benefits to communities 
previously affected by ERW, there was little concrete evidence to sup-
port the assumptions of the positive impacts of humanitarian mine 
clearance in Colombia. With this in mind, the Department of State 
and HALO sought toinvestigate the causal link between humanitar-
ian mine clearance activities and socioeconomic development in the 
landmine-free municipalities of Nariño and La Unión, Antioquia. 
The key areas investigated were:
1. Productive land use included cleared land and increased 
agricultural productivity.
2. Economic benefit increased property value and monthly 
income.
3. Social benefit increased connectivity within communities, 
return of IDPs, and reduced levels of fear.
4. Municipal economic growth increased principally through 
the collection of property tax.
5. Implementation of development projects included 
improvements in the standard of living through municipal and 
third-party investment in rural community projects.
6. Employment consisted of hiring local staff from the region.
The full investigation report is published on HALO’s website and is 
available for download here.3
Figure 1. Map of Colombia. 
In 2013, with US funding, HALO began its first humanitarian dem-
ining operations in Colombia in Nariño. Over the next three years, 
HALO cleared nearly 114,000 sq m of hazardous area—the equivalent 
of more than twenty-one football fields—and disposed of dozens of 
explosive devices. In La Unión, meanwhile, HALO conducted non-
technical survey (NTS) across the municipality, but no explosive con-
tamination or minefields were identified. The Colombian military had 
conducted demining operations in La Unión prior to HALO’s arrival, 
but it had not yet been certified as free of mines.
Methodology
This project was implemented in collaboration with two prominent 
economists—Professors Raúl Castro Rodríguez and Jorge Armando 
Rueda—from La Universidad de los Andes, Bogotá, one of Colombia’s 
leading universities. Professors Castro and Rueda provided a macro 
view of the economic impact of demining at a municipal level, as well 
as support in the design of household survey forms and in the analysis 
of the data collected by HALO.
HALO conducted the investigation over a fourteen-month period 
(extended somewhat due to the COVID-19 pandemic) in four phases: 
planning and training, data collection, data analysis, and final 
report preparation. As there was no pre-clearance survey conducted 
in Nariño and La Unión, and no previous studies of this kind con-
ducted in Colombia, HALO reconstructed a baseline in order to cre-
ate a starting point from which to measure the level of socioeconomic 
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Data collection teams visited households of 
direct and indirect beneficiaries of landmine 
clearance.
Investigation Results
The key findings of this investigation provided concrete evidence 
for a causal link between humanitarian demining and socioeconomic 
development in Colombia. Furthermore, the investigation has pro-
duced a viable set of indicators that provide the humanitarian demin-
ing sector in Colombia with the appropriate tools to similarly measure 
impact across the country.
 This former minefield (Figure 2) in El Bosque vereda was handed 
over to the local community in June 2016 and was the last minefield to 
be cleared in Nariño. The land has since been put to productive use by 
a local farmer who is growing coffee and avocados as well as grazing 
his animals.
development in the two municipalities. This was principally achieved 
through desk-based research as well as retrospective questioning dur-
ing household surveys.
Through these household surveys, HALO gathered data from three 
main groups: direct beneficiaries of clearance, indirect beneficiaries of 
clearance, and a control group (residents of veredas,4 where no con-
tamination was identified). Information was also gathered from key 
informants such as vereda presidents and members of the municipal 
governments. In total, HALO conducted 699 household surveys across 
the two municipalities.
Once all the data was collected, HALO and the supporting profes-
sors carried out in-depth analysis of the information gathered through 
survey and key informant interviews. As both the original demin-
ing activities and the more recent data collection were carried out by 
HALO, the participation of well-respected third-party moderators—in 
this case Professors Castro and Rueda—was important to ensure the 
impartiality and reliability of results.
Productive land use. Aside from the previously contaminated land 
that was cleared, there was a significant increase in overall agricultural 
productivity in surrounding areas as a result of the removal of explo-
sive devices. The removal of the threat posed by landmines and other 
explosive ordnance has allowed landowners to use their land with con-
fidence, resulting in higher levels of productivity. The amount of land 
in productive use today (for cultivation and grazing) has increased 
by an average of 66 percent in Nariño from when landmines first 
appeared. Thanks to clearance, there have been significant improve-
ments in access routes through paved roads, improving social connec-
tivity as well as access to services such as public transport, schools, and 
medical facilities.
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and land is considerably 
more valuable there than in 
Nariño. As a result of the lack 
of growth in property value 
during the twenty years when 
landmines and other explo-
sives were present in Nariño, 
property value is still sig-
nificantly lower from what it 
would be had landmines never 
been laid in the municipality. 
Social benefit. In almost 
all cases, the three target 
groups reported an improve-
ment in social connectivity. 
To assess the changes in social 
connectivity, HALO imple-
mented a line of questioning 
that reported beneficiaries’ attitudes toward certain activities before 
HALO’s arrival and after clearance activities. A few examples of the 
questions asked and results reported are captured in Table 1.
The overall results showed improvements in the capacity to share 
resources, the capacity to work together, and the sense of connec-
tivity with the rest of the municipality. As shown in Table 1, lev-
els of fear were also significantly reduced, and direct and indirect 
beneficiary households reported an improved sense of security in 
Direct Beneficiary Households Indirect Beneficiary Households
Before 
Clearance
After Clearance Before Clearance After Clearance
Q: How fearful was/is your household to live and work in your vereda?
Extremely fearful 69% 0% 64% 0%
Fearful 26% 0% 33% 0%
Somewhat fearful 3% 0% 1% 0%
Not fearful at all 3% 100% 2% 100%
Q: How fearful was/is your household to use your own land?
Extremely fearful 62% 0% 51% 1%
Fearful 19% 0% 33% 1%
Somewhat fearful 6% 0% 2% 0%
Not fearful at all 13% 100% 14% 98%
Table 1. Sample questionnaire used by HALO staff.
Property value. An unexpected finding of this investigation 
was the profound effect that the presence of landmines has had on 
property values in the municipality of Nariño. Where landmines 
were present, property values decreased by an average of 83 percent. 
Once clearance was completed and the municipality was declared 
landmine-free, a significant rise in property values followed at more 
than a 480 percent average increase. In La Unión, where no explo-
sive contamination was identified, property prices increased yearly, 
Figure 1. Map of cleared land.
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conducting day-to-day activities such as working and transiting 
through their vereda. The peace of mind provided through the 
clearance of landmines and the increase in psychological wellbeing 
are almost impossible to quantify, but they are an integral part of 
the service that demining organizations in Colombia can provide to 
communities affected by conf lict.
According to the information gathered, 772 displaced families (646 
families from Nariño and 126 families from La Unión) have returned 
since their displacement, a process that cannot legally happen until 
clearance is completed. This in itself is a noteworthy achievement that 
can be directly attributed to HALO’s work, as this would not have been 
possible without humanitarian demining.
Implementation of development projects. The presence or even 
suspicion of landmines acts as a roadblock to development projects, as 
Surveys were conducted using a combination 
of physical survey forms and the digital data 
collection application Fulcrum. Interviews were 
also recorded for quality control purposes.
these are unable to begin until a municipality is declared landmine-free. 
This was the case in La Unión, where the implementation of key devel-
opment projects followed the mine-free declaration in 2016, enabled by 
land release through NTS of individual veredas and eventually the entire 
municipality. HALO identified fourteen projects aimed at improving the 
socioeconomic wellbeing of rural communities, implemented by local 
governmental and private organizations after 2016. For instance, proj-
ects providing septic tanks, home improvements, and safe, efficient stoves 
have boosted the quality of life for rural families. Furthermore, these 
communities received tools and training that will help diversify crop 
cultivations and generate income. The implementation of such projects 
is inherently sustainable, as it builds capacity within the community for 
individuals to provide for themselves into the future. 
Application of Results
The findings of this investigation have highlighted a critical need 
for accelerated socioeconomic development in rural Colombia. As 
described previously, the current system requires an entire municipal-
ity to be declared landmine-free before the implementation of devel-
opment projects, which hampers the rate of development for some of 
Colombia’s most vulnerable communities. In some cases, a vereda may 
be declared landmine-free but ineligible for any additional support for 
years to come until humanitarian demining activities are completed in 
the rest of the municipality. Fortunately, the government of Colombia 
is considering changes to this system for approving development proj-
ects, supported by the results of this investigation.
As part of this project, HALO held a seminar in March 2021 to 
share the findings of the investigation with the humanitarian dem-
ining sector in Colombia, demonstrating what is possible in terms of 
impact measurement. Following the seminar, the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Peace (OACP) and the Swiss Foundation for Mine 
Action (FSD) are holding talks as to how this type of investigation can 
be replicated across the country. Doing so will allow Colombians to 
not only better understand the true value of landmine clearance but 
also help the government identify where support is needed for com-
munities affected by ERW. 
The framework and methodology established during this study can 
be easily replicated, not only in Colombia but also in other countries 
affected by landmines. By better articulating the medium- to long-term 
outcomes of humanitarian demining in a specific country context—
and providing the evidence to support these findings—humanitarian 
organizations, governments, and their donor partners can more read-
ily demonstrate the true benefit of landmine clearance.
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William Otavalo (fourty-two) lives in the vereda of San Miguel in Nariño, working the land to support his family. In 2004, while working on a neighbor’s farm, William fell victim to an improvised landmine, sus-
taining a severe injury to his hand, burns to his body, and multiple shrapnel wounds. When the fighting intensi-
fied in Nariño in 2006, William and his family were forcibly displaced from their family home. 
After William’s family eventually returned to their farm years later, they were fearful of the potential mines 
that lay hidden, and productive land remained abandoned. When HALO arrived in 2013, William provided 
invaluable information that led to the removal of twelve landmines from his land, preventing further injury. 
Thanks to the clearance on his property, William is now able to use all of his land with the confidence that it is 
safe and is grazing cattle that he has since purchased. The clearance of the mines on his land has also provided 
access to a fresh water source, which has in turn enabled him to start a fish farming project, bringing further 
economic stability to his family. 
Lessons Learned
Given this was the first investigation of its kind in Colombia, there 
are some critical lessons learned for future projects. As in all academic 
investigations, the reliability of data is the cornerstone of objective 
and informative results. The lack of baseline data and the need to 
depend on respondents’ recollection of times past indicate that there 
is a degree of inaccuracy that must be accounted for. In order to pro-
duce more reliable results, it is important that socioeconomic data is 
recorded at the earliest possible opportunity, prior to the start of land-
mine clearance or even NTS.
The inclusion of Professors Castro and Rueda as third-party partici-
pants was of monumental value to this investigation. Their input pro-
vided a level of objectivity otherwise impossible had HALO conducted 
the study alone. An unbiased third party also affords a higher degree of 
transparency and credibility in the reported outcomes. 
58
The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol25/iss1/1
25TH ANNIVERSARY ISSUE @ SUMMER 2021 59
Oliver Ford
Monitoring & Evaluation Officer
The HALO Trust
Oliver Ford moved to Colombia from 
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and works to improve Colombia’s 
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analysis to better understand the 
impact mine action generates in conflict-affected communi-
ties in Colombia.
Amasia Zargarian 
Grants and Development Manager
The HALO Trust
Amasia Zargarian is the grants and 
development manager for The HALO 
Trust (USA), overseeing HALO’s US 
federal and private grants from 
Washington, DC. He first joined 
HALO in 2016, spending two years as 
the regional program officer for the 
Caucasus, based mainly in Nagorno 
Karabakh and also supporting HALO’s Georgia and Abkhazia 
programs. Zargarian is a graduate of Stanford University, 
where he received his bachelor’s and master’s degrees.
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“Through this study, we now have the scien-
tific and academic evidence to be able to say, 
that in effect, there is positive psychological 
impact on communities, once the suspicion of 
landmines is removed, allowing for the return of 
displaced persons and processing of land resti-
tution claims.”
 ~ Martha Isabel Hurtado, 










Perspective from the U.S. Department of State
The United States is the leading contributor to humanitar-
ian demining projects both globally and in Colombia, where US 
contributions have exceeded $159 million. Foreign assistance is 
an investment, and it is incumbent on the Department of State to 
demonstrate clearly to American taxpayers that their investment 
is achieving concrete results. To that end, the Department of State 
requires grant recipients to submit regular programmatic and finan-
cial reports on project performance, including project outputs. That 
information, though important for demonstrating progress, does 
not paint a complete picture of the full impact of US humanitarian 
demining assistance. To more holistically demonstrate its impact, 
the Department of State agreed to fund HALO’s pilot post-clearance 
impact assessment.
The Department of State has provided $92.5 million to support a 
variety of mine action initiatives in Colombia since the peace accord 
was signed in late 2016, with a significant majority of that assistance 
(approximately 79 percent) going toward land release operations in 
priority locations. That assistance directly benefits rural communities 
most affected by the long conflict with the FARC-EP, and it also directly 
enables other US and Colombian priority efforts, including coca eradi-
cation, development initiatives, and land restitution. Humanitarian 
demining work made these broader efforts possible, and the study’s 
findings provide clear and irrefutable evidence that land release gener-
ates positive socioeconomic outcomes. 
The evidence produced by HALO’s study clearly demonstrates that 
humanitarian demining in Colombia has been a wise investment. 
Additionally, HALO’s efforts established a foundation for future moni-
toring and evaluation (M&E) initiatives in Colombia. In August 2021, 
HALO developed roving M&E teams to collect information from com-
munities affected by explosive hazards at various stages of the dem-
ining process. These teams will provide additional information that 
further reinforces the link between humanitarian demining and socio-
economic development. 
Conclusions
The evidence obtained during this investigation demonstrates a 
causal link between humanitarian mine clearance and socioeconomic 
development in Colombia. The presence or suspicion of landmines 
directly impedes the capacity of municipal governments and third 
parties to implement development projects, as well as the legal return 
of IDPs and processing of land restitution claims. The clearance of 
landmines and other explosive ordnance is the first step in creating 
the conditions for rapid socioeconomic development and an overall 
improvement in living conditions in rural areas affected by conflict. 
The increase in land value after clearance, as well as general increases 
in monthly income, will continuously help with creating wealth and 
reducing poverty levels across Nariño.
Though the socioeconomic situation in Nariño and La Unión has 
improved, the long-term benefits of land release through clearance and 
NTS are likely not to be seen for another five years or more. Importantly 
though, the foundations have now been laid for a stable and diverse 
economy. Continued donor support for humanitarian demining in 
conflict-affected communities across Colombia will enable and ensure 
the conditions for socioeconomic development, growth, and stability 
in the years to come. 
See endnotes page 148
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COVID-19
Colombia
The COVID-19 pandemic has impacted the mine action sector globally. In this article, the authors look at how the pandemic has affected Colombia, specifically concentrating on how the pandemic has affected humanitarian demining (HD)-related activities. To do so, the Swiss Foundation for 
Demining (FSD) compared key HD indicators from 2019 to 2020 in order to evaluate the performance of 
HD operations in Colombia, and carried out an assessment among HD organizations (HDOs) operating in-
country through the Quick Impact Survey on COVID-19 Impact on Humanitarian Operations. Moreover, 
the authors provide an example of community service activities and projects implemented by organiza-
tions during the pandemic. The results showed that between 2019 and 2020, there was a 20 percent 
decrease in the reported number of total square meters cleared in Colombia, as well as a reduction in 
the number of non-technical survey (NTS) tasks and clearance operations, explosive ordnance risk educa-
tion (EORE) beneficiaries, and activities completed. Despite numerous lockdowns, the number of victims 
unfortunately increased by 45 percent (from 114 to 166 victims). Regarding fieldwork, all organizations 
reported a temporary suspension of operations (from two to six months in total), with clearance activi-
ties being the most affected. However, the great majority of organizations have re-directed a portion of 
funds to provide emergency humanitarian aid (food, hygiene kits, etc.) to the most vulnerable communi-
ties affected by the pandemic. 
By Salomé Valencia Aguirre, Angela De Santis, Ph.D., and Sebastián Tovar Jaramillo 
[ Swiss Foundation for Mine Action ]
Examples of the activities FSD 
carried out in 2020 to support 
the most vulnerable population in 
Bogotá (Colombia).
All graphics courtesy of the authors.
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The COVID-19 pandemic, as well as all subsequent measures to 
control it, suddenly transformed the living dynamics of most citi-
zens, impacting the socioeconomic, environmental, and cultural 
spheres. In Colombia, the first case of COVID-19 was confirmed on 
6 March 2020. A week later, the government announced a national 
state of emergency, dedicating economic resources to help man-
age the crisis. On 20 March, the national mandatory lock-down 
began, which lasted several months. In fact, Colombia had one of 
the longest mandatory isolation periods globally. As of April 2021, 
2,774,464 cases had been confirmed in Colombia, and 71,351 people 
had died from the disease.1
Although it is too early to assess the magnitude of impacts 
caused by the containment measures, the alarming increase in 
unemployment impoverished millions of households.2 The crisis 
has unequally affected different regions of the country due to pre-
existing social and economic gaps. Another worrying fact is the 
increase in human rights violations, with one of the most affected 
regions being Cauca, a Department with massive anti-personnel 
(AP) mine contamination—which ranks first, in comparison with 
other Departments, and represents almost a third of the country’s 
INDICATOR 2019 2020
Cumulative cleared square meters 1,625,006 1,293,304
Explosive ordnance items destroyed 474 203
EORE beneficiaries 199,305 54,878
Victims 114 166
Table 1. Comparison of indicators between 2019 and 2020.
AP-mine victims. Furthermore, the prolonged confinement has 
exponentially3 increased femicides and other types of gender-based 
violence, which has disproportionately affected indigenous, afro-
descendant, and peasant women, among others.
Regarding the mine action sector, several authors have identified 
specific effects,4,5 such as the suspension of programs, repatriation 
of international staff, temporary closure of worksites, travel restric-
tions imposed on staff, and limitations in victim assistance (VA) 
and EORE activities. Moreover, official data provided by the Office 
of the High Commissioner for Peace (OACP)6 was used to analyze 
the results of HD operations, victim assistance (VA), and EORE. 
Accordingly, with funds from The Office of Weapons Removal 
and Abatement in the U.S State Department’s Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs (PM/WRA), FSD conducted a survey with accred-
ited HDOs to assess other impacts where questions from the Quick 
Impact Survey on COVID-19 Impact on Humanitarian Operations7 
were used as a guide to prepare a specific questionnaire adjusted to 
the context of HD activities in Colombia. Seven accredited organi-
zations replied to the survey: five civilian HDOs8 in addition to the 
United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) and FSD.
Impact on Indicators Related to Humanitarian Demining, Explosive Ord-
nance Risk Education, and Victim Assistance (2019 vs. 2020)
As shown in Table 1, based on IMSMA data from the OACP,9 there 
was a 20 percent decrease in the reported number of total square 
meters cleared in Colombia in 2020 compared to 2019. This reduction 
was not so dramatic, given that military demining operators were not 
required to suspend operations during the most critical months of the 
pandemic. Hence, military operators carried out 88 percent of clear-
ance operations (1,138,832 sq m). Although this ratio of military- to 
civilian-conducted clearance is normal in Colombia, civilian orga-
nizations cleared 30 percent of the total number of square meters in 
2019 versus 12 percent in 2020. In regard to destroyed mines/explosive 
remnants of war (ERW) items, 57 percent less were destroyed in 2020 
than in 2019. In terms of operations, 86 non-technical survey (NTS) 
tasks and 213 clearance operations were completed in 2019, compared 
to 15 and 183 in 2020. Regarding EORE activities, Table 1 shows 
the reduction in the number of beneficiaries and activities between 
2019 and 2020. However, in 2020, EORE was prioritized in the most 
AP-mine-affected municipalities to try to maximize the impact of the 
reduced number of activities carried out.
Despite numerous lockdowns, the number of victims unfortunately 
increased by 45 percent, rising from 114 to 166 victims. Moreover, there 
was a higher proportion of afro-descendant (2019: 0, 2020: 19) and 
indigenous (2019: 1, 2020: 20) victims (20 percent in 2020 versus 1.7 per-
cent out of the 2019 total). Nariño was the most affected region in both 
periods (2019: 38, 2020: 62) and faced a dramatic social crisis due to the 
murder of social leaders, threats to the civilian population, and clashes 
between illegal groups. Following the start of the pandemic, AP-mine-
contaminated areas, which already had access limitations, were blocked 
until further notice due to security issues and government restrictions 
resulting from the pandemic. Throughout the pandemic, some exist-
ing challenges have increased: food insecurity, reduced access to edu-
cation, health services, vaccinations, etc. Similarly, the uncertainty 
faced by people with disabilities caused by AP mines, who struggle to 
access health care services (prosthetics and rehabilitation), will be fur-
ther exacerbated due to the current health system collapse. Ultimately, 
it is likely that productive use of released land will be delayed, and the 
difficulties in undertaking productive projects will be greater, causing 
further instability for survivors.
Perception of HDOs
 In regards to the impact caused by the pandemic, the measures imposed by the national and/or local authorities have 
impacted humanitarian operations at various levels. Seven civilian organizations, five of whom carried out demining operations, 
completed the Quick Impact Survey on COVID-19 Impact on Humanitarian Operations, and the most relevant findings follow.
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The data considered for this section corresponds only to information provided by HDOs.
Suspension of employment contracts
Suspension of operations
Telework
Repatriation of international sta
Limitation of mobilization of personnel
to or from the sites of operations
Number of organizations
0 21 3 4 5 6 7 8
Figure 1. Measures taken by HDOs.
MEASURE IMPACT
Movement restriction – 
closure of national borders
Suspension of operations (temporary)
- Suspension of technical assistance in the field
Movement restriction – 
closure of international borders
Repatriation of international staff 
Mandatory isolation – curfew Prohibition of on-site meetings and workshops
- Reduction of EORE activities
- Telework
Import – export restrictions Reduction on the availability of supplies
Table 2. Measures and impacts.
Impact on Demining Operations 
All HDOs surveyed reported a meaningful impact on demining 
operations among the five pillars of mine action (demining, EORE, 
VA, advocacy, and stockpile destruction). 
Regarding fieldwork, all organizations reported a temporary sus-
pension of operations (from two to six months in total). When inquir-
ing about the causes of these suspensions or limitations against the 
normal conduct of activities, in addition to the suspension of opera-
tions from March to June 2020 imposed by the national government, 
organizations reported other external causes related to the pandemic 
and security issues: COVID cases in the allocated areas; road block-
ages by communities to prevent access; lack of supplies and suppli-
ers; presence of illegal armed groups; adapting operation sites to face 
the pandemic; limited ground transportation; and lack of knowledge 
regarding risk prevention.
All these organizations adjusted their NTS, EORE, or community-
liaison data-collection activities due to potential contagion 
risks for their staff. In addition, three out of five organi-
zations that carried out demining operations reported 
that communication with their beneficiaries was severely 
affected, and all reported a medium impact regarding 
communication with local authorities.
When inquiring specifically about the degree of 
impact produced by some measures (Table 2), six out 
of seven organizations claimed that the impact due to 
the limitation of imported supplies was low, whereas 
the impact on traveling within the country was high for 
five organizations and medium for the remaining two. 
Some of the most frequent changes in organizational 
dynamics were the limitations on mobilizing staff and 
the implementation of telework. One organiza-
tion reported the repatriation of international 
staff, although none suspended employment con-
tracts. These measures were applied to national 
and international staff—except repatriation—in 
six organizations out of seven.
Organizations conducted specific activities 
that had different degrees of impact: three orga-
nizations experienced medium impact, two high, 
and two low. None of the organizations reported 
any impact on communications with donors, and 
only two organizations claimed to have some 
degree of impairment in the communication with other civilian 
organizations. Transportation suffered high and medium impacts 
for six of the organizations. Moreover, the reallocation of funds 
and cost reduction due to a decrease in funding did not represent 
a significant impact, five organizations reported it as low and two 
as medium. 
More specifically, when the organizations were asked about the 
percentage of general economic impacts of the pandemic on the 
projects in relation to the initial budget, six organizations reported 
an impact between zero to 20 percent, and only one reported an 
impact between 20 to 40 percent. Four organizations allocated some 
activities focused on COVID-19-related actions such as providing 
supplies and other products to local communities. Lastly, six orga-
nizations implemented capacity-building activities with their staff 
during the suspension of operations.
Successful Experiences Implemented During the Crisis
 One of the greatest challenges imposed by the pandemic was the 
inability to carry out on-site activities. In this regard, several organiza-
tions reported the use of virtual media. Some of the organizations used 
this tool to train their field staff, and one organization included human 
rights and gender training for all staff. Another organization resumed 
EORE activities through the design of social media campaigns, radio 
messages, and virtual workshops.
One organization discussed its strategy to reduce the contagion 
risk, and another one reported “zero contagion” within its operational 
teams and during its retraining sessions as a result of strict compliance 
62
The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol25/iss1/1
25TH ANNIVERSARY ISSUE @ SUMMER 2021 63
Salomé Valencia Aguirre, M.D. M.P.H.
Technical Adviser on Data Analysis
Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)
Salomé Valencia Aguirre currently 
works at the Swiss Foundation for 
Demining (FSD) as a Technical Adviser 
on data analysis. Aguirre has experi-
ence in research carried out in the field 
of evidence-based decision making in 
different areas. She has been working 
in the field of humanitarian demining, 
supporting the national authority in monitoring indicators to 
improve operational efficiency as well as the systematic and 
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Angela De Santis, Ph.D., has over fif-
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including in the fields of crisis manage-
ment and humanitarian aid. Due to her 
work as Adviser and Regional Focal 
Point at the Geneva International Cen-
tre for Humanitarian Demining 
(GICHD), and humanitarian demining 
consultant and program manager for mine action programs, 
she has extensive experience working with mine action pro-
grams in Africa and Latin America, with special focus on 
Colombia. She holds a doctorate in Remote Sensing, GIS, and 
Topography, an international master’s degree in the Manage-
ment of NGOs, International Cooperation and Humanitarian 
Aid; and a Project Management Professional (PMP) certifica-
tion. She has experience in several areas of mine action includ-
ing victim assistance, post-natural disaster environments, 
gender, conflicts in Latin America, and capacity-building.
Sebastián Tovar Jaramillo
Translator and Interpreter 
Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD)
Sebastián Tovar Jaramillo is a modern 
language professional specializing in 
commercial translation and holds a 
master’s degree in political science 
and international relations. He has 
worked in the mine action sector in 
Colombia for more than four years as a 
supporting member of the team of 
technical advisers in FSD. As a fundamental part of his job, 
Jaramillo has strengthened his knowledge through seminars, 
meetings, and field visits in regard to technical subjects, 
including the use of manual, mine detection dog, and mechan-
ical assets in demining; EOD activities, and environmental 
management in mine action. In November 2019, Jaramillo was 
involved in an initial mine risk education training coordinated 
by the Danish Demining Group (DDG) and led by OACP - 
Descontamina Colombia. He also has been involved in the 
construction of national mine action standards since 2017.
with its biosafety protocols. One organization established work peri-
ods, which were increased from three to five weeks to avoid recurring 
entry and exit movements from and into the sectors or municipali-
ties. Likewise, tests were carried out for the access of staff after break 
periods. Ultimately, one organization carried out a project to mitigate 
the socioeconomic impacts of the pandemic on the community. FSD, 
in partnership with the local NGO Fundación Sembradores de Luz y 
Recolectores de Esperanza (https://sereza.org/)—led and composed by 
victims of the conflict with experience in assisting vulnerable commu-
nities—provided assistance in Bogotá, Colombia, by distributing hot 
meals, hygiene kits, face masks, etc., to indigenous internally displaced 
children, the homeless, Venezuelan refugees, elderly people, and fami-
lies with no sources of income from May to December 2020.
Conclusions
Because of the conditions caused by the pandemic in Colombia, 
mine action activities have suffered setbacks in comparison with 
preceding years. The most affected component has been the 
humanitarian demining sector’s clearance activities. The increase 
in the number of mine victims, who reside in violence-affected 
areas of the country, is concerning, especially as it is dispropor-
tionately affecting the most vulnerable populations. Even though 
EORE activities have been allocated to these strongly affected 
areas, and innovative campaigns have been carried out through 
virtual media, the technological gap does not allow equitable 
access. Finally, there are two aspects that may hinder the projec-
tions made by the Colombian government to meet Colombia’s obli-
gation under Article 5 of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention 
to remove all AP mines by 2025: the decrease of key operational 
indicators in 2020, and the uncertainty of the duration of the pan-
demic and a full return to full activities. 
See endnotes page 148
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By Brenna Matlock [ Center for International Stabilization and Recovery ]
The humanitarian mine action (HMA) sector, as a part of the wider security and peacebuilding field, has made significant gains related to gender equity in field operations. In recent years, women deminers have received increased donor and media attention. As a result, there now 
exists a wide breadth of texts, literature, documentaries, etc., about women who work to remove 
landmines and other explosives from the ground. The availability of this new information and recent 
increased public and media attention generates the following questions: Are the narratives accurate, 
and do women deminers agree with them? How do women deminers view the ways that they are rep-
resented in the media? What has been shared about female demining with the world? How can HMA 
organizations use information on women deminers’ experiences to make meaningful connections with 
the wider security and development sector? 
A mixed-methods study was designed to understand and evaluate 
popular narratives about women deminers as they emerge in publicly-
accessible and popular media. In addition to document collection and 
review from such sources, a survey was administered to women demin-
ing teams globally to ask them about these narratives and to capture 
their opinions on what has been written. Women deminers from at least 
three demining teams from different geographic regions (Southeast 
Asia, South/Central Asia, and the Middle East) answered the survey.
Findings from both datasets—a corpus of published narratives and 
results from this survey study—illustrate important themes about the 
current literature and, ultimately, provide important considerations 
for how women deminers are written about in the future. As a result 
of these intentional narratives, the potential exists to improve gender 
mainstreaming/equity outcomes for women demining teams as well 
gender equity in other areas of security and peacekeeping. Specifically, 
the texts provide insights into women deminers’ motivations and 
occupational choices, but little information is discussed beyond these 
topics. Thus, the HMA sector should evolve the narratives surround-
ing women deminers using the techniques that have so far captured 
accurate portrayals to advance the role of women in the wider secu-
rity and development sector. The next sections outline the structure 
of the study and the major themes portrayed in the popular media. 
These themes are then compared to the survey responses from women 
deminers.
Materials and Methods
Using a phenomenological framework and relying on theories in 
the field of rhetoric, the study collected qualitative data sources from a 
range of texts written about women deminers and from online surveys 
distributed to female demining teams.1 This design approach allowed 
for emergent themes and trends related to gender equality in post-
conflict environments, particularly through a focus on the deminers’ 
roles as active participants in the peacebuilding and reconstruction 
processes. Texts created about women demining teams demonstrate 
the current popular view of deminers within their career field and the 
media. Rhetorical-framed insights into women deminers’ experiences 
in this unique space of post-conflict and peacebuilding also emerge 
from the collected surveys of the participants.2 In addition to knowing 
whether or not women deminers have access to the narratives written 
about them for public consumption, more information on how subjects 
consume and interpret those narratives now exist.
First, public and easily-accessible text-based content about women 
deminers were collected from an array of sources, including journals 
and news articles, and public relations pieces from HMA organizations 
(such as social media and blog posts). The sample size totaled fifty-two 
unique documents published between 2000 and 2021. The goal was 
to locate pieces that anyone would be able to find through a simple 
search, whether they were part of the HMA community or a mem-
ber of the general public. Categorizing the documents by geographical 
region (Eastern Europe, Africa, South/Central Asia, South America, 
in Mine Action and Beyond
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and Southeast Asia) ensured that women deminers from each region 
were nearly equal in representation.3 Using NVivo research software, 
the documents were coded using the scheme illustrated in Table 1. 
By reviewing the documents, emergent and recurring themes were 
assigned codes with specific definitions. The second column defines 
each individual code. 
In addition to the document review and coding, anonymous sur-
veys were created in QuestionPro, which were sent to representatives 
of HMA organizations to distribute to their women demining teams. 
CODE DEFINITION
Descriptors (Character, Ability, Personality) A word that describes a quality, personality trait, or characteristic of a woman deminer
Descriptors II (Physical Appearance) A word or statement that describes a woman deminer’s physical appearance
Motherhood/Marriage A statement that relates to the woman deminer’s status as a mother or wife
Assessments
A statement that assesses the women deminers’ 
quality of work or contributions to the demining 
profession
Motive A statement that illustrates or discusses the motivations of women deminers
Occupational Choice
A statement that discusses the occupational 
choice of women deminers and/or the occupation’s 
relationship to family or cultural norms
Table 1. Coding Scheme and Definitions.
Respondents had the opportunity to complete the survey in English, 
Arabic, or Spanish, but in some cases, surveys required translation 
to local languages. In such cases, local translators signed nondisclo-
sure agreements and completed the translation work.4 The survey 
received forty-one unique responses from women deminers in at least 
three different regions of the world, including Southeast Asia, South/
Central Asia, and the Middle East. In addition to extracting quantita-
tive data, the same coding scheme in Table 1 was used to compare the 
two datasets.
Results
These robust datasets provided a wealth of information about 
women deminers, their portrayals in the media, how these represen-
tations relate to women’s own self-reported experiences and percep-
tions, and how these portrayals are perceived by the female demining 
Motivation
community. By far, the most prevalent topics discussed were the moti-
vations and occupational choices of women deminers. In addition, a 
majority of the news articles were introductory in nature, meaning the 
author focused on introducing the idea that women deminers existed.
After coding the documents, there were sixty-two unique references 
in thirty-three (or 63 percent) of the documents related to motiva-
tion. This article operationalizes motivation to mean a statement that 
illustrates or discusses the motivations of women to go into work as 
deminers. The deminer’s motivations as explained by the authors of the 
documents fall into three motivation categories: financial, personal, 
and humanitarian. Financial motivations relate to being unemployed 
or needing to support themselves/dependents. Personal motivations 
relate to self-fulfillment, being personally affected by the presence of 
landmines, or using demining as a means to reach a personal goal such 
as raising money for university fees. Humanitarian motivations relate 
to assisting others impacted by the presence of landmines and other 
unexploded ordnance, whether that is at the local or national level. 
While all three were prevalent, humanitarian motivations were the 
most frequently cited in the documents. While the current body of 
available information suggests that women deminers are motivated by 
financial, personal, and/or humanitarian reasons, the survey results 
indicated financial motivations were more common. Understanding 
the motivations of women deminers is important in at least two 
respects. First, from the perspective of news articles or public relations 
pieces, which commonly introduce the concept of female demining 
teams, the authors answer a key question that their audience would 
ask: why would someone (and in this case, a woman, specifically) want 
to remove landmines or other explosives from the ground? Secondly, 
understanding motivations is key to HMA organizations’ efforts to 
successfully recruit and retain women employees. 
The authors of the various texts make it clear that women are moti-
vated to pursue demining work for personal and altruistic reasons. 
Likewise, survey respondents explained that they are drawn to their 
work for similar reasons and for the same type of motivations (human-
itarian, personal, and financial). From this correlation, it seems that 
popular portrayals of women deminers as it relates to their motivations 
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have been accurate. However, there was one major difference between 
the datasets. While the most common motivations cited in the docu-
ments were humanitarian-related, the survey responses overwhelm-
ingly described financial motivations. This difference is significant 
when it comes to understanding this population, their unique needs, 
and how security and peacebuilding operations might draw them into 
other aspects of their collective work. 
Occupational Choice
 One hundred and five unique references in thirty-five (67 percent) 
different texts related to occupational choice. As defined in Table 1, 
these references discussed the occupational choice of women demin-
ers and/or the occupation’s relationship to family or cultural norms. 
Most references constitute the latter definition. The current litera-
ture illustrates the cultural and familial norms women face or over-
come in order to enter and maintain their positions as deminers. 
Understanding this aspect of their role assists both the general public 
and the HMA community to better understand gendered elements of 
their experience. However, while illustrating that women succeeded 
in becoming deminers, these narratives do not explore how they over-
came challenges relating to gender bias or subverted social norms. 
Readers also do not learn how these women may be able to parlay their 
demining experiences into future careers in the peace and security sec-
tor writ large.
Information related to occupation and cultural/family norms most 
often appeared in survey responses to the question “How would oth-
ers outside your profession describe your work?” Describing conversa-
tions with family, friends, and the local community, women discussed 
experiences with gender-biased remarks, or initial surprise and unac-
ceptance. While the respondents outlined their motivations, they 
did not discuss their immediate or future career aspirations beyond 
demining. The discussion about occupational aspirations in differ-
ent security, humanitarian, or peacebuilding careers did not emerge 
organically from the survey responses, and this may be an area to 
consider by HMA stakeholders or those conducting gender equity ini-
tiatives in-field as they evaluate their programming. When it came to 
their contributions to security and peacebuilding and their involve-
ment in these sectors, the women’s responses focused specifically on 
their direct clearance activities. 
Lastly, quantitative findings outlined in Table 2 demonstrate the 
survey respondents’ current view of popular narratives about women 
deminers, and 80 percent of survey respondents were aware of depic-
tions of women deminers in the media. Of that group, a large majority 
(82 percent) agreed with the views or perceptions of women deminers 
that they had seen portrayed in the media. Interestingly, a majority of 
women deminers wanted to see more representation as it made them 
feel proud and recognized for their work; respondents felt that media 
depictions demonstrated women can be successful deminers. Feelings 
that these texts accurately portrayed women were overwhelmingly 
positive. This is significant as we compare these feelings to the per-
sonal conversations the women experience in their local communities 
where the opinions of others towards their career choices may be less 
accepting or positive.
Sample Deminer Responses (Spring 2021 Survey)
Table 2. Survey Qualitative Data
SURVEY QUESTION YES/AGREE NO/DISAGREE
Are you aware female deminers are described in the media (for example, in 
the news, public relations pieces, documentaries, etc.)? 81% 19%
Do you agree with the views of perceptions of female deminers and their 
role in the media (for example, in the news, public relations pieces, docu-
mentaries, etc.)? Please explain your answer.
82%* 2%*
*Percentage of total 84% of responses to this question; five answers did not agree or disagree/were not applicable.
“I agree, for me as an individual in the group of female deminers, always make an effort 
and try to fulfill the assigned tasks. The media has helped bring to light the efforts what we 
are making to share difficulties with society. When I watch those shows, I feel so proud and 
confident that I can do it.”
“Yes, I agree, I would like the world to see that women are an effective element and can be in 
all positions and missions.”
“I do not agree with the opinion, because women are half of society, just as they work, learn 
and sacrifice, and can overcome all difficulties.”
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Discussion
 As popular narratives about women deminers (many perpetuated 
from within the HMA community) appear to be accurate from the 
results of the study, they have a positive effect on women demining 
teams. As other sectors of security and peacebuilding struggle with 
gender-related issues and underrepresentation, narratives about 
women deminers may be useful resources. Knowing this, a reader 
may be tempted to ask, “If it’s not broke, why fix it?” However, just 
as clearance and survey techniques continue to improve, the sector’s 
narratives can also evolve to better improve gender outcomes in the 
HMA community. 
While these narratives are both accurate and informative, they 
remain focused on the introductory, surface-level elements of wom-
en’s stories. The documents reviewed spanned from 2000 to 2021, 
and the narrative has not changed much in that time. Authors con-
tinue to introduce and re-introduce the fact that women deminers 
exist and are contributing to security and peacebuilding efforts. Since 
Norwegian People’s Aid established the first all-female demining team 
in Kosovo in 1999, women have been officially clearing mines for over 
two decades. The issue with reusing this narrative is that it perpetuates 
the belief that women’s contributions are novel (or, at worst, an excep-
tion to “normal” operations). This is not to say that new demining 
teams with women or mixed gender teams will not be new in different 
locations in the future, but rather that the location itself is the nov-
elty and not women’s contributions. There is much more that can be 
learned and shared about gender, humanitarianism, and peacebuild-
ing. If women deminers were recognized for the longstanding roles 
they have played in security and peacebuilding, perhaps doors would 
open for more significant involvement. Specifically, the narratives can 
add new information and insights about women’s roles in post-con-
flict efforts rather than repeating some of the stories that are already 
in circulation. For this reason, the HMA community should recon-
sider what profession-related questions are asked of women deminers 
for the purpose of sharing their stories. By doing so, the community 
can better illustrate the role and impact of women deminers in HMA 
in order to recognize and learn from the decades-long contributions 
these women have made. 
Thus, those interested in featuring the work of women deminers in 
popular media should consider ways to highlight the longevity of these 
contributions and to avoid portraying women’s involvement in demin-
ing operations as a novelty. Such intentional shifts to the popular nar-
rative could enhance gender equity in the mine action sector as well as 
in the security and peacebuilding sectors more broadly. As well, sur-
vey results demonstrate that women deminers are both contributors 
to and consumers of these popular narratives. Women deminers have 
a unique perspective and an acquired skill set that can potentially be 
used or shared in the broader security and peace sectors. The current 
literature does not adequately contextualize women deminers within 
the extended security, peacebuilding, and humanitarian communi-
ties. Based on the largely financial motivations for women to become 
deminers in the first place, they may not have previously considered 
being a part of the broader security community and their future poten-
tial in different roles. Still, clearance operations are meant to be finite, 
and there is little data about what women do next after they are no 
longer deminers. One study suggests that women that do not reach the 
supervisory level often return to the social and economic role they had 
before they became deminers (Bini et al). This is a significant potential 
loss for the security and peacebuilding sector. Just as HMA clears safe 
paths for civilians, so too can it create pathways for women’s equality 
and greater involvement in post-conflict contexts. 
See endnotes page 148
The issue with reusing this narrative is that it perpetuates the 
belief that women’s contributions are novel 
(or, at worst, an exception to “normal” operations). 
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Deliver Hope for Survivors
 By Abder Banoune [ Humanity & Inclusion ]
At the Fourth Review Conference of 
the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Conven-
tion (APMBC) in Oslo in November 2019, 
Ugandan conflict survivor Margaret Orech 
Arach had a predicament. She told her fellow 
landmine campaigners that she was in des-
perate need of a new prosthetic leg, having 
lost her right leg during an ambush in 1998. 
Her current artificial limb caused her pain 
and made walking difficult. Yet despite being 
Ambassador for the International Campaign 
to Ban Landmines (ICBL), she was finding it 
difficult to obtain a new prosthesis. 
Meanwhile, in Syria, two men were recov-
ering from landmine accidents, with doctors 
needing to amputate a limb in each case. 
Mohamed was twenty-five years old when he 
encountered a landmine in 2015. And Zidan, 
a shepherd, was just eighteen when he grazed 
his cattle in an area that he didn’t know was 
mined. Zidan’s father had previously died, 
leaving him responsible for the family’s 
income. The effects of his injury would rico-
chet throughout his family. 
The year 2019, the last year for which 
we have explosive ordnance (EO) casualty 
data, saw more than 5,550 people killed or 
injured by mines/explosive remnants of war 
(ERW). Of that total, at least 2,170 people 
died, and another 3,357 were injured.1 The 
majority of people who survive an EO acci-
dent acquire life-changing injuries, with a 
large number of these survivors requiring 
rehabilitation and prostheses. Yet access 
to both remains severely limited. An esti-
mated 80 percent of persons with disabili-
ties live in developing countries. However, 
only 5–15 percent of people living in low- 
and middle-income countries who require 
assistive devices and technologies can 
access them. What’s more, in low-income 
countries, rehabilitation services are often 
under-resourced and undeveloped. This is 
compounded in areas experiencing con-
f lict. Poorly made or unadjusted prostheses 
can cause skin sores, pressure wounds, and 
muscle fatigue. 
Humanity & Inclusion (HI) has been making prostheses and orthoses since its launch in refu-gee camps along the Thailand/Cambodia border in 1982, when it was known as Handicap International. The organization has since developed a global approach to disability, aiming 
to reduce poverty and situations of vulnerability, while working to ensure development and emer-
gency responses are accessible to all. After nearly forty years of action, teams in fifty-five countries 
perform this critical work today.
According to the Global Burden of Disease 
Study 2019, more than one-third of the world 
population, 2.4 billion people,3 would benefit 
from rehabilitation. Rehabilitation for persons 
with disabilities, among them EO survivors, 
requires adapted and accessible infrastruc-
ture, specialized care-providers, trained 
rehabilitation professionals, long-term inter-
ventions, and financial resources. Even when 
services are available, the most marginalized 
populations can rarely afford them. Poverty, 
stigma, and discrimination, as well as inacces-
sible information and infrastructure, combine 
to create what seem like insurmountable bar-
riers for people with disabilities. 
The gap between needs and available ser-
vices is enormous. It limits an individual’s 
ability to to reach and maintain function-
ing capacity, participate in education, find 
decent work, and become an active member 
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of society. A recent study by ATscale3 dem-
onstrates that funding of four assistive prod-
ucts—hearing aids, prostheses, eyeglasses, 
and wheelchairs—would result in a nine-to-
one return on investment.
HI has been making prostheses and 
orthoses since its launch in refugee camps 
along the Thailand/Cambodia border in 
1982, when it was known as Handicap 
International. At that time, HI was the 
first humanitarian organization to meet 
emergency orthopedic needs. By setting up 
orthopedic centers and training compe-
tent local teams, HI used simple, locally-
available equipment to provide immediate, 
effective, and practical services that met 
emergency orthopedic needs of thousands 
of EO survivors in need of a prosthetic limb, 
including many amputee survivors of anti-
personnel mines. The organization has since 
developed a global approach to disability, 
aiming to reduce poverty and situations 
of vulnerability, while working to ensure 
development and emergency responses are 
accessible to all. After nearly forty years of 
action, teams in fifty-five countries perform 
this critical work today. Over decades of 
experience, often with support from agen-
cies like USAID and the U.S. Department of 
State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees and 
Migration, teams have provided a range of 
rehabilitation services and trained local staff 
to provide quality care. Donor support has 
helped establish rehabilitation centers in doz-
ens of countries, including Cambodia, Haiti, 
and Nepal, where USAID opened new clin-
ics and provided professional training after 
the 2010 earthquake. Additionally, similar 
funding provided specialized care to people 
injured after the Nepal earthquake. Syrian 
refugees in Jordan and Lebanon, and refu-
gees living in Kenya’s Dadaab and Kakuma 
camps have also benefited from such care. The 
Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement 
in the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of 
Political-Military Affairs (PM/WRA), as well 
as many other donors—the European Union, 
the Norwegian MFA, Australian Department 
of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Germany, and 
others—have contributed funding for victim 
assistance (VA) as part of broader mine action 
budgets to support the provision of rehabili-
tation and other services. In many countries, 
VA efforts have launched a national disability 
dynamic and supported the delivery of vital 
services for EO survivors and other persons 
with disabilities. 
Even with dedicated donors and partner-
ships, however, the needs still outweigh the 
services that one international nongovern-
mental organization (INGO) using tradi-
tional methods can produce. 
 
Geraldo (age six) shows off 
his new 3D-printed splint 
that he received from the HI 
rehabilitation center in Lomé, 
Togo. The splint will help to  
correct his right ankle.
Image courtesy of Philippa 
Poussereau/HI.
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In 2016, the African Federation of 
Rehabilitation Professionals (FATO) met in 
Lomé, Togo, where Isabelle Urseau, Director 
of HI’s Rehabilitation Division, shared the 
results of a trial using digital technologies, 
including 3D printing, to provide physical 
rehabilitation and assistive support services. 
The potential for digital technologies to 
transform the rehabilitation sector had been 
on Urseau’s mind for years. She pitched the 
concept to HI’s directors in 2014, unlocking 
EUR 70,000 of the organization’s innovation 
funds from private donors. 
Since then, Urseau’s teams have worked 
closely with private stakeholders, universi-
ties, research institutes, and local professional 
associations to put their hypothesis to the 
test: Digitalization combined with additional 
production could improve access to rehabili-
tation care and assistive devices for people 
with EO and other conflict-related injuries, 
Digital Transformation 
including landmine survivors, as well as oth-
ers with mobility issues. HI’s teams facilitate 
access and provide services ranging from 
mental health and psychosocial support to 
rehabilitation and inclusive education, as well 
as social and economic inclusion to survivors 
and other persons with disabilities alike. In 
2019, HI’s beneficiaries included at least 9,965 
survivors of landmines or explosive weapons.
 The next phases of the project benefited 
from a range of partnerships and funding. 
The Directorate-General for Development 
Cooperation and Humanitarian Aid of 
Belgium, the UK’s Foreign, Commonwealth 
& Development office, and Agence Française 
de Développement (AFD) all pitched in. 
To date, HI has piloted 3D-prosthetic and 
-orthotic printing projects in six contexts: 
Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Syrian crisis-
affected countries, Togo, and Uganda. In 
2019 alone, the Syrian crisis response team 
An orthosis stands on 
a table at the HI printing 
facility on June 6, 2018, in 
Lomé, Togo. HI, as part of the 
IMPACTE 3D project, is using 
3D technology in a clinical 
trial to build dedicated ortho-
ses for one hundred patients 
in Mali, Niger, and Togo. 
Image courtesy of 
Xaume Olleros/HI.
Orthoprosthetist Mathieu Afetse (R) and 
printing technician Fabrice Djodji (L) check 
a 3D printer as it prints an orthosis at the 
HI facility in Lomé, Togo. 
Image courtesy of Xaume Olleros/HI.
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saw 3,462 people with injuries caused by 
explosive weapons used in populated areas 
and 801 people affected by EO. Teams use 
small, lightweight 3D scanners to create 
digital molds of body parts, make adapta-
tions according to the patients’ needs using 
computer-modeling software, and then send 
it to the 3D printers. The printers create 
thousands of layers of thermoplastic to pro-
duce bespoke sockets that fit patients’ limbs. 
This work is part of what’s now known as 
the Telerehabilitation for All (TeReFa) ini-
tiative, providing complete rehabilitation 
services in post-conflict settings, in support 
of refugees fleeing conflict, and other under-
served areas through local health partners, 
mobile teams, remote experts via telemedi-
cine, and now technologies such as 3D print-
ing to deliver orthopedic devices. The result 
is a digital ecosystem that is transforming the 
delivery of health care services. 
As a part of the TeReFA initiative, HI con-
ducted studies in different contexts—emer-
gency, EO-contaminated conflict settings, 
development, and refugee camps—focusing 
on technological, clinical, and social aspects 
for patients and professionals. The results 
indicated that access to rehabilitation, pros-
thetic, and orthotic services increases physical 
independence, reduces vulnerability, miti-
gates the risk of exclusion, and contributes to 
improved quality of life. Products were able to 
meet patient expectations; requiring less time 
to customize 3D-printed devices that meet 
structural and mechanical needs; and reduc-
ing the need for infrastructure, equipment, 
and human resources to produce conventional 
prostheses and orthoses. Moreover, tele-
rehabilitation compensates for the shortage of 
professionals on-site/in-country and improves 
communication by bringing qualified special-
ists closer to users who are accompanied by 
on-location health workers.
Nevertheless, difficulties remain: While 3D 
printing and telerehabilitation break down 
some of the barriers to rehabilitation in low- 
and middle-income settings, the price is com-
parable. In 2017, HI published “Pilot Testing 
of 3D Printing Technology for Transtibial 
Prosthesis in Complex Contexts (Togo, 
Madagascar, and Syria responses),”4 which 
demonstrated that there is a limited cost 
difference between the conventional produc-
tion and 3D printing of orthopedic devices.
A shortage of qualified specialists poses 
another challenge. The World Health 
Organization (WHO) indicates that in many 
low- to middle-income countries, the density 
of skilled practitioners is below ten per one 
million population.5 The number of other 
health professionals who can deliver reha-
bilitation services is also extremely low. In 
Africa, Southeast Asia, and Western Pacific, 
the number of practicing prosthetic and 
orthotic specialists is less than one-tenth of 
the number required; there should be at least 
five prosthetic and orthotic professionals for 
every one million people.
The project has since expanded. So far, 
234 people have received rehabilitation as 
well as orthoses or prostheses through the 
pilot phases (150 people received orthoses, 
and 84 people received prostheses), includ-
ing Margaret, Mohamed, and Zidan, who 
each received 3D-printed devices and reha-
bilitation services through HI’s 3D Printing 
Through Emergency Tele Rehab Access proj-
ect (PETRA).
HI, as part of the IMPACTE 3D project, 
is using 3D technology as part of 
a clinical trial to build personalized 
orthoses for one hundred patients in 
Mali, Niger, and Togo.
Image courtesy of Xaume Olleros/HI.
Digital Transformation 
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“W hen I was a young intern, train-ing to become a prosthetist/orthotist, I met a young boy 
from Lebanon. He was the survivor of an 
explosive weapon, with a wound so dire 
that doctors had to amputate. Because 
of weapon fragments that were impos-
sible to remove, the stump they left 
was a difficult one to fit. Desperate, his 
parents traveled to France, seeking the 
specialized care he needed. I couldn’t 
stop thinking, ‘Why didn’t the Lebanese 
health system offer him rehabilitation?’ 
But at the time, rehabilitation was seri-
ously inaccessible in Lebanon. I’d come 
to find that this was the norm in countries 
facing conflict or poverty. This Lebanese 
child showed me my path: I would com-
mit my life’s work to expanding rehabili-
tation into health systems.
From Bamboo to 3D Printing:
In my 35-year career at Humanity & 
Inclusion, I’ve witnessed an evolution 
in rehabilitative technology, the ser-
vices we provide, and how we structure 
them. In working with landslide survi-
vors in Colombia, people living with 
long-term disabilities caused by leprosy 
or polio in India, and mine survivors in 
Mozambique, HI’s goal has been to 
identify problems and find solutions.
Early on, rehabilitation was some-
times the only service HI provided to 
communities in the wake of emergen-
cies or conflicts. But we recognized that 
wasn’t enough. You can help a person 
strengthen their muscles, manage phan-
tom pains, and learn to walk again with 
the help of a prosthesis, but the work 
should not end there. While people may 
be living with different injuries or dis-
abilities, their needs were almost always 
the same: calling for a continuity of early 
care and a comprehensive approach of 
rehabilitation, psychosocial support, and 
inclusive education and/or employment. 
This is especially true in conflict-affected 
regions, where psychological trauma is 
compounded by insecurity, poverty, and 
a constant fear of losing life or limb from 
landmines and other explosive devices. 
Over time, HI has developed effec-
tive, comprehensive health and reha-
bilitative practices, adopting a holistic 
approach meant to last long into the 
future. Providing rehabilitation, mental 
health, and social services was a start, but 
teams now ensure children with disabili-
ties attend accessible schools and that 
entrepreneurs living with permanent inju-
ries can maintain thriving businesses. HI 
also advocates for improved policies to 
create sustainable change. For example, 
HI’s work in Nepal started in response to 
conflict, shifted to crisis mode after the 
2015 earthquake, and is now focused 
on development supported by an estab-
lished network of government actors, 
social services, and NGOs. 
Similarly, HI’s rehabilitation efforts 
and buy-in from stakeholders and insti-
tutes such as the WHO have evolved. In 
1991, toward the end of Mozambique’s 
fifteen-year conflict, I began work-
ing with mine survivors. At that time, 
we used locally-available materials to 
build orthoses and prostheses. I trained 
local technicians to construct assistive 
devices out of bamboo, leather, wood, 
and iron—materials we knew they could 
source locally—and collaborated with 
other institutions to import materials to 
produce low-cost, plastic orthoses and 
prostheses. In the face of emergencies, 
such as the earthquake in Haiti and the 
ongoing Syrian crisis, HI implemented 
emergency programs, providing people 
temporary prostheses that were later 
replaced with permanent ones once ser-
vices were more established.
Fast forward to 2014, when we began 
workshopping the ideas of telerehabili-
tation and 3D printing to better serve 
people in isolated areas. Our goals were 
to improve communication, while cut-
ting costs and transportation times. 
People were dubious at first, but in a 
world of emerging technology, testing 
and experimentation are essential, as are 
agility, frugality, and flexibility in conflict-
affected regions.
When the COVID-19 pandemic hit, HI 
was able to expand existing telereha-
bilitation and 3D-printing programs to 
continue serving communities without 
interruption. As of mid-2021, we’ve fit-
ted 250 people with 3D-printed orthoses 
and prostheses through our pilot projects 
in Africa, produced 3D-printed personal 
protective equipment, and conducted 
thousands of telerehabilitation sessions.
What remains universal is the need to 
work together to identify multiple solu-
tions that answer specific needs and 
demands, while building sustainable 
capacity of local communities over time. 
What has changed is the digital transfor-
mation of rehabilitative care—including 
telerehabilitation and 3D printing—that 
enables users and local communities the 
opportunity to access care and respond 
quickly to individual needs.”
By Isabelle Urseau
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Tabita is an eleven-year-old girl from South Sudan who now lives in Omugo refugee camp in Uganda with her family. When she was three years old, Tabita 
contracted polio, causing her legs to become noticeably weak. Unable to stand without support, she began using crutches to help her walk around the camp 
and go to school. The HI team helped Tabita with her mobility aids, which eased access to her school and gave her greater freedom to socialize with her friends. 
A psychosocial worker of the CRHR and Education Cannot Wait projects is working with Tabita and her family, helping her to manage her disability and 
strengthen her self-esteem. Images courtesy of Quinn Neely.
Tabita is assessed for the 3D Project 
for a knee-foot-ankle orthosis to 
support her lower limbs. 
Tabita with friends and family in the 
Omugo refugee camp in Uganda.
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In 2020, the European Union recog-
nized HI, awarding the organization with 
a Horizon Prize for two innovations in 
humanitarian mine action and beyond, 
namely its 3D-printing innovation that rep-
resents an evolution in VA and its drone 
technology that greatly speeds up safe EO 
impact survey efforts.
In regards to the 3D-printing technology, 
HI’s technical experts are currently working 
to lower production costs. They’ve teamed up 
with the French National Institute for Applied 
Sciences (INSA) to test locally-sourced, 
recycled materials to produce prostheses 
and orthoses. Meanwhile, staff in Vietnam, 
thanks to USAID funding, are developing a 
new app to virtually connect rehabilitation 
professionals with patients, optimizing the 
transition of care from hospital to home and 
improving family-based, follow-up care. All 
of these digital initiatives should reinforce the 
organization’s capacity to reach more benefi-
ciaries and improve their rehabilitation care. 
In the coming years, HI staff will focus on 
scaling the technology and making it more 
sustainable. Plans include launching five 
regional hubs associated with local networks 
of rehabilitation centers and professionals, 
and ensuring proper technology transfer to 
our partners. Advocacy efforts to include 
rehabilitation services in eHealth strate-
gies, and integration of assistive technology 
solutions in universal health coverage will 
be key activities to ensure the approach is 
adopted widely. 
But for now, staff take great pride in the 
wins celebrated by Margaret, who should be 
back on the road advocating post-COVID; 
Mohamed, who has found work at home in 
Syria; and Zidan, who is once again tending 
his cattle and helping to keep his family afloat. 
As of today, thirty-four States Parties of 
the APMBC have reported a responsibility 
for a significant number of EO survivors 
within their national territory, and twelve 
States Parties of the Convention on Cluster 
Munitions have reported the same for clus-
ter munition survivors. In addition, evi-
dence show that mine and cluster munition 
casualties have been identified in other8 
states and regions.6
By adopting the Oslo Action Plan (OAP) 
in 2019, States Parties of the APMBC have 
renewed their commitment to assist mine 
survivors, including providing rehabilitation 
services. In particular, the OAP notes the 
need to “take steps to ensure that, taking into 
account local, national and regional circum-
stances, all mine victims, including in rural 
and remote areas, have access to comprehen-
sive rehabilitation services […] this includes 
the provision of assistive devices, physiother-
apy, occupational therapy and peer-to-peer 
support programs.”9 VA efforts and the provi-
sion of rehabilitation services is a continuous 
process that will allow us to advance toward 
an inclusive society where all persons with 
disabilities, including EO survivors, enjoy 
their human rights. 









Y Abder Banoune 
Rehab Specialist, Physical and Rehabilitation Division
Humanity & Inclusion
Based in Lyon, France, Abder Banoune has seventeen years of field experience with expertise in prosthetic and 
orthotic technology, and project management. After graduate studies in Algeria toward a career as an ortho-
prosthetist with a specialty in physical rehabilitation, he joined Humanity & Inclusion in 2001 as a P&O Technical 
Advisor, working in China and Yemen. From 2005 to 2018, Banoune worked with the International Committee of 
the Red Cross (ICRC), holding a variety of roles, including Physical Rehabilitation Project Manager, working in 
Ethiopia, Niger, Malawi, South Sudan, and Sudan. He completed a master’s degree in Management of Health and 
Social Services within the Business Administration School (ESCAE, Niamey), as well as a Certificate in Advanced 
Training in Leadership Management and Governance (Yale University School of Public Health). Banoune speaks 
French, English, and several Arabic dialects.
In Uganda, HI adapted 
3D-printing technology 
to produce protective 
face visors for the 
COVID-19 pandemic.
Image courtesy of Philippa 
Poussereau/HI.
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By Laura Biscaglia, Abigail Jones, and Robert White 
[ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]
As public awareness on mental health in the workplace has increased in recent years, the humanitarian sector—along with the CHS Alliance, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, the Antares Foundation, and others—has been stressing the need for aid organi-
zations to ensure that their duty of care responsibilities encompass the health, safety, security, and 
well-being of staff.¹ 
This article aims to contribute to existing conversations on how actors in the mine action (MA) sec-
tor can work together to promote mental health in the workplace as well as prevent and mitigate 
adverse mental health outcomes. The article is also a call to action for MA management and leadership 
teams to invest in staffs’ mental well-being. Through interviews with key stakeholders² and desk-based 
review of existing literature, this article’s focus is two-fold. First, it provides an overview of stressors 
on the mental health of different profiles of humanitarian workers. Second, it conceptualizes poor 
mental health outcomes as an organizational risk factor. 
Based on an understanding that mental health risk management cannot be based on a one-size-fits-
all approach, systematically integrating mental health in risk management frameworks is important 
and is exemplified by the good practices employed by other sectors. Moreover, the conceptualization 
and treatment of adverse mental health outcomes requires the application of an intersectional lens to 
be culturally appropriate and adaptable to the varied sources of stress, risks, needs, and priorities of 
a diverse workforce. The interplay between people management, organizational culture, and mental 
health is critical for a holistic understanding of mental health in the workplace.³ This article highlights 
these three dimensions, specifically focusing on the impact of people management and organizational 
factors on mental health outcomes.
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Key Definitions 
Mental health can be defined as “a state of wellbeing in which an 
individual realizes his or her own abilities, can cope with the normal 
stresses of life, can work productively, and is able to make a contribu-
tion to his or her community.” 4,5 An individual with poor mental health 
can experience “a broad range of problems with different symptoms 
generally characterized by some combination of abnormal thoughts, 
emotions, behaviors, and relationships with others,”6 as well as physi-
cal symptoms, such as digestive issues, chest pain, and migraines.
Stressors in Humanitarian Work
A growing body of research has suggested that humanitarian workers with diverse profiles and backgrounds, including those working in mine 
action, are at an increased risk of various adverse mental health outcomes.7 Within the humanitarian sector, stressors can be divided into four 
categories8: a) situational, b) job-related, c) organizational, and d) personal.
A) SITUATIONAL STRESSORS
• Attacks on personal well-being
• Experience of humanitarian crises and/or emergency situa-
tions (i.e., war, armed conflict, natural and industrial disas-
ters)
• Exposure to life-threatening events and/or secondary expo-
sure to trauma
• Exposure to poverty and violence
• Insecurity in the area of operations 
• Political, social, and cultural context
• Presence of explosive ordnance in the area of operations
• Physical health risks and limited availability of treatment 
facilities and medication
• Public health situation in the context of operations
• Relationship and power dynamics with the local population 
and authorities for both foreign and local staff 
C) ORGANIZATIONAL STRESSORS
• Bureaucratic decision-making processes
• Lack of investment in induction and career development
• Lack of training in safety and security protocols
• Leadership and management style
• “Macho” culture in the sector
B) JOB-RELATED STRESSORS
• Difficult and/or isolated living conditions
• Dislocation: social, cultural, spiritual
• Employment in potentially hazardous professions
• Heavy workload and/or periods of inactivity
• Job insecurity related to funding cycles, restructuring, etc.
• Lack of clearly defined job role and responsibilities
• Lack of recognition or adequate compensation in  
accordance with job role and responsibilities
• Relationships and power dynamics within the team
D) PERSONAL STRESSORS
• Lack of alignment between personal and organizational  
values
• Limited contact with social support systems and networks
• Mismatch between high motivation and commitment 
(efforts) and rewards (both emotional and material) 
received at work
• Personal and family situation and/or responsibilities
• Poor self-care behavior/lack of healthy coping mechanisms
• Pre-existing mental health conditions for which adequate 
treatment and healthy coping mechanisms are not  
underway 
Figure 1: Categories of stressors.
Historically, there has been a tendency in the humanitarian sec-
tor and beyond to place most of the responsibility for adverse mental 
health outcomes on biological factors, attitudes, behaviors, and life-
style choices of the individual, which in public health research is com-
monly referred to as “victim-blaming.” However, an amassed body of 
public health and social science research indicates that mental health 
outcomes are in fact determined by a combination of situational, orga-
nizational, job-related, and personal stressors. 
While interventions have generally focused on responding to the 
immediate aftermath of direct exposure to potentially traumatic 
events, the level of stress that an individual was experiencing at the 
time that a traumatic event took place can have important implications 
on the extent to which they will develop poor mental health outcomes. 
Therefore, it could be expected that a staff member that was either bul-
lied or was feeling very insecure in the workplace at the time of the 
traumatic event would have low levels of resilience to help them heal 
from the trauma.10 Equally, a staff member who is experiencing per-
sonal stressors unrelated to their work and work environment may be 
more likely to develop poor mental health outcomes. 
Furthermore, chronic stress, often a result of organizational and 
job-related stressors, can be extremely debilitating. Commonly-cited 
sources of chronic stress in the workplace include poor leadership, lack 
of career opportunities, and bureaucracy. These chronic stressors poten-
tially lead to burnout, disillusionment, and frustration, all of which can 
affect service delivery and, at times, result in staff turnover, which poses 
a significant risk to the ability of organizations to fulfil their mandate.11 
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Organizations stand to benefit from considering elements out-
side the event in question, including “the mental state of the person 
when the event took place and the extent to which the working 
context to which the person returns is psychologically safe and 
supportive.”12 This is now widely recognized as a key determinant 
of mental health outcomes. 
Applying an Intersectional Lens to the Stressors Faced by 
Humanitarian Workers
Humanitarian workers from diverse backgrounds also face differ-
ent real and perceived safety and security risks. For example, research 
by Humanitarian Outcomes found that in South Sudan, perceived 
ethnic affiliations of national staff create safety, security, and opera-
tional obstacles.13 In other contexts, nationality, as well as perceived 
political and/or religious affiliation, can increase exposure to harm. 
Humanitarian workers of diverse profiles and backgrounds are also 
increasingly at risk of becoming victims of gender-based violence 
(GBV).14 Although anyone can become a victim of GBV, women in par-
ticular face higher vulner-
ability in many contexts.15 
By applying an intersec-
tional lens, it is evident that 
the diversity represented by 
humanitarian workers can 
contribute to their different 
experience of stressors. 
Diversity considerations 
such as gender identity and 
expression, age, disability, 
ethnicity, race, religion, 
nationality, or sexual ori-
entation can also increase 
exposure to safety and 
security risks, affecting 
staff mobility and ability 
to engage in healthy coping 
mechanisms, with potential repercussions on mental health outcomes. 
For example, members of the LGBTQI+ community, as well as indi-
viduals perceived to be part of it, may face specific safety and secu-
rity risks in the contexts in which they operate (situational stressor).16 
Furthermore, they may experience stigmatization, bias, and dis-
crimination from their teams and organizations (organizational and 
job-related stressors), with potential negative repercussions on their 
mental health.17 
For employees with disabilities, the way in which an organization 
conceptualizes disability, as afflictions affecting an individual who 
needs to be cared for by others (medical/charity models of disability) 
or as being caused by the way in which society is organized (social 
model of disability) can affect a disabled individual’s perception and/
or the success of their employment.18 The extent to which organizations 
focus their efforts on making all reasonable adjustments and removing 
barriers to the employment of humanitarian aid workers living with 
disabilities can have either a protective or detrimental effect on their 
mental health. 
Just as stressors are different among diverse profiles of humani-
tarian workers, the preva-
lence of different types of 
mental health outcomes 
experienced can also vary 
significantly. More research 
is needed in the field of 
humanitarian work, yet 
statistical evidence from 
studies conducted in the 
general population in differ-
ent social and cultural con-
texts indicates that women 
are more likely than men to 
suffer from post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD),19 
major depression,20 anxiety 
disorders,21 and burnout. 
Women who experience 
burnout are also reportedly at increased risk of hazardous alcohol con-
sumption,22 and less likely than men to seek help for alcohol-related 
problems due to gender stereotypes and social stigma.23 However, sub-
stance use disorder and suicide are overall more frequent among men, 
partly linked to the fact that men across cultures are reportedly more 
prone to ignoring stressors and using unhealthy mechanisms such 
as hazardous alcohol consumption, substance use, and transactional 
sexual activities. These and other reckless coping behaviors can also 
negatively affect the beneficiary community as well as damage the rep-
utation, performance, and funding opportunities of the organization. 
For example, a woman of color working as international staff in 
an organization with predominantly white staff and especially 
management, operating in a context with high security risks 
(situational stressor), and not being treated and rewarded in 
the same way as other colleagues for similar efforts due to 
conscious and unconscious discrimination (organizational and 
job-related stressors) may be at risk of poor mental health. 
The risk of developing adverse mental health outcomes may 
be further exacerbated if her religious beliefs and related 
expression (i.e., clothing, display of symbols) are not socially 
or culturally accepted in the area of operations (situational 
and job-related stressors) and/or in the organization (orga-
nizational stressor) and healthy coping mechanisms are not 
encouraged by the organization (organizational stressor) or 
undertaken by the employee (personal stressor).
While interventions have generally focused on responding to the immediate aftermath of direct 
exposure to potentially traumatic events, the level of stress that an individual was  
experiencing at the time that a traumatic event took place can have important implications on 
the extent to which they will develop poor mental health outcomes. 
~Liza Jachens, Webster University, Geneva
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Applying an Intersectional Lens to the Stressors Faced by Mine 
Action Staff
Mine action often takes place in places where staff face a multitude 
of security risks.24 In some contexts, mine action organizations and 
their staff are considered legitimate targets by armed non-state actors 
and are therefore at high risk of being abducted, killed, or injured.25 
Furthermore, the prevalence of the use of improvised explosive devices 
means that deminers are now at greater risk of death or injury due 
to the unpredictability of these devices. In 2018, the Landmine and 
Cluster Munition Monitor identified twenty casualties among demin-
ers in seven countries (four deminers were killed and sixteen injured).26 
Research into mental health outcomes of explosive ordnance (EO) dis-
posal technicians in the U.S. military suggests that exposure to the 
types of traumatic events described previously can influence the risk 
of developing negative mental health outcomes such as PTSD, anxiety 
disorders, and major depression.27
When considering the mental health outcomes of mine action staff, 
the fact that the sector is traditionally male dominated28 and the com-
mon associations with traditionally constructed notions of masculin-
ity (i.e., encouraging risk-taking, physical toughness, self-discipline, 
emotional control, or numbness), may be particularly relevant when 
assessing the mental health outcomes of men working in the sector. 
This assertion is broadly in line with research into the link between 
notions of masculinity in the military and how it negatively affects 
mental health outcomes.29 At the same time, generalized notions of 
masculinity are only one factor in a complex net of causation for men-
tal health outcomes,30 and approaches that ignore other stressors can 
actually serve to further stigmatize men. 
In some contexts, it is a common practice for field teams to be 
deployed to areas of operations far from their home for long periods 
of time. For mine action staff with family responsibilities, for example 
those who are deployed soon after the birth or adoption of children, 
being placed in areas of operations far away from their families can 
exacerbate stress. This could particularly be a challenge for demin-
ers who are stationed for consecutive weeks in clearance locations 
compared to those who return home at the end of the working day. 
Furthermore, international staff of mine action organizations fre-
quently reside in shared accommodations, where they not only lack 
privacy and personal space but are unable to leave the workplace for 
long periods of time. This is especially the case for those based in areas 
where mobility is restricted due to real and perceived safety and secu-
rity concerns. 
Understanding Mental Health as an Organizational Risk
Taking a proactive approach to the management of mental health 
and building resilience needs to be an objective within mine action. 
Numerous studies from the humanitarian field and other sec-
tors with similarities to mine action, such as the military and the 
police, make a strong case for promoting the mental health of staff 
for organizational purposes. While this should be driven by ethical 
considerations and duty-of-care responsibilities, the negative rami-
fications of poor mental health on an organization’s capacity to ful-
fil its mandate cannot be discounted. 
A Risk Management Approach to Mental Health 
Different frameworks have been used to varying degrees of suc-
cess to address mental health in the workplace as “[t]raditionally, 
mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) actions have been 
focused on the response and recovery phases of emergencies with 
the aims of reducing suffering and re-establishing functioning of 
those impacted … However, recently this disaster management field 
has begun to expand beyond reactive approaches to encompassing 
more proactive disaster risk management (DRM), with the goal of 
disaster risk reduction (DRR).”31
Among these different approaches, a mental health risk manage-
ment framework is relevant for the mine action sector, given how 
critical managing risk is in every aspect of mine action. According 
to International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) 07.14, “the pur-
pose of risk management in mine action is to identify, assess, con-
trol and review risk wherever it may arise, such that mine action 
programmes, projects and activities are safe, efficient and effective 
in achieving their objectives.”32 IMAS 10.10 Safety and Occupational 
Health [S&OH] General Requirements states that “the need to reduce 
risk and to provide a safe working environment are fundamental 
principles of mine action management” and emphasizes the need 
for “developing work practices that contribute to risk reduction.”33 
Even though the title of IMAS 10.10 mentions “occupational health” 
there is no reference to the management of stressors or the effects, 
consequences, or impact of mental health on operations, only stating 
that “NMAA and employers […] should establish and maintain S&OH 
management systems.”34 To date, limited research has been conducted 
on organizational stressors in humanitarian work, prompting the need 
for future research to “develop and explore a hybrid risk assessment 
tool that draws from generic stress models while also including job- 
and context-specific stressors.”35
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Mental Health Risk Management for Mine Action
Within mine action there are many risks to consider when address-
ing the duty of care obligation: to promote mental and physical health, 
and avoid long-term exhaustion, burnout, injury, or illness. 
The risk management framework should consider the potential 
impact on several core risk areas with varying degrees of severity and, 
based on these factors, develop criteria to monitor the ongoing man-
agement of staff mental health.
Mine action can look to other sectors in similar high-risk environ-
ments for examples of effective frameworks and approaches to manag-
ing mental health. These include the police, fire, and rescue services; 
paramedics; and national militaries. The police force in the United 
Kingdom has been reviewing their mental health services’ response 
to demonstrate their commitment and determination to understand 
and address the issues affecting staff and to provide appropriate invest-
ment in the key areas they have identified: prevention, early detec-
tion of illness, and rehabilitation. Since its initial launch in 2017, the 
“Oscar Kilo”38 program has grown rapidly and is now employed by 
police forces and fire and rescue services across the United Kingdom. 
Support is provided through an online platform that gives access to 
CORE RISK AREAS CONSIDERED 
BY RISK MANAGERS
POTENTIAL IMPACTS OF STAFF BURNOUT AND MENTAL ILLNESS 
ON THE ORGANIZATION
OPERATIONAL Unwell staff are more likely to make poor decisions and less likely to achieve desired 
objectives. Productivity is compromised by absenteeism, presenteeism,36 and turnover.
SAFETY, SECURITY Unwell staff are more prone to accidents, illness, and security incidents.
FIDUCIARY Unwell staff may underperform as stewards of financial resources. Financial losses can 
result from absenteeism, presenteeism, and turnover.
REPUTATIONAL With impaired judgement, unwell staff may engage in toxic behaviors and misconduct, 
which could damage the organization’s image and reputation.
INFORMATION Unwell staff may mishandle or lose data, or leave an organization with no handover.
LEGAL, COMPLIANCE If staff become unwell as a result of the work, this calls into question whether applicable 
laws and regulations are being followed.
ETHICAL Harm caused by inadequate duty of care and inequality in the protection and services 
provided to international staff versus national staff represents organizational failure to 
fulfill obligations to protect staff.
MAG have had positive reactions to investing in dialogue and support on 
mental health issues within the organization. 
~Darren Cormack, CEO, MAG
Table 1. Focus areas of risk for staff burnout and mental illness.37
evidence-based research and resources that can be used to help shape 
well-being provision and encourage collaboration and innovation 
across all emergency services. The College of Policing have also devel-
oped the Blue Light Wellbeing Framework.39 This framework pres-
ents a more holistic approach to the risk management of well-being 
and mental health, recognizing the role of management as well as the 
responsibility of individuals to manage their mental health.
Mine action also has positive examples of addressing mental health 
issues in the sector. Within the framework of victim assistance, there 
is a body of work in psychological support for the family and com-
munity. In recent years, countries such as Cambodia have looked 
to increase resources to support mental health in conflict-affected 
communities, although challenges remain.40 Moreover, Humanity & 
Inclusion provide structured support in community-based MHPSS 
interventions, aiming to “increase collaboration and coordination 
among actors to reduce mental health risk factors.”41 This practice can 
benefit risk-management frameworks, supporting mine action staff 
working in affected communities.
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Looking Forward 
There is a standard that individuals, managers, and agencies have to the duty of care, which is 
not just physical wellbeing, but also mental wellbeing. Given that so many people are experi-
encing mental health problems, we are clearly not meeting this standard, so what can we do to 
analyse, reflect and adjust to ensure we do better? ~Melissa Pitotti, CHS Alliance
Mine action strives for a world in which communities thrive, free 
from risks from EO. However, there is a clear need to engage in dia-
logue about how, in addition to supporting beneficiaries, mine action 
organizations can better support the mental well-being of their own 
staff. Indeed, while demining is an especially hazardous profession 
if safety and security protocols are not followed, evidence from the 
humanitarian sector more broadly highlights that all staff can be at 
risk of negative mental health outcomes. 
To fulfill the duty of care to staff, it is critical that mine action 
organizations take steps to adopt a more consistent risk-management 
approach to mental health. Further work and coordination is required 
to this end, which can build upon lessons learned from other sectors 
as well as the work already carried out under the mine action pillar 
of victim assistance. One potential entry point would be to integrate 
requirements related to the mental health of staff by updating the 
IMAS 10.10 Safety & Occupational Health General Requirements, 
subject to the agreement of the IMAS Review Board. That said, it is 
evident that more research is required to understand the risk factors 
and challenges to the integration of mental health considerations into 
risk management frameworks. 
Ultimately, the promotion of mental health in mine action will 
require a commitment to not only deal with adverse mental health 
outcomes as they arise but also to contribute to their prevention, based 
on the understanding that mental health, organizational culture, 
and people’s management are closely interconnected. Furthermore, 
in order to be truly effective and respond to the differentiated needs 
of a varied workforce in culturally appropriate ways, it is vital that 
any future discussion and initiative on mental health that the sector 
engages in is undertaken through an intersectional lens. 
See endnotes page 149
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By Ken Falke, Bret A. Moore, Psy.D., ABPP, and Richard Tedeschi, Ph.D.
 [ Boulder Crest Institute for Posttraumatic Growth ]
In the fields of humanitarian demining and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), physi-cal traumas related to blast and fragmen-
tation injuries receive a great deal of research 
attention. In contrast, focus on the psychologi-
cal health and wellness of humanitarian mine 
action personnel (HMAP) is lacking. Although 
research on the incidence of mental health dis-
orders among HMAP is extremely limited, com-
pared with the general population, this group 
likely suffers more from psychiatric conditions 
such as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), 
depression, and anxiety. HMAP work in a high 
state of hypervigilance because at any given 
moment in a demining operation, there is risk of death and/or severe maiming. In addition to the inherent risk 
associated with searching for and working with live unexploded ordnance, deminers are exposed to the constant 
stress of conflict, which can include shouldering the psychological burden of responsibility for the physical well-
being of innocent civilians exposed to explosive devices and witnessing the death and injury of others. Because of 
the multiple and unique stressors associated with this inherently dangerous work, HMAP likely experience trauma-
related mental health conditions at a rate equal to, if not greater than, other high-risk professionals such as military 
personnel and first-responders (e.g., firefighters, law enforcement, emergency medical technicians). Although esti-
mates vary, rates of PTSD for the latter groups range from 10 percent to over 30 percent depending on the study 
cited.1,2,3 Therefore, it is critical to identify effective strategies for mitigating the effects of psychological trauma in 
this high-risk group. 
Conventional Approaches to Addressing Psychological Trauma
Although there are a number of psychiatric conditions that can 
manifest following exposure to a traumatic event, PTSD is the most 
notable. Symptoms of PTSD vary among individuals, but most experi-
ence some combination of problems related to intrusions (e.g., night-
mares, flashbacks), avoidance (e.g., avoid thinking or talking about 
past traumatic events), mood (e.g., depression, negative thoughts), and 
arousal/reactivity (e.g., insomnia, being easily startled, irritability). 
The primary approach to the treatment of PTSD is psychotherapy. The 
overarching goal of psychotherapy is symptom reduction. In fact, if 
treatment is successful and enough symptoms are eliminated, the per-
son no longer technically meets the diagnostic criteria for the disorder 
and is considered “cured” from a medical model perspective. 
There are several psychotherapies commonly employed in the treat-
ment of PTSD. Two have gained considerable popularity in recent 
years—Prolonged Exposure (PE) and Cognitive Processing Therapy 
(CPT). PE and CPT are trauma-focused, manualized therapies, which 
are stepwise, scripted interventions that require the person to confront 
the trauma through talking or thinking about the traumatic event. 
Humanitarian Mine Action 
Personnel
Deminer in Afghanistan.
All graphics courtesy of the authors.
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Research shows that psychotherapy is beneficial for some individ-
uals who develop PTSD as a result of working in high-risk occupa-
tions (see Moore and Penk, 2019 for a review of PTSD interventions 
for active-duty military members and veterans).4 However, trauma-
focused therapies like PE and CPT have high dropout rates due to the 
increased distress that often arises when a person actively confronts 
past traumatic events. There is also concern about the overall effec-
tiveness of these psychotherapeutic interventions. Studies show that 
up to two thirds of individuals who receive treatment with trauma-
focused psychotherapies show only modest improvements and con-
tinue to meet the diagnostic threshold for PTSD.5,6,7 Limited access to 
psychotherapy services must also be taken into consideration when 
addressing the psychological needs of HMAP. Moreover, the availabil-
ity of psychiatric mental health professionals is significantly limited in 
countries where demining operations occur.
Alternative to Traditional Interventions: 
Posttraumatic Growth and Expert Companionship
Considering the significant limitations and availability of psy-
chotherapy treatments for PTSD, examining other interventions for 
mitigating the negative effects of this relatively common and chronic 
psychiatric condition is imperative. One such approach is applying the 
principles of posttraumatic growth (PTG) as a means to assist people 
who are managing the negative effects of trauma yet also trying to 
thrive and grow in the aftermath of trauma. 
PTG is defined as positive psychological changes that occur as a 
result of the struggle with traumatic events. Instead of thinking of 
trauma as a specific type of event and subsequent dysfunction, the 
concept of PTG considers trauma as life experience that can produce 
transformative change due to reconsideration of previous held beliefs. 
Research identifies five domains of growth following trauma: appre-
ciation of life, new possibilities, personal strength, relationships, and 
spiritual/existential change.8 
The facilitation of PTG is accomplished through the process of 
Expert Companionship, which is a novel approach based on sound 
psychological principles and includes education, distress manage-
ment, emotional disclosure, creation of a new life narrative, and 
mission/service (see Tedeschi & Moore, 2020 for a detailed review of 
Expert Companionship).9 An application of this approach is found at 
Boulder Crest Foundation, a community-based, nonprofit, multisite 
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organization that focuses on improving the psychological health 
of veterans and first responders, including active and former EOD 
personnel. Boulder Crest’s flagship program is a seven-day residen-
tial program called Warrior PATHH (Progressive and Alternative 
Training for Healing Heroes) and utilizes a variety of complementary 
and alternative interventions (e.g., mindfulness/meditation, yoga, 
equine therapy) and traditional psychotherapeutic techniques (e.g., 
psychoeducation, distress management, relationship building, goal 
setting). This initial part of the program has a follow-up component 
that lasts eighteen months through online resources and interper-
sonal connections. As part of an evaluation of the program, forty-nine 
combat veterans who completed Warrior PATHH were followed for 
eighteen months. Results showed reductions in psychiatric symptoms 
associated with PTSD, depression, and anxiety as well as increases in 
the ability to manage stress and psychological growth.10
A unique aspect of Warrior PATHH is that it is peer-delivered 
and is not run or managed by mental health professionals. This is an 
important component of the program as those working within Warrior 
PATHH are veterans and first responders who understand the unique 
needs and professional culture of those who attend the program. This 
peer-delivered, expert companion approach would be serviceable within 
mine action, as HMAP engage in work and function within a professional 
and organizational culture that few people truly understand. Moreover, 
attending a program provided by people who can speak directly to 
the everyday work experiences and shared psychological challenges of 
demining work can rapidly produce trust and open disclosure, facili-
tating the healing process. Although participants in Warrior PATHH 
point to specific program elements as impactful, they commonly refer 
to the way they are treated with respect and understanding by all the 
staff as a crucial element in allowing them to engage in the learning that 
takes place during the program. 
Conclusions
in these professions is because there is an emphasis on developing a 
mission of service as part of the healing. 
Logistically, implementation of mental health programs within 
organizations involved in demining work will need to be championed 
by those within leadership positions. However, the delivery of novel 
psychological interventions similar to the ones noted in this article 
can be peer-managed for reasons already noted. This will likely reso-
nate within the HMA community as peer-support programs have his-
torically been a critical part of addressing the varied needs of HMA 
personnel. 
See endnotes page 150
It is incumbent upon those within leadership positions in humani-
tarian mine action to identify novel and effective strategies for address-
ing the mental health needs of their staff, especially those working in 
high-stress environments. For mental health professionals, our experi-
ence with combat veterans and first responders can be a source of ideas 
about how to help traumatized HMAP. Not only do these groups have 
similar traumatic work experiences, but many individuals involved in 
demining also have engaged in their work as a way to be of service 
to others, and to act as protectors. One of the reasons why the PTG 
intervention model of Expert Companionship resonates with people 
HMAP, whether they are local individuals within their respective communities or former 
EOD professionals, would benefit from an interventional approach that focuses on 
education about common responses to trauma, strategies for managing distress, and 
methods for integrating traumatic experiences into a future-oriented framework that 
promotes psychological growth.
HMAP, whether they are local individuals within their respective 
communities or former EOD professionals, would benefit from an 
interventional approach that focuses on education about common 
responses to trauma, strategies for managing distress, and methods for 
integrating traumatic experiences into a future-oriented framework 
that promotes psychological growth. This is especially true if these 
strategies are not part of a traditional mental health approach to well-
ness. International nongovernmental organizations and nongovern-
mental organizations that are involved in actual demining activities, 
as well as training others in the skill of demining, are well-positioned 
to deliver posttraumatic growth-based programs. These organizations 
and individuals share an understanding of the dangers associated with 
their work and the psychological challenges that are tied to their expe-
riences. Moreover, the need for common sense and culturally-specific 
interventions is great across multiple areas of operations. HMAP not 
only work in active combat environments, they also work in post- 
conflict settings that are also extremely dangerous (e.g., demining work 
in legacy minefields). Indeed, as seen in the recent killing of ten HALO 
deminers in Afghanistan, danger is ever-present regardless of loca-
tion and circumstances. Posttraumatic growth-based programs can 
be tailored to the specific needs of the individuals performing mine 
action work and to the environments in which the work is being done. 
Although the precipitants of psychological stress vary between set-
tings, there is considerable overlap between the responses individuals 
have to the stress. There is also a relative uniformity in how individuals 
overcome significant psychological distress, which includes education, 
distress management, and focus on psychological growth and strength 
as opposed to psychological symptoms and deficits.  
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It is incumbent upon those within leadership positions in humanitarian mine action 
to identify novel and effective strategies for addressing the mental health needs of 
their staff, especially those working in high-stress environments.
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in Southeast Asia
Automated management information systems to enhance decision-making abilities are becom-ing more important today. Funding and resources are scarce, but technological developments are making it possible to conduct sophisticated analyses that will enhance planning and priori-
tization: doing more with less. Centered around optimization and efficiency, the geographic informa-
tion system (GIS) tools provided by Esri1 have been crucial in providing MAG (Mines Advisory Group)
with decision-making software.
MAG has assisted affected communities in Southeast Asia (SEA) 
for more than twenty years. In Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam (SEA), 
MAG employs more than 2,000 national staff—more than 30 percent 
of whom are women. Between 1965 and 1975, more than 7.5 million 
tons of bombs were dropped over Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam, 
which is double the amount dropped on Europe and Asia during 
World War II.2 Despite the conflicts ending more than forty years 
ago, cluster munition and landmine contamination continue to kill, 
injure, and hinder development in the region. 
To be able to make better operational decisions in SEA, MAG 
incorporated information from the Theater History of Operations 
Reports (THOR3) database, which overlays bombing locations and 
By Mikael Bold and David Avenell [ MAG, Mines Advisory Group ]
related data over satellite images. THOR contains declassified 
records of the aerial bombing missions conducted by the United 
States from World War I to the present. In what remains the largest 
aerial bombardment in human history, more than 182,000 bomb-
ing missions were conducted during the Vietnam War using cluster 
munitions in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. As a result, accord-
ing to data from THOR, almost 1.6 billion submunitions were dis-
persed. The cluster munition contamination tool developed by MAG 
aims to accelerate the process of survey and clearance by informing 
stakeholders in advance to determine where there is a need for non-
technical survey (NTS), technical survey (TS), or if an area should 
be cleared directly.
Figure 1. Dispersed 
cluster munition bombing 
over Cambodia, Laos, 
and Vietnam during the 
conflict in the region that 
lasted for a decade.
All graphics courtesy of the authors.
85
JMU: The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Issue 25.1
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2021
THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION86
Problem Statement 
was further strengthened by a new version of the IMAS covering qual-
ity management in 20165 and complemented by the new IMAS on risk 
management in 2019,6 and an updated IMAS on information manage-
ment in 2020.7 
Moreover, in 2018, the Mine Action Review’s publication Clearing 
the Mines8 repeated some of the key issues identified in 2005: 
For sure, mistakes in survey in the early days cost us all dearly, exag-
gerating hugely the extent of the problem and asserting the presence 
of contamination where it did not, in fact, exist. And, despite the 
best of intentions, poor survey and inadequate information man-
agement continues to plague our profession, sometimes leading to 
clearance resources being wasted on uncontaminated areas. Today, 
however, old surveys can no longer be an excuse for slow progress. 
The re-surveys conducted in several countries over the last few 
years, as well as those underway or planned, clearly evidence that 
high-quality survey can be achieved without excessive expenditure. 
An accurate baseline is, or should be, the starting point for all suc-
cessful national mine action programmes.
“Without data, you are just another person with an opinion.”
 – W. Edwards Deming
The first concept of a simple geospatial analysis was conducted in 1832 by geographer Charles Picquet, 
who created a map that showed cholera outbreaks across fourty-eight Paris districts. His cholera out-
break map was an early version of a heat map represented by color gradient according to the percent-
age of deaths from cholera per 1,000 inhabitants. In 1854, a similar geospatial analysis model was used 
by Dr. John Snow who also mapped data from a cholera outbreak in London. His map allowed him to see 
a clear pattern that no one had noticed and to ultimately discover the source of the outbreak. His find-
ings led to changes in the water and waste management systems of London and other cities resulting 
in improvements in general public health. The term GIS did not exist in the 19th century, but it allowed 
Picquet and Snow to ask questions based on data and helped them to solve problems, just like we do 
today with GIS.
Managing Big Data 
Many sectors moved more quickly than others to embrace techno-
logical developments at the turn of the 21st century, including a broad 
range of new technical breakthroughs such as information technol-
ogy and telecommunications. Yesterday’s powerful desktops are being 
transformed to sensory input and output devices, combining intelli-
gent software and extensive connectivity. We become used to networks 
connecting to everything and we are adapting to “smart environ-
ments” that are changing how we work, what we consume, and how we 
interact with other people. In the past decade organizations have been 
increasingly storing, processing, and extracting value from data of all 
forms and sizes. Systems that support large volumes of structured and 
unstructured data will continue to rise. Organizations will continue to 
explore technology that fulfills the demand on platforms that help data 
custodians govern and secure big data while empowering end users to 
analyze that data. These systems will mature to operate well inside of 
enterprise IT systems and standards.
In 2005, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian 
Demining (GICHD) released its publication, A Study of Manual 
Mine Clearance. Many of the conclusions and recommendations in 
this publication are worth revisiting. The publication urged the mine 
action community and its stakeholders to urgently consider moving 
to a more explicit risk management approach. Systematically record-
ing, e.g., the depth at which mines are located, would provide valuable 
information to support development of a professional risk manage-
ment system. Furthermore, if confidence in the mine clearance indus-
try is to be maintained, the study recommended that performance 
must be reported accurately and honestly to reinforce the principle 
that exaggerated clearance statistics are unacceptable. It also recom-
mended that data collection should be standardized and improved 
to allow clearer oversight of cost-benefit issues related to mine clear-
ance. This data should enable detailed analysis of the costs for the land 
that had been cleared. In short, this publication outlined the key ele-
ments for land release, which almost a decade later was acknowledged 
when the major amendment of land release was approved for the 
International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) in 2013. Land release 
86
The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol25/iss1/1
25TH ANNIVERSARY ISSUE @ SUMMER 2021 87
Geographic Information Systems (GIS) Made Simple
GIS is an extension of cartography, which can be summarized as the 
art and science of making maps that enable organizations and individ-
uals to visualize, analyze, question, and interpret data. Realistically, 
there is no limit to the amount of data that can be added to an ArcGIS 
system for an organization working in mine action. Esri was founded 
as the Environmental Systems Research Institute in 1969 as a land-use 
consulting firm and is today a leading international supplier of GIS 
software, web-based GIS, and geodatabase management applications. 
Over the past decade, Esri has transformed its GIS into the power plat-
form it is today—easy to set up and use “out of the box.”
Since 2013, MAG has explored and developed various information 
systems for mapping and reporting of survey and clearance activities. 
In 2015, MAG started exploring Esri tools in Cambodia. Research 
and development activities were conducted under an Operational 
Field Evaluation (OFE) project in Ratanakiri Province in northeast 
Cambodia. MAG’s OFE projects in Cambodia have been funded 
Figure 2. Dispersed submunition density overlaid with cluster 
munition target locations.
Figure 3. Dispersed submunition density overlaid with 
submunition evidence.
Figure 4. Thirty-meter analysis grid, submunition density, and 
target locations.
Figure 5. Submunition risk map overlaid with cluster munition 
target locations.
and supported by the U.S. Humanitarian Demining Research and 
Development (HD R&D) Program9 for almost two decades, and have 
expanded to other global MAG programs in the Middle East, Europe, 
and SEA for mechanical and detection OFEs. HD R&D focuses on the 
rapid development, testing, demonstration, and validation of technol-
ogies that increase the efficiency and enhance the safety of humani-
tarian demining operations. In this mission, HD R&D may adapt 
commercial-off-the-shelf technologies, use mature technologies, or 
leverage existing military countermine technologies.
In 2018, MAG decided that it was of strategic importance to 
replace the paper-based system in use at the time with a “one time 
input” of data method via tablets used by field operators that would 
improve analysis and decision-making. The information system 
also needed to be compatible with IMSMA Core10 that was being 
developed and rolled out to national mine action authorities by the 
GICHD in 2016. The strength of MAG’s information system is that 
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it has taken full advantage of the tools made available by Esri, espe-
cially when it comes to geospatial analysis and predictive analysis to 
inform and assist operational decision-making. 
MAG’s information system was named the Operations Management 
Information System (OMIS) to separate it from other information sys-
tems being developed in MAG at the same time. In late 2018, funded 
by HD R&D, MAG purchased a license for Esri systems, and began set-
ting up and implementing OMIS. HD R&D has continued to provide 
support for the development and rollout of OMIS. In 2020, the Dutch 
government also contributed toward the rollout of OMIS. 
Development of a geospatial analytical tool. During the global 
pandemic in 2020, MAG’s Global OMIS team started work on exploring 
U.S. bombing data from the Vietnam War using datasets from THOR. 
MAG’s aim in developing the tool was to improve planning, prioritiza-
tion, and evidence-based operational decisions in SEA.
Cluster munition contamination tool. The cluster munition con-
tamination tool runs within MAG’s Esri Enterprise environment and 
OMIS, where it classifies priority areas for survey and clearance of 
cluster munition contaminated areas across SEA. To predict cluster 
munition contamination risk, the tool compares extracted data from 
bombing missions that only contain cluster munitions with recorded 
submunition evidence found during explosive ordnance disposal 
(EOD) response, survey, and clearance operations by MAG in SEA. 
Mapping relative risk of ground contamination provides insight for 
prioritizing survey and clearance operations. In certain cases where 
predictive risk is very high, the tool will identify areas where battle 
area clearance (BAC) teams can move directly to clearance operations 
without the need for TS. 
U.S. bombing data. The U.S. bombing analysis uses target location 
data for Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam from the THOR database that 
are mapped as points representing cluster munition target locations. 
Not all cluster munitions were successfully dropped on target, as indi-
cated by battle damage assessment within the dataset. Despite spatial 
uncertainty, clear distribution patterns are detectable and useful for 
analysis, such as bombing missions along roads.
Evidence data. Submunition evidence was compiled from MAG’s 
survey and clearance operations in SEA. Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) 
shared some of its data from Vietnam for comparative analysis. Maps 
of suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) and confirmed hazardous areas 
(CHAs), released land, and areas known to have no cluster munition 
contamination were used in the analysis for validation and refinement.
Elevation data. Thirty-meter grid elevation data from the United 
States Geological Survey (USGS) Shuttle Radar Topography Mission 
(SRTM) was used to create a 30-m slope grid. Terrain type, such as 
steep slope, gentle slope, and flat slope, provides further results seg-
mentation to assist prioritization of contaminated areas.
Tool development. Using the Python programming language, 
Esri ArcPy, and numerical analysis libraries, the geospatial analyti-
cal tool runs locally on Esri ArcGIS Pro and is deployed over server-
side geoprocessing services into web applications via Esri Enterprise 
ArcGIS Server. As data analysis takes place on a 30-m grid covering 
SEA, the tool creates a map of bomb risk by dispersing point-based 
cluster munition data onto this grid and creates a second grid for 
evidence-based risk using the density of items found on the ground. 
The two grids are weighted based on patterns within the data and 
summed to create an overall risk map. This is classified by prior-
ity for survey and clearance, using further ancillary datasets such 
as slope type. The tool enables selection of evidence data for model 
training and prediction. Countries and provinces are selected for 
iterative 30-m grid processing, and the results are converted back to 
seamless vector polygon mapping for reporting and visualization in 
Esri desktop and online products. Analysis is performed using Esri 
spatial grids and running mathematical functions on the same data 
converted into Python programming language data structures.
Figure 6. Evidence risk grid map. 
CLASSIFICATION REASONING
Technical survey-low Nearby cluster munition targets; no nearby submunition evidence recorded
Technical survey-high High levels of nearby cluster munition targets; no nearby submunition evidence recorded
Clearance-low Nearby submunition evidence recorded; no nearby cluster munition targets
Clearance-medium Evidence of nearby cluster munition targets and nearby submunition evidence recorded, where either cluster 
munition targets are high with low submunition evidence recorded, or submunition evidence recorded is high 
with low cluster munition targets, or both cluster munition targets and submunition evidence recorded are 
both medium intensity
Clearance-high Evidence of high levels of nearby cluster munition targets and high levels of submunition evidence recorded
Table 1. Weighted scoring table for classification.
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Model Parameters
Figure 8. Priority areas with gentle and steep 
slopes with evidence points.
Figure 7. Priority TS and clearance areas with 
evidence points.
Several model-run parameters were set 
using a configuration file containing
• Evidence data to be used for training 
and prediction
• Percentage evidence data covered by 
bombing dispersion zone
• Relative weighting applied to bombing 
and evidence risk
• Granularity of output classifications, 
i.e., number of output risk in the final 
risk map (high, medium, or low)
• Slope classification
• Countries and provinces to process
Determine dispersion distance from 
cluster munition drop target location. 
An incremental distance search is performed 
from all cluster munition target point loca-
tions until a required percentage of “training” 
evidence is found. The spatial relationship 
between bombing target locations data and 
evidence data is used to define a distance 
that ensures submunition data is dispersed to 
cover all areas of known evidence, with the 
exception of outliers.
Disperse submunition data into dis-
persion zones. Estimates of submunition 
data at each cluster munition target location 
is calculated using the following formula: 
submunition count = number of aircraft x 
load x 650 as a starting point. Submunition 
counts are dispersed into a circular zone 
on the 30-m grid, defined by the disper-
sion distance and using distance weighting. 
Grid cells closer to the target location will 
receive a greater proportion of submunition 
count than those cells at the edge of the cir-
cular dispersion zone. The full submunition 
count at a target point is dispersed into the 
surrounding 30-m grid. In areas where clus-
ter munition target points cluster, a grid cell 
may receive partial submunition counts from 
more than one nearby cluster munition target, 
which will accumulate. This process creates a 
submunition density map across SEA, where 
the sum of all submunition counts in 30-m 
grid cells equals the total amount of sub-
munitions dropped.
Obtain submunition density profile 
for evidence locations and create a 
submunition risk grid. Evidence points 
are overlayed onto the submunition den-
sity grid to calculate a density profile for 
known evidence. This is converted to per-
centile-based density ranges, where ranges 
are ordered from high to low density. The 
default analysis classifies each grid cell 
in the submunition density grid with a 
weighted score from eleven (low) to twenty 
(high) based on the low-to-high-density 
ranges overlapping known evidence. The 
specific number of ranges and weighted 
scores allocated to each is defined in tool 
configuration settings.
Create evidence-based risk grid. 
Point locations of submunitions evidence 
are interpolated onto a 30-m grid using 
kernel density routines with a 1-km dis-
persion distance. Routines convert this 
grid to numerical Python arrays, and per-
centile density ranges are calculated based 
on cells with evidence densities greater 
than 0. Percentile ranges are classified 
Figure 9. Predicted areas for 
clearance and high-priority TS 







with a weighted score from twenty-one (low) 
to thirty (high) based on the low-to-high-den-
sity ranges. Presence/absence evidence data is 
used to create the evidence-based risk grid.
Create cumulative risk map. Submuni-
tion and evidence risk grids are relative rather 
than absolute. They are summed to create a 
grid cell range (i.e., low-medium-high). Evi-
dence has higher relative weight. The cumu-
lative grid result is re-classified into priority 
levels as indicated in Table 1 (previous page).
Output generation. Quality control 
processes are included in the tool to resolve 
potential misalignment issues between dif-
ferent polygon datasets. For example, CHA 
extents are chopped using extents of clear-
ance polygons to prevent overlap. Processes 
also resolve NTS issues. NTS field survey 
areas indicating no evidence of cluster muni-
tions are subsequently removed from areas 
defined for TS or clearance priority.
To add reporting value to outputs, prior-
ity classifications are further refined by slope 
type (flat, gentle, or steep) and overlap status 
with CHA/clearance areas by combining with 
maps of slope classification and CHA/clear-
ance polygon extents. Outputs are supplied 
as Esri raster grids and Esri file geodatabase 
feature classes ready for ingestion into Esri 
desktop and online products/services.
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Conclusion
Easy access to interactive global networks together with machine 
learning (ML) can improve how we gather, analyze, monitor, and evalu-
ate information. Mine action in particular benefits immensely, enabling 
the sector to move away from a traditional tiered command and control 
structure to horizontal networks and co-operative teams that continually 
enhance decision-making, monitoring, and evaluation abilities.
The cluster munition contamination tool will not be truly effec-
tive on its own. The more data that is entered, the better the system 
becomes. It requires stakeholder and operator feedback, sharing of 
data, and most importantly, use of the tool. Equipped with ML capa-
bilities, this tool can assume control of manual and repetitive tasks to 
increase the speed of data analytics. This helps to eliminate manual 
data entry errors and data duplication, ensuring higher quality of 
work. Moreover, organizations do not need a developer to reprogram 
the system every time organizational workf lows change inside the 
system. By learning from data continuously, the platform will be 
able to improve its performance and adjust work processes in the 
system with minimum human assistance.
Conclusively, access to information is key to inform decisions 
and actions determined by methods applied, to manage risk sup-
ported by a quality management system to ensure that acceptable 
risk is monitored and kept as low as possible. This should be a pro-
cess driven by evidence and systematically sequenced for the con-
trol and continuous improvement of processes and products well 
known to many of us as the Deming Cycle: Plan, Do, Check and 
Act (PDCA). Consequently, location intelligence and data driven 
decision-making are key attributes for “doing the right things” and 
“doing things right.” 
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By Roly Evans [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]  
and David Hewitson [ Fenix Insight Ltd. ] 
In March 2021 the International Mine Action Standards Review Board (IMAS RB) adopted by con-sensus a new Technical Note for Mine Action (TNMA): Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for Land Release and Stockpile Destruction Operations.¹ The TNMA detailed new Common Counting Rules 
for land release outputs, identified elements of Context Capture at points of data entry and underlined 
the need for operational staff to prioritize the collection of relevant good quality data. The purpose 
of this article is to set out why the TNMA was developed and explain certain aspects of its content, 
particularly those where prolonged debate was necessary in order to achieve agreement. 
In its most basic form, the TNMA is a list of thirteen suggested oper-
ational KPIs that organizations may wish to consider when designing 
the dashboards they use for operational oversight and management. 
They may also be considered by donors when developing their report-
ing requirements. However, the KPIs are in no way obligatory; they are 
there to be used if considered helpful. The KPIs are disaggregated in 
broad headings, such as Land Release, Planning and Progress, Open 
Burning and Detonation, Safety, Reporting, and Compliance.
The TNMA was subject to prolonged discussion by a Technical 
Working Group (TWG) of the IMAS RB over the course of 2020.2 The 
TWG included representatives from DCA, DDG, FSD, HALO, MAG, 
Mine Action Review, NPA, HI, and UNMAS.3 It debated at length the 
key issues of Common Counting Rules for Land Release outputs and 
Context Capture at the Point of Data Entry.
One example of how individual KPIs are detailed in the TNMA is 
meter squared per explosive ordnance item (m²/EO item).4 This KPI is a 
useful metric when assessing land release operations but, like all KPIs, 
may be subject to misrepresentation. The TNMA tries to present this 
KPI in a way that, while acknowledging how it may be misused, dem-
onstrates how it can be used well. Firstly, the importance of situating 
the KPI in context is emphasized. For a typical m²/EO item KPI such 
as meter square per anti-personnel mine (m²/AP mine), the meters 
squared might very well be quite low when clearing dense minefields 
in a country like Sri Lanka, and quite high when clearing nuisance/
low density minefields in a country like Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 
KPI could tell us equally about the nature of the contamination in a 
country as about the operations there.
Also, this KPI can be used to discern different factors about a given 
land release activity. For example, m²/AP mine can help us understand 
the efficiency of a clearance plan for a pattern minefield. If for a com-
parable site this figure is 20 m²/AP mine, but on the site in question it 
is 200 m²/AP mine, this may imply inefficiency. However, in the same 
scenario, it might also be an indicator of the effectiveness of survey 
and operational planning that targeted the clearance. As with all KPIs, 
m²/EO item does not necessarily lead to hard conclusions, at least not 
immediately. The TNMA emphasizes that analysis of KPIs should 
invariably lead to more questions being asked to understand why a 
given KPI apparently indicates what it does. There might be a number 
of explanations as to why we could see 200 m²/AP mine instead of 20 
m²/AP mine in the clearance of seemingly comparable minefields. It 
could be inefficient clearance or ineffective survey, or another explana-
tion to do with a particular context. The key point is that indicators 
based on “data of a higher quality”5 induce managers to find out why 
and allow us to know and understand our operations better. 
The comparative use of the m²/AP mine KPI for a set of tasks is also 
demonstrated. For example, the dataset in Figure 1 shows a compari-
son of results in one country over different timescales (before 2009 in 
blue, between 2009 and 2012 in red). The red line sits below the blue 
line suggesting that later operations are more “efficient” than ear-
lier ones. A range of influences could be significant: later operations 
could have benefited from initiatives such as the adoption of improved 
concepts and methods of land release that took place around then. 
Additionally, improvements could reflect a general learning curve over 
time as a result of managers repeatedly encountering similar sites and 
Notes on a New Technical 
Note for Mine Action 
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circumstances. Other factors could also explain apparent differences 
in performance. For those conducting operational analysis, draw-
ing on skills similar to those used in the root causes analysis or those 
found in quality and safety management systems may be necessary 
to understand why differences in performance occur and to identify 
appropriate management responses. 
One theme that is emphasized throughout the TNMA is the need for 
good quality data. Unless the data that any KPI is based on is true and 
accurate, the KPI may not only be useless, it can also be misleading. 
Good quality data requires two things initially: well-designed forms 
and operational staff who understand that appropriate data collection 
is an essential part of their job. Forms that capture data, while not over-
burdening field operators, are not as common as we may like to imagine 
in mine action. Typically, it is only feasible to collect a finite amount of 
data about operations. Overambitious levels of data collection can result 
in lower quality data collected. What data is prioritized for collection is 
a choice. Operations managers should be clear about exactly what they 
want to measure and ensure that no superfluous data is collected when 
designing their operational forms. For this reason, design of data forms 
for operations should be led by operations managers. Moreover, all field 
personnel should not only be actively trained in data collection, they 
should use KPIs daily so that analysis becomes a norm and they appre-
ciate the value of the data they collect. In short, if KPIs are relevant and 
help field staff perform better, and if operations managers closely qual-
ity control data collection, field staff will take more care in collecting 
the all-important data that feeds the KPIs in the first place.
The need to try to reflect the context of a given KPI, not least to assist 
in an explanation as detailed in the hypothetical 20 m²/AP mine and 
200 m²/AP mine example discussed previously, is also covered in the 
TNMA. Capturing even basic context will allow those examining data 
with no connection to the operations on the ground—and thus no 
intuitive knowledge of a given context—to under-
stand why a given performance is indicated in cer-
tain KPI figures. However, capturing context at the 
point of data entry is not necessarily straightfor-
ward. For example, hard ground presents a signifi-
cant challenge to manual deminers. How best to 
capture this context in a dataset? Should there be 
basic descriptors such as low, medium, or high and 
in which case how do we make valid comparisons 
if one individual would judge ground hard, but 
another might judge it as medium? Other issues 
include a lack of agreement about what would 
constitute heavy, medium, or low metal contami-
nation. Would the threshold for heavy contamina-
tion be five indications per m² or ten indications? 
Agreement on this proved elusive. The imperfect compromise that 
resulted was just to capture as much context as practical with simple Yes 
or No questions. The TNMA details seventeen context capture ques-
tions that may be used by operators. The unit of measurement is the site 
or polygon as recorded in a task order or clearance plan. Where condi-
tions vary significantly within a given site, the operator may consider 
splitting the site for reporting purposes. Given that conditions change 
as a site is processed, the point of context capture should be the first day 
of Technical Survey (TS) or Clearance.
 
Figure 1. Analysis of m²/AP mine by number of mines at a 
site, including “best fit” curves, Afghanistan pre-2009 in blue, 
2009–2012 in red: Survey Action Center (SAC) Afghanistan 
Database Project 2012; the fact that the red line is lower 
than the blue line implies an increase in average land release 
targeting efficiency within the pre- and post-2009 figures (base 
data provided by the MACCA).
Figure courtesy of David Hewittson.
Figure 2. Demining in saturated ground in 
the Falkland Islands. Capturing Context at the 
Point of Data Entry is difficult to do effectively. 
This TNMA suggests 17 basic context capture 
questions with the demining site/polygon being 
the unit for which context is recorded. 
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Like-for-Like Principle
Analysis of performance invariably entails some form of compari-
son. In order for any comparison to be valid, data is required to be 
collected and reported in the same way: the application of the like-
for-like principle. For example, for KPIs involving time, the unit of 
time must be standardized. The length of a working day can differ 
between organizations and countries, but an hour can be compared 
on a like-for-like basis. The same principle is true for teams, the size of 
which can vary. Thus, it is better to adopt a comparable “unit” such as 
a deminer. As a rule, the lowest common denominated unit should be 
chosen for a given KPI. For these reasons, KPIs such as m²/deminer/
hour are preferred. 
The like-for-like principle becomes more challenging for land 
release outputs. While the key terms “Cancelled,” “Reduced,” and 
“Cleared” were last defined in the most recent editions of IMAS 07.11 
Land Release,6 those definitions were still open to a significant degree 
of interpretation. For example, clearance might entail full excavation 
in a demining lane on one site but be interpreted as only a visual check 
on another. This TNMA aimed to at least try to sharpen the definitions 
Cleared versus Reduced Land
of key land release outputs. While some progress was made, it would be 
wrong to suggest that definitions are now fully clarified. 
Cancelled land is now defined as “Areas designated as a SHA/CHA,7 
or part thereof, which have not been physically processed in any way, 
and meet set cancellation criteria. This includes areas re-designated as 
either SHA/CHA as the task progresses. Cancellation may be done at 
any stage of the LR process.”8,9 The key for such a definition are the can-
cellation criteria, which we are yet to develop in many National Mine 
Action Standards (NMAS) or International Mine Action Standards 
(IMAS). Cleared is now defined as an “area where the organisation has 
applied a process, or processes, to ensure the removal and/or destruc-
tion of all EO hazards from the specified area to the specified depth. 
Where multiple processes are applied to the same area to achieve the 
clearance standard, the area shall only be reported once, although the 
processes that achieved clearance may be recorded in order to reflect 
the accumulated effort applied.”10 What those processes should be 
remains undefined.
The TWG spent a long time debating what constitutes Reduced land. 
A significant sticking point was whether land processed to a clearance 
standard during the course of technical survey could be counted as 
Cleared rather than Reduced. Some operators were adamant that it 
should be, emphasizing the need to record the effort that goes into 
releasing a site. However, this is not necessarily straightforward. For 
example, a grid of lanes is not easy to 
disaggregate as processed to a clear-
ance standard from the areas they 
encompass that are not processed to 
the same standard. This is especially 
true for those demining operators who 
don’t employ Differential GPS when 
surveying progress on their sites. Some 
pointed out that it would be simpler 
to try to maintain these areas as one 
coterminous unit, bounded as a poly-
gon. This view prevailed. Of course, if 
EO is found on-site, inevitably what on 
one day might have been recorded as 
Reduced, by default becomes Cleared. 
For this reason, land release outputs 
should typically reflect the respective 
totals on the last day on site. 
The new definition also empha-
sizes the need to capture exactly what 
was done to land counted as Reduced 
and where it was done: “Within an 
area reported as reduced, organizations shall record clearly where is 
processed and where is not. Area processed shall be further disag-
gregated into those subject to manual, mechanical and ADS process-
ing, with multiple processing of the same area by different assets 
recorded in detail.”11 The Reduced figure is not counted multiple 
times, but the processing, possibly the repeated processing, that 
Figure 3. The edge of a minefield marked by the Iraqi Mine Clearance 
Organisation (IMCO), Iraq. The new TNMA has attempted to add more 
definition on what is Cancelled, Reduced, and Cleared land, albeit full 
definitions will depend on the development of agreed criteria, most 
likely at a national level. 
Image courtesy of Roly Evans.
93
JMU: The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Issue 25.1
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2021
THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION94
produces the figure is different and is captured (most likely in daily 
reporting). In this way it is hoped the effort that goes into releas-
ing a site is recognized, but pitfalls such as multiple counting of the 
same meters squared as released is avoided. Ultimately, at the point 
of handover, the combined meters squared of Cancelled, Reduced, 
and Cleared should equal the surface area of the polygon, with rea-
sonable margins allowed for topography. 
Another issue of significant discussion was how to define clear-
ance; specifically whether the actual removal of an item of EO 
was a requirement for clearance to have taken place. The discus-
sion was based on the need to try to reduce instances where many 
meters squared are reported as cleared without any EO removed. 
A number of operators were adamant that there will always be 
instances of sites that were cleared in good faith based on a rea-
sonable level of evidence providing sufficient justification at the 
time. These operators believed such instances should still count 
as clearance even if no EO is actually removed. This was the view-
point that prevailed in the TWG despite some concerns about the 
need to minimize clearance of uncontaminated sites. One of the 
benefits of standardizing KPIs such as m²/EO item is that such 
instances will be more easily identifiable as they occur. There may 
be a reasonable explanation as to why no EO was found during 
the clearance of a site. The important thing is to find, document, 
and learn from that explanation. Hopefully instances of clearance 
where nothing is found will become increasingly rare. 
The Common Counting Rules12 outlined in this TNMA are not 
mandated by a shall statement as might be found in a full IMAS. 
However, they have been approved by the IMAS RB. When IMAS 
07.11,13 08.10,14 and 08.2015 are reviewed, these terms will possibly be 
incorporated into that revision, along with the standard updating of 
IMAS 04.10.16 The definitions may be seen as a step on the road to a 
clearer explanation of the key land release outputs, but they are cer-
tainly not the final word. There remains a degree of ambiguity with 
definitions still open to interpretation. How land release outputs are 
reported and counted in the coming years will need to be closely 
monitored to see how well these revised definitions are serving the 
sector. Ultimately definitions for each land release output and activ-
ity will require criteria, at least at a national level, in order to be fully 
transparent. It might be said that until clear criteria are developed 
for land release outputs and activities, they will not be sufficiently 
defined. The development of criteria is an important and overdue 
task for the future.
Figure 4. A deminer processing land by 
means of raking. What constitutes clearance 
was one of the topics subject to debate by 
an IMAS Review Board Technical Working 
Group during the development of this TNMA. 
Further definition will most likely require the 
development of transparent criteria. 
Image courtesy of Roly Evans.
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Determining Cost
Figure 5. A BLU-97 submunition, Iraq. Correctly 
identifying the ordnance model is an example 
of basic data collection required to enable 
meaningful KPIs to analyze field operations. 
Reporting items simply as
“UXOs” into databases is so general
as to be meaningless or 
worse misleading. 
Image courtesy of 
Roly Evans.
Figure 6. Inspection of BETAB-500 concrete-
piercing aerial bombs. It is important such 
items are reported into databases in detail 
and not just as abandoned unexploded 
ordnance (AXO) or worse, misidentified as 
unexploded ordnance (UXO). 
Image courtesy of Roly Evans.
Noticeably absent from the TNMA are any KPIs dealing with cost, 
specifically cost per meter square (cost/m²). Historically this is a dif-
ficult KPI to calculate since there is no Common Counting Rule for the 
cost element of this KPI. It could be that only “operational” costs are 
counted, or that all costs including overhead support costs are calcu-
lated. Fixed price contracts tend to give a clearer view concerning the 
real cost/m², but even in this context figures can be misleading. It could 
be that organizations with a significant existing footprint in a given 
country, where equipment is already procured and imported under a 
previous contract, might be able to artificially reduce their operational 
costs. Some estimate initial deployment costs at 30 percent of a first-
year budget.17 While many donors would welcome a clear common 
counting rule for cost, or maybe a defined disaggregation for different 
cost categories (e.g., operational cost, operational cost minus equip-
ment, overall cost, etc.), it was not possible to agree on a cost/m² during 
the development of this initial TNMA. It is hoped that if this TNMA 
is revised in the future, development of a cost/m² KPI will be possible.
It should be stated clearly that operational KPIs are just a number, or 
a metric, that inform us about our own operations. They are not neces-
sarily targets. If KPIs are used to set targets, that may well be positive, 
but it should be done with a degree of care. Many in mine action are 
aware of targets such as mines destroyed being prioritized in the past. 
In certain circumstances this incentivized clearance of sites where 
there were high volumes of contamination rather than those where a 
higher socioeconomic impact was possible.18 Scenarios such as this are 
not a reason for not using KPIs, they are a reason for using them well.
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Figure 7. An NPA cluster munition remnants survey (CMRS) 
team prepares to move to a new search box in Saravan, Lao 
PDR. CMRS better targets subsequent clearance efforts, 
producing better m²/submunition cleared figures. 
Image courtesy of Roly Evans.
This TNMA should be seen as a starting point. As with all TNMAs, it 
is intended to complement the broader issues and principles addressed 
in IMAS. It also supports a key element of the 2019 Oslo Action Plan 
that made multiple references to the importance of analyzing good 
quality data.19 Until now, IMAS have had no agreed standard definition 
of performance or standard way of measuring performance. This has 
had an impact on how well we can analyze and subsequently improve 
our operations. This TNMA should at least start to address this issue. 
It is in no way a final word on how we collect operational data and 
analyze it. In its simplest form the TNMA can be seen as a list of sug-
gested KPIs that mine action operators, national mine action authori-
ties, and donors can consider when analyzing operations. However, in 
many ways its main focus is improving the quality of data on which 
KPIs are based, enabling a real analysis of that data by operations staff. 
Doing so while recognizing the context, even in a limited way, is key. 
For without good quality data counted in a standardized way, KPIs can 
actually be misleading. Hopefully this TNMA will contribute towards 
development and use of suitable KPIs that are not misleading and that 
actively support mine action operations. 
See endnotes page 150
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As virtual reality (VR) tools continue to improve, more fields are finding ways of implementing the technology to take advantage of training opportunities that reduce costs, alleviate logistical chal-lenges, and more. Where humanitarian deminers must prepare for dangerous work, VR facilitates 
training that minimizes the danger while giving trainers a level of control over the different conditions of 
the training and the ability to easily monitor and instruct the user. For this purpose, the American University 
of Beirut (AUB) and the Beirut Research and Innovation Center (BRIC) developed a VR application for the 
basic training of deminers, which is called the VR Demining Trainer (VRDT). The first version of the VRDT, 
presented herein, teaches trainees how to turn on a metal detector, test the detector, conduct soil compen-
sation, and start searching in a virtual minefield. These activities can be done in a closed room, regardless 
of time of day or weather conditions. Different training scenario attributes—including soil properties, land-
mine types, and locations—can be easily selected beforehand via software. The VRDT, which is a lab-ready 
prototype being developed using the Unreal Engine software and the Oculus Quest VR device, is not meant 
to replace but supplement field training, cutting down on training time and logistics by performing basic 
training phases in a VR-controlled environment.
 
Benefits of Virtual Reality in Training Deminers
In the case of demining, VR eliminates many requirements such 
as the need for ideal weather conditions, logistics, physical training 
objects, or location setup. When using VR, trainees can practice any-
time and anywhere, as all requirements can be controlled in a virtual 
environment. Terrain can be changed (e.g., from flat to mountainous), 
vegetation type can also be controlled, and the location of land-
mines can be altered by the software. With VR, the demining process 
becomes more cost-effective, modular, less time-consuming, and easy 
to monitor. 
VR in Different Applications
VR is continually being used in training programs ranging from 
military to medical applications. One example of an existing applica-
tion is the “Officer of the Deck (OOD)” VR simulation in which a naval 
officer is trained to navigate a submarine safely into port. Using OOD 
was found to improve the performance of trainees, proving its effective-
ness. Another example is the “Firefighting Trainer” application used 
by the US Navy for training personnel to utilize optimal procedures 
to fight fires on ships. A comparison between two different groups, in 
which only one took the VR training, showed measurable improve-
ments in the group with VR training. Moreover, medical applications 
are another utility for VR and are used to provide medical students 
with adequate training for real-life situations. This is the case at Dallas’ 
Southern Methodist University (SMU), where their VR-developed 
program allows for numerous medical students to practice the steps for 
performing a radical abdominal hysterectomy within a specified time 
and degree of accuracy. Another medical application, Virti—which is a 
medical training platform focused on building soft skills in augmented 
and virtual reality simulations—utilizes artificial intelligence (AI) and 
natural language processing (NLP) to analyze decision-making, lead-
ership, communication, and other capabilities that are not typically a 
focus of medical school training. Hence, VR systems are time-efficient 
ways of providing basic training for these surgeons.1
97
JMU: The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Issue 25.1
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2021
THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION98
VR Demining Training System
The system is expected to train deminers faster and at a lower cost. 
The VRDT version presented in this article can be thought of as a pre-
cursor for trainees before going to demining schools and before ever 
stepping onto a training field. 
The VRDT system is based on two key components: hardware and 
software. Hardware includes the headset used by the trainees and the 
hand controllers that simulate a handheld metal detector (MD). The 
headset is an Oculus Quest (priced below $300)2 used to render the 
environment and provide mobility through sensors and controllers, 
which are provided with the Oculus Quest (see Figure 1). Software cre-
ates the virtual demining environment and its associated objects, and 
translates the movements, actions, and feedback between real-life and 
virtual environments.
The VRDT system was developed over the course of nine months. It 
is important to note that the main requirement has been for the VRDT 
to be practical for use, and to offer the real-life expertise that deminers 
possess in the field. This means that the VRDT should provide distin-
guishable responses to the different types of targets faced in the field, 
and be able to give the user information about the class of the target, 
e.g., whether it is a landmine or clutter, and possibly the type of the 
landmine. While a preliminary lab-ready prototype has been made, 
more work is under way to produce a more practical and complete pro-
totype that can be easily deployed. 
The work has faced several challenges: the main one being the abil-
ity to exactly replicate the MD responses for different target types and 
in different terrain and soil conditions. For example, the MD pro-
duces a certain response for an anti-personnel No. 4 landmine and a 
different response for a buried metal pin. These two responses them-
selves change when the soil has more or less metal content, and when 
the terrain changes. The main challenge has been for the VRDT to 
be able to produce all these different responses and associate them 
with their respective targets. Other challenges involve configuring the 
Oculus Quest controllers, which are lighter and have a different form 
factor than an actual MD, to more accurately simulate the real thing. 
The system will be updated with additional functionality to make 
it suitable for all demining stages and embed the controllers in an 
MD-like device that would provide additional realism to the system. 
It is worth noting that obtaining a suitable interaction in addition to a 
high frame rate were the main challenges regarding the software part 
of the system.
 
Figure 1. Oculus Quest device and 
two-handed controllers.
All figures courtesy of the authors.
In the case of demining, VR eliminates many requirements such 
as the need for ideal weather conditions, logistics, physical 
training objects, or location setup.
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Implemented Demining Stages
The VRDT focuses on emulating the three stages of the demining 
process as described in CEIA’s tutorial videos.3 
Startup phase. The first phase teaches the trainee how to start the 
MD and operate it. The trainee begins by turning the sensitivity con-
trol to the red dot and the volume knob to maximum. These actions all 
occur in the VR environment. Then, while virtually holding the MD 
at about 1 m above the ground, the trainee pulls the on/off switch to 
the on position, which generates a series of beeps followed by the con-
fidence click. In order to ensure that the MD is operating according to 
factory specifications, the trainee inverts the MD and places the arm 
rest on the ground, and then passes a reference metal sample across 
Figure 2. VR model of CEIA MIL-D1 MD 
metal detector. Figure 3. Sample of an Unreal Engine blueprint.
the search head, from side to side, and in two different directions in 
order to hear the target tones in both directions. This confirms that the 
MD is operating properly. Finally, the trainee adjusts the search head 
to make it parallel to the ground in preparation for the next phase, 
which is soil compensation. All details in this phase are provided by 
the VRDT system using various blueprints in Unreal Engine.
Soil compensation phase. In this phase, the trainee accounts for 
the metal composition of the soil apart from the metal content of any 
target landmine. It should be performed every time the detector is 
turned on. For this purpose, a 1 m by 1 m metal-free box is designed for 
use in the VR environment, and the trainee starts by holding the MD 
Hardware Component of the System
The VRDT application requires a powerful VR device to efficiently 
render the virtual demining environment. Moreover, trainee mobility 
is an essential application requirement since deminers must move in 
order to sweep a field and locate landmines. The Oculus Quest was 
chosen to support the VRDT system because of its performance and 
its ability to integrate user mobility into the system through its sen-
sors, enabling it to be used indoors without any wiring or space limi-
tations. The VRDT supports casting to other devices such as Google 
Chromecast, a feature that enables instructors to view the stream on 
a separate monitor. This function, in addition to video recording, 
allows instructors to monitor the actions of the trainees in real time, 
and feedback can be relayed to the trainees at any time during the VR 
training. The controllers are used to simulate the hands of the trainee 
during demining, and each button on the controllers controls a specific 
function such as resetting the view or changing the settings of the cur-
rently simulated environment (e.g., soil properties).
Software Component of the System
The Blender software is used to create the environmental objects 
(e.g., the MD model, the vegetation, etc.). The interactions with the 
environment are coded using Unreal Engine, which utilizes blue-
prints or pre-designed blocks of code that provide all functions needed 
within the system. In addition, the Unreal Engine offers several graph-
ics rendering options compared to other platforms and a relative ease 
of implementation. The simulated MD is a CEIA MIL-D1, which is 
implemented with all its functionalities, including an on/off switch, 
a sensitivity knob, and a volume knob. All interactions happen when 
the virtual hands, controlled by the Oculus Quest’s controllers, come 
into collision with the virtual objects (MD and its different parts 
and controls). A frame rate of sixty-eight frames per second (FPS) is 
achieved, which minimizes the latency time between user action (i.e., 
pressing a button) and the simulated counteraction within the VR 
environment, making for a smoother user experience. Gravity is also 
implemented in order to make the simulation as close to reality as pos-
sible, meaning an object in the scenario can be picked up, handled, 
and dropped, and is interactive—especially in regards to the MD. 
Moreover, the software enables the environment to be easily adapted to 
account for different terrain, vegetation types, and landmine types and 
locations. Other MD types can also be designed in Blender or other 3D 
software and added to the Unreal Engine environment. 
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Figure 4. The trainee testing the MD with the reference metal 
sample. 
Figure 5. The trainee using a virtual 1 m x 1 m metal-free box 
to learn how to do soil compensation. 
Figure 6. The trainee doing target detection over a marked 
search lane. 
Figure 7. Two different terrain and vegetation types in the VR 
environment.
above this box (Figure 5) and then holds the switch in the reset position 
until a series of fast clicks is generated followed by a series of double 
clicks. At this point, the trainee returns the search head to the ground 
inside the metal-free box, and sweeps side to side close to the ground 
in order for the MD to acquire the soil characteristics. If the process 
is successful, the double clicks change into a fast series of clicks. In 
this case, the trainee lifts the MD up into the air until a single beep is 
produced, where the MD returns to the regular confidence clicks. The 
trainee sets the sensitivity, gradually lowering the maximum setting 
until no alarm is generated when the metal-free box is swept. Every 
detail of this phase is also implemented in the VRDT system using 
Unreal Engine blueprints. 
Detection and Pin-pointing Phase. After the soil compensation 
is done, the trainee starts looking for landmines. The trainee holds 
the detector so that the search head is parallel and as close as possible 
to the ground. The trainee then learns to properly sweep the MD and 
advance forward over the search area (Figure 6). If no target is found, 
only the confidence click is heard. When the MD detects a target, the 
center of the target is located where the alarm tone changes from high 
to low or from low to high. 
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 Comments and Conclusions
The VRDT aims to accelerate and reduce the cost of the training of 
deminers while removing weather and some logistical constraints. 
Other advantages include the ability to change the terrain, vegetation, 
landmine types, and landmine locations in software. As an example, 
Figure 7 shows two different terrain and vegetation types in the VR 
environment. This first version of the VRDT covers the demining 
training phases of MD startup, soil compensation, and basic detec-
tion.4 Mistakes and errors made by the trainees as well as unsuccessful 
training phases are reported using messages that appear on the headset 
screen. Future versions of the VRDT can include more MD brands and 
types and could focus more on the detection phase. 
See endnotes page 151
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By Martina Salini and Samuel Paunila [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]
The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) first engaged in the stock-pile management of conventional ammunition in 2013 and has since developed in-house techni-cal, operational, and strategic capabilities for ammunition through-life management. The GICHD 
is an active supporter of the ammunition management community of practice, and has authored and 
contributed to articles on this topic, including raising awareness of ammunition safety and security con-
cepts.1 The GICHD also collaborates with the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery (CISR) 
at James Madison University by jointly managing the Collaborative Ordnance Database Repository 
(CORD). This article discusses ammunition and explosives management from global to state levels and 
examines risk reduction in this setting, building on the experience of the Ammunition Management 
Advisory Team (AMAT) response mechanism—a joint initiative of the GICHD and the UN Office of 
Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) since 2019.
In the past decade, states around the world have become aware of 
the safety and security risks associated with explosive ordnance (EO)2 
and the consequences associated with poor management practices. 
Today, an increasing number of states are ready to discuss the sensitive 
topic of risks associated with their stockpiled EO and seek technical 
assistance toward reducing those risks.
Implementing a risk management system is vital for any state 
holding EO, from the early stages of procurement through to the 
stockpiling, use, and disposal of those munitions. As such, a good 
risk management system extends to the entire life cycle of EO and 
is integrated within the framework of national regulations and 
procedures. It is comprehensive and effective but not necessarily 
resource-intensive nor technically difficult to implement.
The global frame of reference for managing ammunition, the Inter-
national Ammunition Technical Guidelines (IATG), was developed 
and made publicly available in 2011 to assist states in addressing 
inherent risks stemming from stockpiling ammunition accord-
ing to their capacity and available material, financial, and technical 
resources. The IATG contain an integrated risk management system, 
providing concrete guidance to technical and policy practitioners on 
risk-management principles and processes, as well as procedures to 
guide risk-based decision-making in ammunition management.
Alongside these guidelines, states and organizations specializing in 
ammunition through-life management are also known as the “ammu-
nition management community of practice.” This article builds on the 
experience of the AMAT, a joint initiative established in 2019 by the 
GICHD and UNODA, to assist states in enhancing ammunition safety 
and security by managing risks from EO as per the IATG.
Global Attention to Ammunition and Explosives Risks
The safety and security risks pertinent to conventional ammunition 
management have captured the attention of states’ arms-control bod-
ies as well as humanitarian and development circles. Connecting dots 
between these risks and sustainable development goals (SDGs) at the 
policy level, this topic has taken center stage in international, regional, 
and, less visibly, national debates.3 Direct testimony of this are the two 
Groups of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Ammunition established 
by the United Nations General Assembly. Established in 2008, the first 
group looked at technical aspects of ammunition stockpile manage-
ment. The work of the GGE resulted in the development of the IATG, 
From Ammunition and 
Explosives
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and gave birth to the United Nations SaferGuard Programme to main-
tain, update, and disseminate the guidelines.4 The second ammunition 
GGE commenced its work in 2020 and is scheduled to hold its third 
and final session in September 2021. The second GGE’s recommenda-
tions, which will address challenges pertaining to through-life man-
agement and security issues across the ammunition supply chain, will 
be presented to the UN General Assembly for consideration later in 
the fall of 2021.
As discussions continue towards safer and more secure ammuni-
tion stockpiles, states’ demands for technical and financial assistance 
have been on the rise. In the past, a small group of states provided 
assistance that was largely a bilateral affair between the donor and 
recipient states’ militaries, comprising training of personnel in ammu-
nition depots, and technical advice in physical security and stockpile 
management (PSSM). Over the past decade, a handful of international, 
regional, and nongovernmental organizations further developed their 
capabilities and became heavily invested in direct assistance to states 
in ammunition management.5
In addition to bilateral assistance, states in need of assistance are 
also submitting their requests through sub-regional, regional, and 
international channels. In 2020 alone, ten states submitted requests 
for assistance with ammunition management to the United Nations in 
their national reports on their implementation of the UN Programme 
of Action (PoA) on Small Arms and Light Weapons.6 Meanwhile, in 
the midst of the global COVID-19 pandemic and associated, compet-
ing national priorities, five states requested assistance from AMAT 
with their stockpiled ammunition.
Lessons Learned
Whenever inherent risks are not properly addressed, stockpiled 
EO pose two distinct threats to local communities, armed forces, the 
economy, and society at large: the risk of accidental explosions and the 
risk of diversion. Mass explosions can result in people killed, injured, 
or displaced, and have significant socioeconomic consequences. 
Additionally, diversion of EO from stockpiles—in-transit and during 
transfer—leads to unchecked proliferation, which has proven to be a 
catalyst for conflict and a contributing factor to the escalation of armed 
violence in several regions of the world.7 Diverted EO has further been 
systematically used to assemble improvised explosive devices (IEDs).8 
The latest available data confirms the gravity and persistence of 
safety and security risks arising from ineffective stockpile manage-
ment: the Small Arms Survey (SAS) recorded 242 unplanned explo-
sions at munition sites (UEMS) over the 2010–2019 period, of which 
39 took place in Africa, 16 in the Americas, 116 in Asia, 70 in Europe, 
and 1 in Oceania.9 Similarly since 2011, Conflict Armament Research 
(CAR) has documented approximately 7,500 cases of ammunition 
diversion.10 Furthermore, in 2018 alone, IEDs used by non-state actors 
were responsible for 9,366 civilian casualties in forty-nine countries.11 
Too often, post-explosion investigations report how an accident 
could have been easily avoided and its impact minimized, if risks 
inherent to EO had been better understood, appreciated, and man-
aged. Hence, risk management should be perceived by states as a fun-
damental measure to prevent accidental explosions, unauthorized 
access, and diversion.12
Effective risk management within this context is a joint undertak-
ing by technical and policy practitioners: a process initiated with a 
state understanding the nature of the risks involved, appreciating 
their magnitude in the surrounding environment and communities, 
and anticipating their consequences if materialized.13 Sound techni-
cal knowledge of EO as well as good management practices should 
be required from the outset. In the long run, for a state to maintain 
safe and secure ammunition and explosives stockpiles, the risk man-
agement process must guide the development and implementation 
of a national strategy and standards, as well as advise the competent 
authority and dedicated work force.14
Managing Risks, Mitigating Threats
In the long run, for a state to maintain safe and secure ammunition and 
explosives stockpiles, the risk management process must guide the 
development and implementation of a national strategy and standards, 
as well as advise the competent authority and dedicated work force.14 
While risks inherent from stockpiling EO cannot be entirely elimi-
nated, the likelihood of an accident can be reduced to as low as reason-
ably practical, and its effects can be mitigated. Similarly, the likelihood 
of diversion can be reduced to near zero. Across its modules, the IATG 
are strong in practical risk management15 and structured around 
gradual improvements considering the diversity of states’ capacities 
and available material, financial, and technical resources.16 Modules 
use three levels of gradual ascending compliance, also known as 
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Image 1. Iterative risk-reduction process in the IATG.
All graphics courtesy of GICHD.
risk reduction process levels (RRPLs): basic (RRPL1), intermediate 
(RRPL2), and advanced (RRPL3). All states, regardless of their risk 
baseline and financial and technical capacities, can assess and improve 
management processes based on the IATG, using the RRPLs as bench-
marks to work toward.
 At a minimum, states should aim to maintain processes related to 
stockpiles at RRPL1. This implies the adoption of low-cost actions that 
do not often require extensive technical and material capabilities, and 
can be easily implemented to improve the safety and secu-
rity of EO. For example, the guidance to achieving RRPL1 
entails storing weapons and ammunition separately, segre-
gating certain ammunition types from others in storage and 
transport, regularly ventilating explosives store houses, and removing 
vegetation around them.
Forward-planning is important. When more resources become 
available, a state can upgrade its storage facilities, transport infra-
structure and surveillance processes, and fill the deficit in qualified 
ammunition personnel—gradually advancing to RRPL2 and RRPL3. 
Acquiring knowledge (e.g., through staff training) and applying the 
IATG (i.e., risk management principles and processes) will enable a 
state to identify specific challenges, capabilities, and gaps. Moreover, 
communicating these in appropriate national, sub-regional, and 
regional forums may bring expert advice and services to the state 
from other states and specialized actors. By using the IATG and ser-
vices made available, a state can establish realistic and sustainable 
action plans and/or a strategy toward closing the gaps and commenc-
ing its implementation.
Risk Reduction in Select States
Significant differences in states’ subject knowledge and manage-
ment practices continue to be observed; however, a growing number 
of countries seek international assistance, communicating chal-
lenges and capability gaps. Some also prioritize risks with aging, 
unstable, and obsolete ammunition stockpiles—proactively plan-
ning for risk reduction.
Peru. Peru was the first country to approach UNODA 
for assistance from AMAT. As part of the process for 
their Institutional Transformation (2020–2034) plan, 
Peru is taking its first steps in aligning its policies and practices with 
the IATG. After delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic travel 
restrictions and lockdowns, AMAT is now able to assist Peru with its 
ongoing efforts. Currently, nearly seventy war materiel army officers 
have been trained on the IATG,18 and deployed in-country in various 
management and regulatory functions.19 With technical assistance 
from AMAT, Peru plans to update and streamline the regulatory 
framework between branches of the military into a set of national stan-
dards for ammunition management, as stipulated by national legisla-
tion. These multi-year activities with key ministries and armed forces 
will be accompanied by further training. Additionally, Peru, in 
partnership with the Spanish Ministry of Defence and AMAT, will 
conduct risk assessments of ammunition storage facilities.
Mauritania. In response to a request from the 
Republic of Mauritania for technical assistance in late 
2020, AMAT carried out a preliminary assessment 
mission in support of the Programme National de Déminage 
Humanitaire et de Développement20 (PNDHD). Through this assess-
ment, AMAT visited eleven storage areas, identifying capabilities, 
risks, and needs in weapons and ammunition management. The 
assessments were conducted against the baselines from the IATG and 
the Modular Small Arms Control Implementation Compendium 
(MOSAIC). Following the mission, short- and longer-term recom-
mendations were submitted to the PNDHD, aimed at gradually 
improving safety and security management. Pending relaxation of 
COVID-19 travel restrictions, AMAT’s plans with Mauritania include 
a follow-up mission to implement recommendations.
Moldova. For nearly two decades, the Ministry of 
Defense of Moldova, with support from the interna-
tional community, has implemented a program to 
secure and make safe its ammunition stockpiles largely inherited 
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Image 2. Delivery of a virtual training course on the IATG to the Peruvian Army.
following the fall of the Soviet Union.21 
Significant steps have been taken to make the 
management more systems-based, effective, 
and responsive to risks. This has included 
bringing ammunition-related policies and 
practices in line with IATG practices. For 
example, Moldova has gradually reduced the 
number of ammunition storage locations from 
eighteen to five, involving surveillance, trans-
port, and disposal of dysfunctional, unsafe, and 
surplus ammunition.22 Yet, aware of the magni-
tude of the remaining challenge, the Ministry of 
Defense requested in 2020 that AMAT review 
the PSSM program’s progress as well as 
Moldova’s National Army Action Plan 2020–
2024. In response, AMAT visited Moldova’s 
ammunition facilities in October 2020 and, in 
May 2021, convened a technical workshop for Moldovan experts in 
Geneva in July 2021, raising government awareness on ammunition 
through-life management and effective safety and security risk reduc-
tion measures.
Equatorial Guinea. In March 2021, a series of explo-
sions rocked the city of Bata, Equatorial Guinea, result-
ing in more than 100 deaths and 600 injured. The 
explosions annihilated the military camp housing the storage facilities 
in which the explosions originated and destroyed more than 200 build-
ings in the surrounding areas. Following the explosion, Equatorial 
Image 3. Meeting between AMAT and the Armed Forces of the 
Republic of Moldova.
Difficult but Passable Road Ahead
In contrast to earlier observations of positive change vis-à-vis states’ 
efforts to reduce risks, and despite the availability of the IATG, the 
root causes of the recent, avoidable humanitarian disasters bear wit-
ness to the under-appreciation of the safety risks associated with EO—
both military ammunition and commercial explosives. Lack of action 
by authorities is often explained as an absence of advanced technical 
knowledge and insufficient financial resources. However, all states 
have access to the IATG and may seek assistance from the commu-
nity of practice, e.g., UN SaferGuard Programme, regional organiza-
tions, other states, or through a dedicated response mechanism such 
as AMAT.25 Additionally, states may take advantage of financial assis-
tance mechanisms and trust funds through which technical assistance 
can also be channeled.26 For many states, the road to progressive and 
sustained risk reduction is long and winding but passable.
Guinea requested technical assistance from UNODA’s Regional Centre 
for Peace and Disarmament in Africa, which resulted in UNODA acti-
vating the quick response mechanism of the UN SaferGuard 
Programme. Within three days of the request, AMAT deployed and 
tasked an expert team to Bata to assist in determining the cause of the 
incident; identifying further explosion risks through a rapid risk 
assessment on the ground; assisting in reducing the risk of further 
explosion incidents through technical advice on risk-mitigation mea-
sures; and providing technical support recommendations to the 
United Nations in light of the coordinated bilateral offers of assistance 
from other states and organizations. During and after the mission, the 
team made next-step recommendations, which the government of 
Equatorial Guinea approved. These included a training program in EO 
safety and security; a new design and relocation of storage areas away 
from populations; and development of national standards and legisla-
tion for EO management.
Of these examples, Peru, Mauritania, and Moldova manifest a pro-
active approach to risk reduction. While each country has differing 
capabilities, the challenges, baselines, and inherent risks from EO 
are the same across countries. Such proactive approaches to reduc-
ing risks in states are important, especially when comparing the costs 
of maintaining an effective ammunition through-life management 
system. This is exemplified by the devastating series of explosions in 
Equatorial Guinea where, besides the tragic loss of life, the estimated 
cost for recovery runs in to the hundreds of millions USD.24 
105
JMU: The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Issue 25.1
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2021
THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION106
Image 4. AMAT expert (right) and United Nations Disaster 
Assessment and Coordination CBRNE23 specialist conducting 
post-explosion investigation at the blast site in Bata.
Conclusion
 
The importance of recognizing the inherent risks posed by stock-
piled EO and the potential consequences stemming from inadequate 
reduction of such risks cannot be understated, marking a state’s first 
step in questioning the adequacy of its policies and standards for 
conduct. The IATG’s RRPLs offer milestones to work toward, gradu-
ally bringing the different components of EO management in line 
with international good practice. When performed well, through-life 
management of EO is a costly affair; yet implementing a system for 
risk reduction is not overly technical or resource intensive. Integrated 
into a state authority’s logistics management processes, proactive risk 
reduction prevents UEMS and diversion—saving lives and property. 
It instills security, accountability, and even slows degradation of stock 
while lessening the impact of risks materialized—human, material, 
financial, political, environmental, or reputational. Among other 
mechanisms for assistance, AMAT and its partners stand ready to sup-
port states with their stocks of EO, ensuring that they are safe, secure, 
and fit-for-purpose. 
See endnotes page 151
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By Linsey Cottrell [ Conflict and Environment Observatory ] 
and Kendra Dupuy [ Norwegian People’s Aid ]
Use of OBOD, however, is under increased pressure due to environ-
mental regulation, better understanding of the environmental contam-
ination risks, land remediation costs, and access to OBOD alternatives. 
In 2016, the United States Congress instructed the Department of 
Defense to arrange for the review of technologies available as alter-
natives to OBOD.5 The National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, 
and Medicine (NASEM) review findings, published in 2019, provide a 
useful update and comparison of a broad range of technologies, in spite 
of its focus on conventional munition stockpiles for the US military.6
Some countries already ban the use of OBOD, unless there is no 
alternative and it is justified on safety grounds. NATO also prohibits 
the use of OBOD under the contract framework for munition disposal.7 
NATO does not prescribe specific technologies to be used in place of 
OBOD but does require contractors to adhere to environmental man-
agement protocols. This includes requiring contractors to provide 
independent test reports to demonstrate that any pollution abatement 
systems for closed incineration or detonation meet the appropriate 
environmental emission standards.
Residual energetic material can accumulate and persist in soil. 
Contaminants may migrate to underlying groundwater or nearby sur-
face water, leading to the risk of significant environmental impacts. 
This risk can be reduced by the careful positioning of OBOD sites away 
from any water resources. The level of risk will depend on the sensitiv-
ity of the environmental setting, nature of contaminants, and the like-
lihood of a viable exposure pathway. In addition to residual explosives, 
there are contaminants from other toxic components of munitions 
(for example, antimony, cadmium, chromium, lead, and mercury) and 
combustion of by-products such as noxious gases, dioxins, and carci-
nogenic polyaromatic hydrocarbons (PAHs), which are produced from 
incomplete combustion.
OBOD remains a primary disposal method across humanitarian 
mine action (HMA) programs since it is cost-effective, can be used 
across a diverse range of munitions, and does not require sophisticated 
infrastructure and equipment. It also remains in common use across 
the military, including in the United States.
The Disparity Between HMA and 
Commercial Best Practices
Munition and explosive residues have the potential to cause long-term harm when released into the environment. Common explosives, such as TNT and RDX are toxic, with both classed as possible carcinogens.1,2 The environmental fate of explosives is complex and varied. TNT 
absorbs onto soil, slowly leaches, and degrades to form degradation products such as DNT, which has a 
higher toxicity than TNT itself.3 RDX leaches from soil more readily, degrades slowly, and can persist in 
the environment. The residual soil and water contamination at military ranges caused by the firing, det-
onation, and disposal of munitions by open burning and open detonation (OBOD) is well documented, 
and there has been increased attention on finding more environmentally acceptable options.4 This is 
reflected in the draft Lausanne Action Plan from the Second Review Conference for the Convention on 
Cluster Munitions, which sets out the need for stockpile survey, clearance, and destruction to be car-
ried out with minimal environmental impacts.
OBOD: Open Burning and Open Detonation
OBOD remains a primary disposal method across humanitarian mine action (HMA) programs since it 
is cost effective, can be used across a diverse range of munitions, and does not require sophisticated 
infrastructure and equipment.
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Constraints to Change
Armed forces worldwide have been late and slow to adopt environ-
mental policies and practices, playing catch-up with the commercial 
and private sector. This has historically been underpinned by how 
military activities are exempt from the regulations, including environ-
mental legislation, which govern the civilian sector.
Humanitarian programs are also prone to late adoption of environ-
mental practices. For the HMA sector, there are obvious financial and 
logistical constraints that restrict adoption of alternatives to OBOD: 
Funding remains a key barrier to deployment. The environmental 
impacts from OBOD have been known for some time, but where there 
are safety and cost constraints, environmental mitigation will often 
be regarded as a lower priority. In line with other sectors, these barri-
ers may also be psychological and due to individual behaviors, mind-
sets, and attitudes toward the environment. Perceptions, old habits, 
and lack of awareness may prevent and slow down the take-up of alter-
native initiatives.
It is also a challenge to increase or promote environmental pro-
tection measures when munition disposal is taking place in an area 
already regarded as contaminated or environmentally degraded. HMA 
implementers may similarly not be fully aware, or understand the com-
plexities and ecological sensitivity of the area in which munition dis-
posal is taking place. Areas may still have high ecological value, even if 
they are not designated or regionally recognized as important habitats 
(see Figure 1).
Existing environmental governance and legislation in the region 
may already be weak or loosely enforced, in which case there will be 
limited accountability or incentive to improve environmental perfor-
mance. The International Ammunition Technical Guideline (IATG) 
10.10 notes that national environmental legislation “shall dictate the 
emission levels to be met which will in turn dictate the type of technol-
ogy required to meet these emission levels” and that donors may insist 
on higher standards if national legislation is less than the international 
norms.11 For the HMA sector, there appears to be little evidence that 
this is regularly being required or monitored by donors.
Land and Marine Environments
The need for the wider adoption of alternative approaches is not 
just restricted to land-based disposals. For underwater munitions, 
blow-in-place detonation is regarded by International Mine Action 
Standard (IMAS) 09.60 as the safest option but potentially harmful 
to the marine environment.8 For detonation, bubble curtains can be 
used to attenuate the explosive shock wave, and with monitoring put 
in place, operations can be delayed if marine mammals are detected. 
Bubble curtains however can be expensive to deploy and ineffective in 
deep water or strong water currents.
Figure 1. Percentage of key biodiversity areas (KBAs) 
that are protected. Large areas of KBAs remain 
unprotected, at-risk, and are not legally recognized 
as ecologically important. Globally, approximately 20 
million square kilometers of KBAs have been identified 
by the International Union for Conservation of Nature. 
Less than 20 percent of these critically important KBAs 
are covered by complete ‘protected status’.11





Capable of killing adult and juvenile sea creatures, blast detonations 
also risk physical trauma or permanent auditory injury to marine 
mammals up to 15 km away (for an explosive charge of more than 
700 kilograms).9 Although estimates of these distances do differ, the 
OSPAR Commission reported harbor porpoises being killed within 4 
km of explosions and suffering permanent hearing damage as far as 
30 km away.10 This evidence indicates that a focus on alternatives to 
detonation is similarly required to reduce environmental harm in the 
marine environment. 
All of these constraints, together with conflicting priorities and 
goals, play a role in preventing changes to disposal practices. There 
is the risk that the HMA community will continue with “business as 
usual” by comparing itself to others within the sector (such as the mili-
tary and other contractors) and a belief that changes will make little 
impact in the wider context. Collective action will be needed to see 
real change.
 There is the risk that the HMA community will continue with “business as usual” by comparing itself 
to others within the sector (such as the military and other contractors) and a belief that changes will 
make little impact in the wider context. Collective action will be needed to see real change.
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If militaries move away from using OBOD, there is the potential 
for increased availability and use of alternative technologies within 
the HMA sector, provided that momentum continues and the military 
does not revert to its historical reliance on exemptions to circumvent 
environmental regulation. Increased uptake of alternative technolgies 
by militaries should play a key role in driving down cost, demonstrat-
ing reliability and fitness-for-purpose, increasing technical capacity, 
and addressing any capability gaps. 
This is similar to some militaries’ ambitions to transfer to low-
carbon technology and renewable energy, which could mean access 
to cheaper and greener technology options for civilian society. Given 
countries’ considerable spending on their militaries, there is the 
opportunity for economies of scale and investment that would create 
more efficient technological alternatives while lowering costs, incen-
tivizing wider adoption and increased partnerships. Both advances 
in military technology and potentially lower costs could support and 
incentivize the transfer of technology to the HMA sector.
As the viability of alternate technologies within HMA evolves, tech-
nologies improve and unit costs fall. However, given shifting attitudes 
and understanding of the environmental implications of OBOD, it is 
important that these alternatives (discussed in the following section) 
are evaluated on a regular basis. 
The current IATG 10.10 suggests that, for less than 1,000 tons, 
alternative disposal methods to OBOD are not cost-effective. 
The basis for this assessment should be challenged and reviewed, 
because alternative technologies become more cost-efficient as they 
improve. It is also important to understand what has been consid-
ered under any option benefit analysis, especially whether it takes 
into consideration any environmental remediation that could be 
required in the future to address residual contamination at sites 
where munition disposal has taken place.
have steadily increased in recent years, and the revenue from recov-
ered material could support operational costs.12 This is provided 
that ownership of any scrap is not contested, and that suitable 
infrastructure and management controls are in place, with control 
measures that certify items are safe and free from explosives. 
The United States Environmental Protection Agency’s (USEPA) 
report on alternative disposal methods gave a perspective from envi-
ronmental considerations and concluded that a wide range of alter-
native treatment technologies have been successfully used instead 
of OBOD techniques.13 The criteria used to compare technologies 
included the scale at which the technology has been developed (i.e., to 
what degree the technology has been successfully piloted or used full-
scale); portability of the technology; and the emissions/outputs of the 
process—all of which are relevant for the HMA sector. 
Some technologies have yet to reach full-scale development, includ-
ing some chemical treatment and chemical neutralization processes 
that have applicability in the HMA sector given their portability 
but, at the time of the USEPA report, have not yet proven to success-
fully treat bulk energetic material for extended periods. Any process 
requiring the use of chemicals will need the supply, storage, handling, 
and disposal of all chemicals or waste by-products managed appro-
priately. Suitable disposal facilities may not be available in countries 
where the HMA sector operates. The throughput capacity and rate 
at which munitions and energetic material can be processed by the 
technology is also a factor. Some chemical treatments can be slow and 
take several hours to fully react, require treatment tanks, and must 
be able to treat wastewater. Treatments that convert explosives into 
non-energetic by-products, such as fertilizers, could also be sold to 
generate revenue. This would be subject to quality assurance checks, 
such as checking residual heavy metal content. 
Safety, cost, and environmental performance must all be consid-
ered in parallel to assess the viability of alternatives. There are no 
disposal procedures that will have zero environmental impacts, but 
steps can be taken to minimize the impacts to soil, water, and air. 
This means following the same “as low as reasonably practicable” 
approach, which is adopted for the management of other non-envi-
ronmental risks. 
As well as good environmental performance, munition disposal 
options must be practical and economically viable. The type and state 
of the munition, the amount to be disposed of, local staff training and 
competencies, consistency with international agreements, and align-
ment with applicable national safety, security, and environmental 
regulations are all factors to consider. When selecting an alternative 
to OBOD, basic considerations will include
• Is the technology safe, reliable, and affordable?
• Does the technology irreversibly destroy the munition 
and its energetic materials?
• Does the technology guarantee environmental benefits 
compared to OBOD?
• Are there opportunities to safely recover and recycle 
munition components to reach near net-zero waste?
• Can its environmental performance be monitored?
• Will the public and local community have confidence in 
the technology? 
An options appraisal process can be used to evaluate and determine 
the most feasible and appropriate technology (see Figure 2).
As noted in IATG 10.10, alternatives to OBOD can also create 
revenue-generating opportunities such as recycling recovered 
materials (e.g., steel, aluminum, and copper). Scrap metal prices 
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Figure 2. Example of an options appraisal process for technology selection.
Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) already 
utilizes techniques including mechanical 
breakdown (e.g., band saw), the extraction 
of explosives as developed by Golden West 
Humanitarian Foundation,14 and def lagra-
tion for programs (e.g., Palau), where there 
are environmental and logistical constraints. 
Explosive harvesting can be used to recover 
and re-purpose high explosives but 
is not suitable for all explosives. 
Harvesting can yield small donor 
charges for disposal efforts or for 
commercial use as quarry charges. 
For HMA, this eliminates the need 
to purchase explosives to use as 
donor charges, but any extraction 
must be strictly managed to pre-
vent soil or water contamination 
from process discharges. Although 
harvested explosives remain avail-
able for use and the demand for 
purchasable explosives is reduced, 
their production and use still 
impacts the environment. 
A combination of alternatives 
to OBOD may prove viable, 
but their feasibility and 
adaptability within the 
HMA sector need to be 
fully evaluated. Many 
successful partnerships 
already operate across 
the HMA sector and, for tech-
nologies to be viable, this may 
mean extending local partner-
ships to share expertise and pool 
resources where possible.
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OBOD will still be needed where technical and safety issues pre-
vail and, until technologies advance, where OBOD remains the only 
option for certain energetic materials. Environmentally, OBOD is the 
least preferred method; however, measures can be adopted to help 
reduce the environmental impacts of OBOD practices. While not all 
listed here, measures can include the choice of location for central 
demolition sites; the use of platforms, burning pads or trays to limit 
contact with soils; and clearing other combustible material from the 
site. Weather conditions should also be carefully considered, including 
wind direction, wind speed, and rainfall. OBOD should not be car-
ried out in heavy rainfall or high winds, as an optimum wind speed is 
needed to enable atmospheric mixing and dispersion of smoke plumes. 
Without better access to cost-effective, safe, and reliable technolo-
gies for the HMA sector, OBOD will remain the primary means of 
disposal. Funding is needed to pilot a range of alternative technolo-
gies, provide staff training, and deliver the commitments to minimize 
environmental harm, as set out in the Lausanne Action Plan. 
By seeking ways to accelerate the adoption of more environmen-
tally acceptable munition disposal techniques, we can hopefully avoid 
the adage that “if the only tool you have is a hammer, everything looks 
like a nail.” 
See endnotes page 152
So What’s Next?
IMAS 07.13 and IATG 10.10
• IMAS 07.13 sets out guidance on mitigation measures needed to prevent pollution
• IATG 10.10 reiterates the need for environmentally-responsible disposal practices
BIOGRAPHIES
NPA is not yet in a position where a single technology or combina-
tion of technologies will be adopted program-wide as an alternative 
to OBOD. Field trials and comparative analysis of the environmental 
performance of selective alternatives are still necessary to evaluate 
operational constraints. This will include learning from the range of 
techniques that have already been used and better understanding con-
straints by mapping regional differences in existing knowledge, levels 
of training, logistics, and infrastructure. 
Environmental management obligations in HMA are already 
given in IMAS 07.13,15 which sets out guidance on mitigation 
measures needed to prevent pollution, and IATG 10.10 reiterates 
the need for environmentally-responsible disposal practices. It 
is important to ensure that the environmental risks from OBOD 
are being communicated to EOD operatives and others to increase 
awareness on the link between chemical pollution and the disposal 
of explosives. This also means raising awareness about the potential 
ecological sensitivity of an area, even though the area may not be 
officially designated or visibly rich in biodiversity. Communicating 
the risks and educating donors on the need to fund alternative dis-
posal approaches is similarly needed to overcome the financial and 
operational constraints.
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FIRST STEPS TO LIMITING 
CONFLICT POLLUTION IN 
Central Vietnam
By Allan Vosburgh [ Golden West Humanitarian Foundation ]
Awareness and concern are growing worldwide regarding pollution resulting from conflicts. In Vietnam, decades of wars have left a legacy of contaminated land and increasingly polluted water. Golden West Humanitarian Foundation (Golden West) believes future success in elimi-
nating explosive remnants of war (ERW) will depend on highly-skilled, dedicated Vietnamese techni-
cians who can apply training, tools, and techniques that mitigate ERW without unnecessarily adding 
new contaminants to the environment. Open detonations always contribute steel fragments and par-
ticles of explosive residue in the ground along with smoke and detonation products in the air. Golden 
West is helping to develop facilities, technology, and initiatives that reduce pollution from humanitar-
ian mine action (HMA) operations.
Image 1. A PMC Engineer prepares a remote cut on a 500 lb bomb.
Image courtesy of Golden West.
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Quảng Trị is arguably Vietnam’s province most impacted by ERW, 
but positive measures are beginning to reduce environmental impacts 
of HMA operations. The civilian population of Quảng Trị has endured 
decades of wars and conflict resulting in trauma and slow recovery 
from widespread ERW contamination. Cooperation between Quảng 
Trị’s Provincial Military Command (PMC) Engineers and Golden 
West,1 is making HMA operations safer and limiting damage to the 
environment. Golden West believes that building indigenous capaci-
ties in enduring institutions that can solve their own ERW challenges 
without foreign assistance is a long-term key to success for HMA.
A vital element of this partnership has been an effort to nurture 
and encourage growing Vietnamese environmental awareness, and to 
develop and enhance techniques that address ERW while incorporating 
environmental concerns. These include specialized explosive ordnance 
disposal (EOD) tools such as cartridge-powered dearmers, shaped 
charges, and mobile cutters that attack fuzes and can prevent unwanted 
detonations. These tools manage unexploded ordnance (UXO) while 
mitigating the need for open detonations. By controlling solid waste 
and upgrading facilities, we pursue the goal of enhancing safety and 
acknowledging community concerns regarding air and water quality.
The Quảng Trị PMC is an integral part of the People’s Army of 
Vietnam, tasked with the mission of protecting the people of Quảng 
Trị Province from a wide range of threats, including exposure to UXO 
and other ERW. Golden West recognizes that regardless of outside 
funding or level of international assistance, the PMC Engineers will 
always be there and will strive to support the population of Quảng 
Trị. Because we believe in this concept, Golden West is self-funding 
Quảng Trị PMC training and mentoring programs, building PMC 
capacity to conduct EOD operations to an international standard of 
excellence as central Vietnam transitions to a reactive model of resid-
ual ERW response.2
 Image 2. Construction of the Cam Lộ Ordnance 
Detection Testing and Training Area.
Image courtesy of Golden West.
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Image 3. Golden West and PMC team assisting Cam Lộ neighbors. 
Image courtesy of the Quảng Trị Department of Foreign Affairs.
Cam Lộ EOD Range
In 2019, the Quảng Trị Provincial Peoples Committee provided 
their PMC with 400 acres of land in Cam Lộ District for use as a dedi-
cated EOD training facility. The PMC partnered with Golden West and 
the US Army’s Humanitarian Demining Research and Development 
Program (HD R&D) to develop this site into a world-class EOD test-
ing, training, and demolition range. Access was improved by expand-
ing the range road network, upgrading gravel road surfaces, and 
increasing drainage. Several existing structures were developed into 
modern classrooms with new windows, improved lighting, and class-
room furnishings. Demolition areas were improved with proper pits 
for open demolitions and separate pits for white phosphorus projec-
tile disposal, and other areas for open burns of munitions cut by the 
Mobile Cutting System (MCS). These improvements greatly improved 
the overall safety of the range. 
The Cam Lộ EOD Range is important because it provides a perma-
nent site for both PMC EOD training and application of safe and envi-
ronmentally conscious demilitarization of UXO. Centrally located in 
Quảng Trị Province, the range accommodates treatment of recovered 
UXO from PeaceTrees Vietnam in the western districts and PMC oper-
ations in the rest of Quảng Trị. ERW from other HMA organizations 
in the province can also be processed if requested by the Quảng Trị 
Mine Action Center (QTMAC).
In early 2020, with generous support from HDR&D, a purpose-built 
Ordnance Detection Training and Testing Area was constructed by the 
PMC Engineers and Golden West on the Cam Lộ EOD Range. This 
training and testing area incorporates three test lanes, consisting of 
representative soils from the iron-rich west, native Cam Lộ soil, and 
sandy soil from Quảng Trị’s eastern coastal districts, all seeded with 
free-from-explosives (FFE) munitions—produced using Golden West’s 
MCS—that represent commonly-found UXO. These were recovered by 
the PMC in Quảng Trị Province, made inert, and emplaced by Golden 
West EOD operators and geophysicists. The site provides PMC EOD 
operators with outstanding experience locating and characterizing real 
UXO targets in all soil conditions, and provides opportunities to test 
and evaluate new detection equipment and technologies in an indig-
enous environment. Detection equipment used for training included 
Vallon handheld detectors—provided by a previous U.S. Department 
of State grant to Golden West—and Ebinger large loop detection tools. 
Moreover, we hope to obtain the resources to expand the site to include 
various types of landmines and additional munitions. 
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Environmental Considerations
In 2020, at the behest of Golden West, initial baseline water qual-
ity testing was conducted around the Cam Lộ EOD Range by a com-
mercial environmental company based in Da Nang. The baseline tests 
characterize the levels of contaminates that exist in ground water, 
establish acceptable levels of typical range contaminants, and enable 
control measures if future tests suggest these levels are being exceeded. 
Golden West has engaged this company to manage the waste lubri-
cants and solid wastes from the MCS training site. A future program 
of regular water testing is being planned, monitoring the run-off from 
the range and protecting the water supplies of nearby farmers and 
communities. We are standardizing this testing and making it a rou-
tine training component at the range, with the aim that the PMC will 
continue the practices when we depart. 
In late 2020, multiple tropical typhoons swept across the central 
region of Vietnam. The Quảng Trị PMC provided immediate assis-
tance, responding to landslides and endemic flooding across much of 
the province The Cam Lộ EOD Range was badly damaged by flood-
ing and erosion, with the Ordnance Detection Training and Test Area 
eroded, demolition pits washed out, and access to the range disrupted.
Golden West responded by soliciting additional funds and real-
locating funds from training support to the US Army Pacific’s HMA 
training for Vietnam’s National Mine Action Centre (VNMAC) and 
HDR&D to assist with urgent repairs to the Cam Lộ EOD Range. With 
materials from Golden West and equipment and manpower provided 
by the PMC Engineers, repairs began and access was restored over the 
next several weeks. Golden West also supported civilian neighbors of 
the range, providing emergency supplies for forty-six families living 
in Cam Lộ.
In the early stages of ERW clearance in Quảng Trị Province, blow-
in-place open detonations of large UXO were the only safe means of 
disposal available. Since the war had recently ended, there was no 
access to reliable EOD publications detailing United States’ munitions 
and fuzing, often making trial and error render safe procedures and 
blow-in-place detonations necessary. We now know that open deto-
nations generally endanger the public, contaminates areas with metal 
fragmentation, and deposits explosive residues. Noise from detona-
tions, damage to crops, and disruptions from safety evacuations alien-
ate local farmers and other residents. In many areas of the world, open 
detonations of residual ERW are no longer authorized except in emer-
gencies when dangerous munitions cannot be safely moved. 
Golden West has pioneered use of the MCS to effectively treat 
bombs and large projectiles. The MCS consists of an electric bandsaw, 
a generator, and various tools for lifting and positioning munitions, 
enabling safe separation of fuzes. Through the use of fixed cameras and 
airborne drones, Golden West uses video supported by high resolu-
tion imagery to ensure safety during remote cutting operations. X-ray 
imagery of suspected white phosphorus filled munitions will soon be 
incorporated as an additional safety measure, preventing damage to 
the equipment and a dangerous and messy cleanup. The key to safe and 
effective operation of the MCS is knowing how to cut, what to cut, and 
especially what not to cut. 
Originally developed in Cambodia as a spinoff of Golden West’s 
Explosive Harvesting System, the MCS has been used to great effect in 
the Pacific Islands where open detonations are not feasible due to small 
island land areas and at-risk populations. With more than fifteen years 
of experience, Golden West routinely cuts large aerial bombs and pro-
jectiles, removing fuzes and enabling munitions to be safely moved. 
The concept is simple, but the equipment is only a small part of the 
process. Detailed knowledge of munitions and fuze functioning result-
ing from IMAS EOD Level 3 training and mentoring combined with 
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Allan Vosburgh has served as Chief 
Executive Officer of the Golden West 
Humanitarian Foundation since 2016. 
Vosburgh served thirty-six years in 
munitions and EOD in the U.S. mili-
tary forces and an additional seven 
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Golden West constantly strives to develop training, tools, and 
techniques that make HMA operations faster, safer, and more cost-
effective and environmentally conscious. In central Vietnam, 
Golden West will continue working with our Vietnamese partners 
to improve safety and eliminate ERW while improving techniques 
that protect the environment. We plan to continue working with the 
Provincial Government and PMC to further develop the Cam Lộ 
EOD Range, making it a model facility for training and destruction 
of ERW. By incorporating environmental considerations into the 
establishment of range operation procedures, Golden West aims to 
ensure the long-term viability of the range as a permanent PMC 
asset for management of residual ERW in the region. 
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By Jonathan Robinson [ Humanitarian Researcher ] and 
Christoph Baade [ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs ]
S ince 2011, there has been widespread use of explosive weapons—including conventional weap-ons, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and landmines—by all sides in the Syrian conflict.1 As is known from other contexts, a proportion of these either fail to detonate, becoming unexploded 
ordnance (UXO), or are abandoned by combatants to become abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO).2 
Long after conflicts have ended, these explosive remnants of war (ERW) endure as multi-generational 
threats to a community’s population and future development.3
One of the first major challenges of dealing 
with the physical threat of ERW is assessing 
levels of explosive contamination in a given 
area. A vital aspect of this is conducting 
physical visits to field locations for a variety 
of activities, such as interviews and surveys. 
However, in places like Syria, this is not 
always possible due to insufficient access and 
other security, political, and financial con-
straints. Adapting to these challenges, many 
humanitarian mine action (HMA) organiza-
tions turn to desk-based, data-driven activi-
ties, such as non-technical surveys (NTS) 
or impact surveys, as a means to prepare for 
when conditions become available for con-
ducting operations on the ground.
In 2019, The Carter Center4 found an 
opportunity to engage productively via the 
Explosive Munitions Use in Syria Project.5 
Using its unique, open-source conflict data-
set and an innovative method that counts 
the number and general category of explosive 
munitions mentioned within a conflict event,6 
it began analyzing and mapping informa-
tion about explosive weapons use in Syrian 
A New Tool for Enhancing 
Humanitarian Mine Action
communities. So far, The Carter Center has 
published four reports on southern Syria, 
areas around Damascus, northwest Syria, and 
northeast Syria. It has extrapolated 267,267 
uses of explosive munitions in 2,485 commu-
nities from 63,344 reported conflict events.7 
A final report summarizing the whole of 
the country, including central Syria, will be 
released by the summer of 2021.
Not only does this desk assessment con-
tribute to the existing body of information on 
explosive weapons used in the Syrian conflict, 
it also provides a new tool at the operational 
level to assist with initial planning and priori-
tizing actions on the ground. For example, the 
findings can infer the likely location8 and gen-
eral category of potential explosive hazards.9 
This can act as a basic risk assessment tool for 
anyone seeking to travel to an area,10 especially 
HMA personnel. The study could also be used 
as a roadmap to help prioritize various tasks 
within HMA, including risk education (RE) 
activities and NTS, especially if other verified 
data is unavailable or verified data is slow to 
materialize.11 
The study aims to complement exist-
ing data, data-management tools, and soft-
ware, such as ArcGIS, Google Earth, the 
Information Management System for Mine 
Action (IMSMA), or Power BI. The study will 
be readily available in Excel/CVS file format 
for HMA actors to utilize for their own pur-
poses, compare with their own datasets,12 
and temporarily fill gaps in understanding. 
The study would effectively augment verified 
data until this type of data can be collected 
or released, or until an on-the-ground assess-
ment can be conducted. 
At the strategic level, the granularity pro-
vided by this type of study can give political 
and donor entities a better understanding of 
the scale and complexity of the issue of explo-
sive weapons contamination in Syria. This is 
especially true if the data from Syria is com-
pared to other environments where explo-
sive hazards clearance has taken place. The 
aims of the project firmly align it within key 
frameworks used in the HMA sector, namely 
the five pillars of mine action and the UN’s 
Sustainable Development Goals.13 
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events and the number of explosive munitions 
used in those conflict events grows consider-
ably. The result is a significant discrepancy 
in the understanding of explosive munitions 
used in a given context. 
The Carter Center’s project aims to rectify 
this limitation. Between 2013 and the present 
day, it has collected over 200,000 corrobo-
rated conflict events from a variety of open-
source outlets, including Syrian Observatory 
for Human Rights (SOHR), Syria Live Map, 
and the Armed Conflict and Location & Event 
Data Project (ACLED) data, as well as a small 
number of verified reports from the ground.16 
To the authors’ knowledge, this data had not 
been systematically analyzed for use in the 
HMA sector until now.
Using this data, one of the authors devel-
oped and applied a simple method to extrap-
olate the number of explosive munitions 
mentioned within a conflict event. In cases 
where numbers of explosive munition uses 
were mentioned, these were counted (e.g., an 
airstrike, two barrel bombs, three airstrikes). 
However in cases where the number of explo-
sive munitions were not explicitly mentioned 
(e.g., shelling, several air-
strikes, etc.), they were given 
a minimum count of three. 
This is because single and dou-
ble uses of explosive munitions 
were typically mentioned in the 
data, and so the most accurate 
but conservative guess for plu-
ral explosive munitions uses 
after this is three. This rule was 
used even if adjectives such as 
“intense” or “heavy” preceded 
the explosive munitions type 
in the conflict event (e.g., heavy 





Figure 2. Current method of mapping conflict events by 
counting conflict events (left), and the Explosive Munitions 
Use in Syria Project’s method of counting explosive 
munitions mentioned within conflict events provides a 
more detailed picture of the distribution of explosive 
munitions in a given area (right).
Figure courtesy of Jonathan Robinson.
Figure 1. Two example rows of data used in The Carter Center’s Explosive Munitions Use in Syria Project. 
Figure courtesy of Jonathan Robinson.
Unique ID Incident Type Initiator Target Governorate District SubDistrict Town/Village Neighborhood Point of Interest Latitude Longitude Comments Total Killed Units Displayed Source URL Date
1 Aerial Bombardment NA NA Idleb Ma’rrat an Nu’man Khan Shavkun Hobit NA NA 35.4395 36.536 3 x airstrikes at around 20:30, resulting in no casualties. NA NA Carter Center Carter Center 11/29/2016
2 Shelling NA NA Idleb Jisr-Ash-Shugur Badama Maraand NA NA 35.7776 36.224 10 x artillery bombardment at around 12:30, resulting in no casualties NA NA Carter Center Carter Center 05/10/2016
Comments
3 x airstrikes at around 20:30, resulting in no casualties
10 x artillery bombardment at around 12:30, resulting in no casualties
One dataset that is particularly insightful 
for HMA organizations conducting desk-
based assessments is verified conflict data,14 
which is typically person-confirmed, known-
to-be-true information that details the type 
of conflict an area has experienced, the 
ammunition used, and the intensity of the 
fighting there. 
While useful, verified conflict data has 
limitations if used exclusively. A sizable 
amount of other types of data may be dis-
counted at times, especially open-source 
datasets and social media that have perceived 
accuracy or trust limitations, as the source of 
the information is not always clear or veri-
fied. Moreover, the process of verifying or 
confirming data is time consuming to do 
and sensitive to release in situations where 
conflict persists. In addition, the way cur-
rent conflict data is recorded and visualized 
is limited; often focusing on the events them-
selves, rather than the information contained 
within them, which can show key details 
about the number of explosive munitions in 
an event.15 This approach can lead to signifi-
cant discrepancies in how explosive weapons 
use in an area is understood. 
Taking two real examples from The Carter 
Center’s Explosive Munitions Use in Syria 
Project, Conflict Event A records “three air-
strikes” in Hobit town, while Conflict Event 
B records “ten artillery bombardments” in 
Maraand town (Figure 1). In the current sys-
tem used by many HMA actors, the two con-
flict events would be analyzed and visualized 
in the same way: as two single-conflict events. 
However, there is obviously a significant dif-
ference in the number of explosive munitions 
mentioned in these two conflict events. Over 
time, and with a dataset of thousands of con-
flict events, the gulf between the number of 
Despite its limitations,18 the study nonethe-
less provides a useful starting point, identify-
ing a minimum count or baseline of explosive 
munitions used in a given area, from a dataset 
not typically employed in HMA. The data is 
divided into four groupings of air-launched 
munitions (excluding cluster munitions), 
ground-launched munitions (excluding clus-
ter munitions), air and ground cluster muni-
tions, and landmine/IED/UXO. Within each 
of these groupings, more details of the explo-
sive munitions used are given, such as barrel 
bombing, artillery shelling, or mortar shell-
ing, and thus can highlight the general type of 
hazards potentially in an area.19 Rather than 
it being viewed as an exact type or number 
of explosive munitions used in an area, this 
baseline count should be seen as providing a 
more detailed picture about the distribution 
of explosive munitions over an area (Figure 
2). The method does not attempt to replace 
verified datasets or HMA activities, but rather 
seeks to augment those efforts until condi-
tions become conducive to such activities or 
receive such data.
The Data and Method
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The Technical Tool
The potential of the project is wide-ranging 
and is already supported by some in the HMA 
community.20 At the operational level, the 
project functions as a basic risk assessment 
tool for initial planning stages and prioritiz-
ing HMA activities for actors traveling to a 
potentially contaminated area.21 Another use 
could be to help initially plan NTS and RE 
activities in a more systematic way, given that 
the findings cover the distribution of explo-
sive munitions across Syria (Figure 3).
Wider Applications and Future Outlook
Looking to the future, while the current 
study is applied to Syria, its methodology eas-
ily lends itself to other environments where 
HMA activity is needed or conducted, given 
that this type of project only requires open-
source conflict data as an input.27 Not only 
this, other information could supplement the 
Figure 3. Map of 
explosive munition uses 
in southern Syria from 
The Carter Center’s 
Explosive Munitions 
Use in Syria Project.22 
Figure courtesy of  
The Carter Center.
open-source data to strengthen the inference 
of explosive weapons use and potential con-
tamination, including other open-source con-
flict datasets, open-source data on explosive 
munitions clearance, satellite imagery detail-
ing explosive munitions damage, weather 
conditions during the events, information 
on how long communities remained under 
the control of an armed group, or the time a 
community spent close to a frontline to name 
a few (Figure 4).
Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine 
learning (ML) could also be used to extract 
information about explosive munition uses 
At the strategic level, the study can aid 
political and funding advocacy efforts by bet-
ter highlighting the scale and complexity of 
the issue as well as an estimation of the signifi-
cant resources required. For example, if a per-
centage of between 10 percent and 30 percent23 
is given as the number of items that failed to 
detonate and applied to the 267,267 explosive 
munitions used in The Carter Center’s stud-
ies so far, this suggests that between 26,727 
and 80,180 explosive munitions are present 
in communities identified in southern Syria, 
areas around Damascus, northwest Syria, and 
northeast Syria.24 Although it would not pro-
vide an exact dollar amount or hours needed 
for the clearance of UXO in Syria, compara-
tive analysis of estimated contamination 
levels, clearance rates, and the geographical 
size of contaminated areas with regions such 
as Iraq or Mozambique25 could go some way 
to creating a tangible reference into what is 
minimally required to deal with the UXO 
problem in Syria.26 
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More Accurate Inference of UXO Contamination
Other Open Source Datasets
Figure 4. Different layers of data that could improve the results of the Explosive 
Munitions Use in Syria Project.
Figure courtesy of Jonathan Robinson.
from visual (video and photo) or text media 
from a wide range of sources, including social 
media tools like Twitter or Facebook. AI and 
ML would also improve the speed and effi-
ciency of the project; instead of manually 
extrapolating the explosive munition counts 
from each conflict event, it could be done 
automatically. 
The additional layers of information men-
tioned previously are by no means exhaustive, 
but could result in unprecedented findings 
on the validity and utility of open-source 
data and its usefulness in the HMA sector. 
As mentioned previously, rather than replace 
existing methods and systems in the HMA 
sector, the study would seek to augment these 
in cases where conditions are not available for 
HMA actors to obtain firsthand verified data 
from the ground and act as an initial phase of 
the desk assessment.
Used intelligently, open-source data could 
support different purposes outside of the 
HMA sector as well. For the peacebuilding 
sector, HMA and open-source data studies 
can be used as an entry point for conven-
ing and conducting initial practical discus-
sions between sides in a given context, as the 
topic of dealing with explosive munitions 
contamination is relatively neutral and is 
a problem that people often unanimously 
agree needs solving.28 If successful, HMA and 
Conclusion
and donor entities a tool that helps contextu-
alize and appraise the scale and complexity of 
the issue of explosive weapons contamination 
in an area, especially if used comparatively 
with other contexts. Not only limited to Syria, 
the project has strong potential in a number of 
other locations around the world, such as Libya, 
Ukraine, and Yemen as well as in neighboring 
sectors such as peacebuilding. The authors 
hope that this article encourages other entities 
to replicate this study in the future with their 
own conflict data to supplement their existing 
methods or datasets. 
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open-source data studies could then be used 
to build discussions on wider topics, such as 
humanitarian access issues, housing, land 
and property rights, or good governance. 
Examples of HMA being successfully imple-
mented in peacebuilding initiatives have been 
seen in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Colombia, Sri 
Lanka, and Sudan.29 
By using open-source data and a method that 
counts explosive munition uses rather than con-
flict events, a detailed overview can illustrate 
the distribution of a variety of types of explosive 
munitions in a given area. This can give actors 
conducting initial desk-based assessments an 
advantage if other methods are ineffective or 
unavailable. This tool can be used to conduct a 
basic risk assessment for HMA actors, as well as 
add to HMA actors’ ability to plan and prioritize 
activities over a large area, such as NTS or RE 
activities. At the strategic level, the granularity 
provided by this type of study can give political 
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The Government of Iraq viewed rehabilitation of infrastructure contaminated with explosives during the conflict with the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) as a prerequisite to socioeconomic recovery and political stability, which, in turn, established a need for the mine action community to deploy qualified, 
certified clearance teams as quickly as possible. While these teams could deploy quickly, their reliance on inter-
national staff and their associated costs attributable to security and other factors introduced a high overhead 
business model that became an accepted standard during a first clearance phase from 2015 to 2019, despite the 
understanding that this model could not be sustained indefinitely. A shift in donor priorities and reduced budgets 
effectively introduced a second clearance phase beginning in 2020. The challenge to the mine action community 
became the development of a more cost-effective, time-sensitive approach to clearance so as to reduce costs to 
levels acceptable to donors without compromising clearance standards.
In response, the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) Iraq through its (1) evidence-based analysis and 
measurement of data and (2) effects-based approach to clearance delivery introduced a low cost, high return 
business model. This model offered a more efficient approach when compared to previous like-for-like models, in 
addition to providing useful tool sets applicable for other locations and conditions similar to those found in Iraq. 
As of December 2017, west Mosul was heavily contaminated not only with explosive remnants of war (ERW) but 
also with what proved to be thousands of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) left by ISIL. These devices denied 
access to sites and infrastructure, thereby delaying the complicated task of render safe/removal efforts consis-




By Mark Wilkinson, Ph.D. [ United Nations Mine Action Service ]
Phase 1: The Problem
The urgency and conditions that determined the need to deploy 
qualified, certified clearance teams quickly also de facto dictated the 
terms for what became the Phase 1 business model of clearance, lasting 
roughly from 2015 to 2019. 
During Phase 1, UNMAS relied on international commercial 
companies (ICC) for explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and impro-
vised explosive device disposal (IEDD) expertise despite their rela-
tive high cost attributable (1) to their reliance on foreign experts; 
and, concomitantly, (2) to their need for protection provided by pri-
vate security detachments. 
Although costly, the model achieved the desired results. From 
2016 to 2020, explosive hazard (EH) clearance teams under 
UNMAS-managed contracts performed 1,823 clearance tasks, ren-
dering safe/removing 67,335 EH while clearing 10.6 million sq m of 
land and counting.3 
Yet, at the end of 2019, an estimated 2,522 sq km in an area formerly 
occupied by ISIL remained contaminated (see Figure 1) while budgets 
available to support clearance began to decline, partly because donor 
priorities and strategies had changed. Nonetheless, for the Government 
of Iraq, rebuilding and rehabilitating infrastructure remained critical 
and depended upon EH clearance to proceed despite the ongoing risks 
posed by ISIL insurgents and related security costs (see Figure 2, ISIL 
Activity); and therein, lay the crux of the business problem entering 
Phase 2: do more with less.
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Figure 1. Explosive hazard contamination in Iraq, UNMAS Information Management Unit, 4 February 2021.
All graphics courtesy of UNMAS.
 Phase 1: The Factors
 
From the outset, UNMAS realized the high overhead model could 
not be sustained indefinitely, and several factors drove its change.
Security. UNMAS recognized that, effectively, it was managing a 
hybrid clearance situation: neither peacekeeping nor humanitarian due 
to the continuing security threats. After their retreat from Mosul in 
December 2017, ISIL’s remaining fighters did not leave; they switched 
from conventional warfare to guerilla tactics in an 
effort to deny recovery and maintain de facto control 
in the one-third of Iraq they once occupied. Some 
disappeared literally underground, while others hid 
in plain sight among sympathizers, at times targeting 
clearance teams. According to UN security analysts, 
2020 set a new record for ISIL incidents (Figure 2). 
This hybrid situation remains very much a concern 
and a factor for a low cost, high return model. 
Time. Data analysis by UNMAS since December 
2017 has shown time-on-task varies as a function 
of (1) events leading to contamination; (2) extent of 
contamination; (3) environment type; (4) exposure 
of operators based on the device and/or its design; 
(5) operators’ experience, (i.e., skills and assets 
appropriate for clearance and safe removal of threats 
as assessed); and (6) events beyond operational con-
trol, (e.g., security and COVID-19 restrictions), which either disrupt 
or delay clearance operations. 
Measurement. UNMAS reasoned that these factors when mea-
sured systematically4 could provide an evidence-based estimate of 
relative hazardousness for contaminated areas with implications for 








Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Open Source 2019 Open Source 2020 Amaq 2019 Amaq 2020
Comparison of ISIL Incidents 2019–2020
Figure 2. Comparison of open source and Amaq (ISIL News Agency) data as 
compiled by, and courtesy of Joint Analysis Unit (JAU), United Nations Assistance 
Mission for Iraq (UNAMI), 27 January 2021.
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consistent with IMAS standards; and, importantly, for team compo-
sition, training, and deployment (i.e., assigning teams appropriately 
trained for each task). Accordingly, by mid-2019, UNMAS began 
development of what became a lethality index, which—for the first 
time—classified clearance tasks according to environment and techni-
cal factors (see Time), and assigned values for locations, thereby pro-
viding an evidence-based measurement of lethality with implications 
for skillset, time, and cost. The more lethal the task, and the longer 
the time required for render safe and removal, the greater the skills 
required and associated hourly cost. 
Fit-for-purpose. At the same time, UNMAS began evaluating 
alternative team compositions and, by mid-2019, introduced on a trial 
basis a light version based on the decades-old, proven rapid response 
team (RRT) concept.5 These highly-mobile, cost-effective teams relied 
exclusively on fully-trained Iraqi staff for high-risk search (HRS), EOD, 
IEDD, and geographic information systems (GIS) reporting, equipped 
with integral medical support, and deployable anywhere in the liber-
ated areas of Iraq within a twenty-four-hour period. The RRTs were 
backed by a single, on-call international technical advisor who did not 
deploy. The RRTs relied on local security, eliminating the constraints 
and costs associated with predominately international staff and less 
mobile-heavy teams equipped with mechanical assets. 
Repositioning. UNMAS positioned itself to (1) rewrite the way 
business was conducted through statements of work based on evidence- 
based data measuring time-on-task as a function of relative diffi-
culty (the lethality index) and validated operational concepts (e.g., 
RRT teams) that could provide both flexibility in tune with changing 
requirements and tasks as received from the Directorate of Mine Action 
(DMA), Iraq’s national mine action authority; and (2) deliver results 
meeting IMAS standards at reduced costs and a higher rate of return. 
Expediency. If the new ideas being developed offered a poten-
tial low-cost, high-return business model, UNMAS also would need 
to change its statements of work, which initially focused on specific 
requirements for clearance teams and their capability rather than out-
comes, thereby introducing an unintended bias into the process that 
favored ICCs largely for reason of expediency: Given that their accredi-
tation, team composition, and readiness to deploy solved the urgency 
issue, ICCs became the only viable clearance solution in the short term. 
Double jeopardy. As of 2018, this safe choice pattern began to 
repeat. New contracts nearly always specified size, capability, and 
scope that favored bidders with similar, previous experience. This 
generic, more-of-the-same approach de facto endorsed the ICC profile 
as a norm for clearance teams, negating nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGO) cost advantages. Since virtually all ICC teams were domi-
nated by large numbers of international personnel, their statements of 
work built in higher personnel and security costs as an accepted cost 
of doing business. NGOs accredited for clearance in Iraq could there-
fore find themselves responding to statements of work that assumed 
security costs based on an ICC model despite NGOs’ reliance on less 
costly local staff as well as associated operational advantages, includ-
ing a reduced security requirement, thereby negating their competi-
tive advantage while adopting the ICC’s disadvantages. This situation 
would not begin to change until late 2018 when UNMAS awarded its 
first commercial contract for EH clearance in Iraq to an NGO. 
Phase 2: The Changes
 Statements of Work. The experience of Phase 1 strongly sug-
gested other changes were necessary including re-design of statements 
of work, the part of each contract that detailed the methodology for 
delivery of services using an effects-based approach toward delivery of 
services.6 By 2019, UNMAS was developing evidence-based measure-
ment useful in assessing time-on-task for appropriate skillsets (the 
lethality index) and adapting and testing an agile, flexible team concept 
(the RRTs) which, taken together, promised the low-cost, high-return 
model sought for a Phase 2. 
Effects-based. This inherently fairer approach gave potential 
clearance partners more freedom and an opportunity to focus on 
outcomes rather than dictating means of delivery. Thereby, UNMAS 
not only achieved a desired outcome but also tested potential clear-
ance partners’ existing knowledge while encouraging a just enough 
approach to resources, thus promoting innovation and cost-effective-
ness while meeting IMAS standards. 
Accordingly, consistent with its evidence-based measurement and 
agile, flexible team concepts, future statements of work were framed 
using an effects-based approach to clearance delivery around the fol-
lowing parameters:
• Intelligence analysis. UNMAS includes an initial work 
package based on lethality index measurements to ensure that 
clearance partners base their proposals on a thorough and 
evidence-based assessment of the intended geographical area, 
the impact of the conflict there, its IED and EH threat charac-
teristics, likely task types, and mobility/travel requirements.7
• Requirements. Clearance partners use environmental and 
technical factors8 derived from UNMAS intelligence analysis as 
a guide to ensure adequacy of delivery proposals. 
• Capability. Clearance partners demonstrate their capability 
to deliver the required clearance outcome(s) through a detailed 
analysis of tasks, and their working procedures and practices as 
meeting relevant national/international standards.
• Enhancement. Clearance partners include mentoring and 
development of both individual and team skills in a logical way 
such that teams can plan, deliver, and report effectively on the 
task types they have been trained to conduct: capacity enhance-
ment is as important as clearance.
• Risk management. Clearance partners demonstrate a 
dynamic and proactive approach to risk management to pre-
defined levels that are “as low as reasonably practicable.” 
Transition. By 2019, UNMAS Iraq had worked through details of a 
two-step approach as agreed with its procurement partners to transi-
tion to an effects-based approach and was ready with a first clearance 
contract, including a statement of work based on three parameters 
open to both ICCs and NGOs. Accordingly, UNMAS aimed to
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• shorten the mobilization phase by providing precise environ-
mental and technical information related to current and poten-
tial locations, thereby ensuring ICCs and NGOs could reflect 
this information in terms of proposed team composition and 
equipment as cost effectiveness/value for money;
• limit international staff and increase national staff levels and 
ownership, both of which are consistent with a commitment to 
mentoring and development of national resources along with 
cost reduction; and
• ensure proper oversight by linking the operational delivery to a 
pilot study using an UNMAS risk management tool set dating 
from contract signature onward, affording a visibility of risk so 
that UNMAS could comment and/or intervene constructively 
and developmentally to address concerns at any time.
This first step in the transition to full effects-based clearance activi-
ties was delivered with a contract for clearance in Ninewa that com-
menced in January 2020, followed by the second step in October 2020 
when the new grant partnership model was signed and initiated. 
Statements of work for a two-year time frame included management, 
programs, operations, support, quality assurance, leadership, risk 
management, and resource mobilization as parameters in anticipa-
tion of fully-qualified, Iraqi-managed clearance capability sustained 
by international and national NGOs. 
Phase 3: The Transition
Even as UNMAS was developing an evidence-based measurement 
tool useful in assessing time-on-task for appropriate skillsets (the 
lethality index) and adapting and testing an agile, flexible team con-
cept that, taken together, promised the low-cost, high-return model 
sought in Phase 2, the experience of Phase 1 strongly suggested other 
changes were necessary. These included a transition in advance of an 
UNMAS exit to a stronger leadership role for DMA. During this tran-
sition, UNMAS saw itself moving into a consulting role, gradually 
transferring ownership of the day-to-day management of clearance 
tasks under contract. By mid-2019, UNMAS Iraq had introduced four 
management initiatives to guide those making decisions on both sides 
while managing the expectations of all, namely: 
Cost $ Sq m Environment Type Contractor
Jun-18 10,232,049 179,472 Urban Complex ICC 3 Mosul
Feb-18 11,156,652 164,188 Urban Complex ICC 1 Mosul
Aug-20 2,786,194 Urban Complex ICC 2 Mosul
Table 1.
Cost $ Sq m Environment Type Contractor
Dec-18 7,486,814 639,450 Rural Simple ICC 3 Sinjar
Aug-18 8,509,911 2,089,806 Rural Simple ICC 3 Kirkuk































































































































Contract Cost: Complex Urban
Figure 3. Figure 4.
• Partnership. UNMAS would approach operational oversight 
and quality assurance on a cooperative basis, with an emphasis 
on coaching and mentoring delivery partners so as to build local 
capacity, confidence, and independence. 
• Sustainability. Delivery partners should train initially with 
minimal direct international technical supervision so as to 
strengthen and sustain national capability to the point that it is 
self-sustaining and self-supervising.
• Identity. National capability should represent the ethnography 
of the areas it operates within, thus bolstering acceptance of 
clearance teams and their work. 
• Gender. UNMAS and the DMA would share a leadership role 
to assure that all strategic, managerial, and operational decision-
making, planning, and participation would reflect both women’s 
and men’s experiences, needs, and perspectives.
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Benefits 
The benefits of an effects-based approach to clearance deliv-
ery are clear, beginning with the most important: a sustain-
able, fully-national, and non-profit clearance capability. Three 
additional benefits are worth noting:
• Value for money. A reduction in the contracted cost of 
like-for-like clearance contracts by a factor of five during 
a two-year period, largely as a result of reduced reliance 
on international personnel and related security require-
ments, while maintaining IMAS quality standards.
• Ownership. Locally-recruited teams generate both 
acceptance and sustainability, eliminate accommoda-
tion costs, and require only a locally-based office to 
sustain operations. Any required international staff can 
work remotely with travel limited to quality assurance, 
technical oversight, or training purposes until they are 
no longer required.
• Redefined role. Relationship with delivery part-
ners is now based on a clear definition of pragmatic 
outcomes, when-needed support, and operational and 
quality oversight. 
Cost $ Sq m Environment Type Contractor
Jun-18 6,374,302 183,906 Mixed ICC 1 RRT
 Sep-18 3,996,182 111,235 Mixed NGO 1 SAD
 Jun-18 3,782,356 740,146 Mixed NGO 2 Ninewa
Jul-19 3,691,709 Mixed NGO 1 Anbar























































Contract Costs: Mixed Simple 2D & 3D
The Future of “Just Enough”
UNMAS Iraq through its (1) evidence-based analysis and measure-
ment of data and (2) effects-based approach to clearance delivery 
offers a logical and coherent approach to planning, reduced cost, and 
performance gains when compared to previous like-for-like projects, 
and useful tool sets applicable for other locations as well. Most 
important, the timing of this low cost, high return model coincides 
with the on-going transfer of UNMAS Iraq’s evolving role and trans-
fer of remaining clearance activities and related management to DMA 
as part of a well-planned exit strategy. 
See endnotes page 153
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Improving Lebanon’s PSSM Capacity 
By Jamie McGhee [ Mines Advisory Group, MAG ] 
Weapons and ammunition management (WAM) is a global issue in which nations are responsible for the physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) of weapons and ammunition to help mitigate weapons diversion and proliferation, and to prevent against an unplanned explosions 
at munitions sites (UEMS). Although in most instances preventable, UEMS incidents have increased, lead-
ing to significant loss of life, life-changing injuries to innocent civilians, and damage to property.¹
In ideal circumstances countries would have the money for suffi-
cient equipment and storage facilities; however, this is not always the 
case. Often the security sector is left to manage its weapons and ammu-
nition stockpiles on an extremely limited budget. This means having 
to be self-reliant to keep things running as they should, sourcing basic 
equipment such as wooden pallets to stack ammunition. While this 
is often seen as a short-term scenario, the reality is that these stop-
gaps often turn into a long-term solution or become the “norm” in 
the absence of sufficient cash or capacity to run technical refresher 
training for military personnel, replace outdated equipment, and keep 
existing storage facilities maintained. As a result, ammunition stock-
piles can deteriorate rapidly. 
The same can be said of the procurement of arms and ammuni-
tion. If states do not have a budget to purchase newer ammunition 
and phase out older stockpiles, ammunition is inevitably kept past 
its original shelf life, with insufficient technical capacity to conduct 
routine surveillance and maintenance of the ammunition through-
out its lifecycle. Through no fault of the military, ammunition is often 
housed in less than adequate storage facilities or buildings not origi-
nally designed for its storage. 
These are the defining factors in global incidents involving 
ammunition stockpiles, and it’s why the Lebanese Armed Forces 
(LAF) requested assistance to bolster its national capacity for PSSM, 
as they fully understood the dangers posed to both the military per-
sonnel working at these facilities as well as the civilian population 
living nearby. 
Global Challenges
There are always challenges when discussing WAM with any gov-
ernment, due the sensitive nature of the subject, and general reluctance 
to allow outside parties to see the true extent of the state’s deficiencies 
regarding PSSM. Every country ultimately has different needs when 
looking at both technical capacity of existing security sector personnel, 
weapons/ammunition storage, accounting practices, and management 
systems that are at different levels of compliance when looking at the 
risk reduction process levels (RRPLs) in the International Ammunition 
Technical Guidelines (IATGs).2 
International best practices are often associated with costing mil-
lions of Lebanese pounds (LBP). However, this is not necessarily the 
case, particularly at the start of any WAM pilot project. While it does 
cost money to train and provide adequate equipment for security sec-
tor personnel to conduct their duties, first understanding what the 
problems are and finding the solutions through dialogue with the 
national authorities can bring an easy resolution to what initially 
seemed a difficult problem. 
Similarly, governments often claim there are insufficient funds to 
provide better storage, train more personnel, purchase new weap-
ons and ammunition, and destroy older stockpiled ammunition. 
However, thorough risk assessments of all ammunition stockpiles and 
existing storage facilities, and estimated financial implications of a 
potential UEMS can incentivize more governments to better man-
age their weapons and ammunition stockpiles. In the case of stor-
ing explosive munitions, “risk avoidance” is impossible as the state 
already has ownership. Therefore, identifying all risks and ensuring 
they are professionally managed is critical.
The essence of risk management lies in maximizing the areas where we have some control over the  
outcome while minimizing the areas where we have absolutely no control over the outcome”.
~ Peter L. Bernstein
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Weapons and Ammunition Management in Lebanon
In 2017, the LAF approached the U.S. Department of State with a 
request to support PSSM activities at three of their existing ammuni-
tion storage facilities. After an initial assessment (21–22 January 2018) 
of the LAF’s PSSM practices at several locations by a US technical 
team, MAG was asked to assist LAF improve current WAM practices, 
and bring them into line with the IATGs. MAG conducted technical 
site assessments (October and December 2018) at the three locations 
and made recommendations on how to improve the overall security 
of the facilities. 
With an additional $1.6 million in continuation funding in February 
2019, MAG has since conducted PSSM technical site assessments at 
thirteen locations (three in 2018 and ten in 2020) identified by the 
LAF as high priority for possible intervention. At each location, MAG 
assessed and then prioritized storage facilities utilizing a “low cost-
high impact” model when looking at WAM interventions, i.e., MAG 
provided the correct level of intervention to meet the requirements for 
that specific location. This process often involves finding a simple, cost-
effective solution to resolve an issue and mitigate the risks identified, 
which is just as effective as a more complex high-cost intervention.
Whereas all locations are prioritized by risk probability and impact, 
several key factors must be taken into consideration when conducting 
a site assessment to ensure the correct level of intervention is identi-
fied. These can include the following
• accessibility (including visibility) of the site
• adequate fire-fighting equipment and personal protective 
equipment (PPE)
• adequate lightning protection3
• compatibility groups of the ammunition4,5
• construction design and blueprint of existing facilities6
• costs of potential rehabilitation/construction works
• estimated repair costs if UEMS take place (conducted by the 
state)
• future expansion plans of facility (if applicable)
• hazard class of the ammunition7
• hazard division of the ammunition8,9 
• location of facility
• net explosive quantity (NEQ) of ammunition being stored on 
site for calculating quantity distances (QDs)10
• number of personnel living/working at the base
• number of trained ammunition technical staff
• quantity and types/nature of ammunition stored
• secondary hazards or critical infrastructure near storage facili-
ties (fuel stations, gas pipelines, underground services, hospi-
tals, ministries, schools, power stations, religious buildings, etc.)
• security of area in which ammunition depot is situated
• value of ammunition stocks stored
While this list isn’t exhaustive, it highlights the need to gather sig-
nificant data to ascertain the appropriate intervention level required to 
ensure the safety and security of both the ammunition stockpiles and 
the civilian population living near the potential explosion site (PES).11 
In December 2020, MAG completed construction work at three of 
the thirteen locations previously identified as a priority by the LAF. 
The level of intervention at each of the storage facilities at the locations 
varied in scale and complexity, and involved MAG providing technical 
training—an IATG familiarization workshop to introduce the IATGs 
and international best practices to forty-seven existing LAF ammuni-
tion technical personnel from the Ammunition Directorate who will 
be managing the ammunition at the three locations where these tech-
nical interventions were conducted. Additional refresher training for 
LAF personnel was planned in 2020, but due to COVID-19 restrictions 
in Lebanon this was not possible. 
Due to land constraints and the encroachment of the civilian popu-
lation to existing ammunition storage facilities in country, the pro-
vision of QD training to the LAF was seen as critical. This training 
familiarized staff with online tools that (1) can help determine what 
can safely be stored at all ammunition storage facilities in country and 
(2) assist them with risk mitigation as part of the long-term planning 
for the Ammunition Directorate. 
As a result of the training, a plan is underway to destroy donor-gifted 
ammunition that cannot be used by the LAF, which will provide much 
needed space inside the storage facilities, in turn reducing the risk to 
both military and civilian personnel living nearby. A joint assessment 
of the LAF central demolition site was also conducted on 17 September 
2020 to check the location’s suitability for future ammunition destruc-
tion operations by LAF explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams.
This QD training also allowed the Ammunition Directorate to start 
planning logistical movements of larger caliber ammunition to more 
suitable locations outside of populated areas. The QD training showed 
MAG History in Lebanon
Mines Advisory Group (MAG) currently has operations in twenty-six countries globally, and nineteen of those countries have a 
WAM program. Operational in Lebanon since 2001, MAG began by conducting mine clearance operations and mine risk educa-
tion (MRE). Lebanon has endured several decades of both civil and external conflicts that have left the country with an exten-
sive legacy of landmine and cluster munition contamination. In total, MAG Lebanon has cleared more than 18 million sq m of 
contaminated land and removed or destroyed more than 62,000 landmines, cluster munitions, and other unexploded ordnance 
(UXO). Since 2017, MAG has deployed teams on the Blue Line (the border demarcation between Lebanon and Israel as defined 
by the United Nations on 7 June 2000). In this time, MAG has cleared and released an area of more than 400,000 sq m and found 
and destroyed more than 29,000 items including anti-personnel mines, anti-tank mines, and explosive remnants of war (ERW). In 
October 2018, MAG expanded operations in the northeast of Lebanon and has since conducted non-technical survey (NTS) and 
clearance activities; releasing over 786,000 sq m of suspected and contaminated hazardous land.
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the LAF the minimum safety distances needed for each site based on 
the NEQ of explosives being stored. With this knowledge they were able 
to identify the amount of ammunition that had to be either moved from 
the location to somewhere more suitable or marked for destruction if it 
was (1) surplus to operational requirements or (2) if there was a lack of 
sufficient storage space to house it securely and safely. 
Image 1 and 2. Storage of projectile propellant before (left) and after (right) intervention by MAG.
All images courtesy of MAG.
One of the biggest challenges for the LAF is availability of suitable 
land for construction of military bases and larger ammunition storage 
facilities. A large proportion of existing military infrastructure was 
purpose built by France in the 1950s. Although a lot of this infrastruc-
ture remains and is still functional, facilities previously isolated with 
excellent safety distances are now located in highly populated areas. 
At the end of the Lebanese Civil War (1975–1990), plots of land were 
quickly snapped up by civilians and used to build houses, shops, etc. 
Building developments continue to expand and now encroach close to 
existing ammunition depots, meaning they are at risk should an UEMS 
take place. As the minimum safety distance in the IATGs for storing 
explosives is 400 m, the LAF has thought innovatively about how to 
Current Challenges in Lebanon
reduce the risk at these sites, while mitigating the threat posed to the 
civilian population. In light of this, the Ammunition Directorate, 
who are responsible for all in-country ammunition, has managed sig-
nificant logistical movements of ammunition stocks throughout the 
country to reduce the threat to civilians while still maintaining LAF 
operational effectiveness.
As part of the LAF long-term strategic planning, MAG is in reg-
ular contact with the LAF’s G3 Director of Planning Department 
and G4 Logistics regarding available governmental land, and dis-
cussions continue to identify suitable areas pending technical field 
assessments for the construction of large-scale ammunition depots 
and sub-unit depots.
LAF Response to the Beirut Port Explosion
On 4 August 2020, a warehouse in the Port of Beirut containing 
2,750 metric tonnes of ammonium nitrate (confiscated off a cargo ship 
in 2013 for failure to pay port fees and stored with commercial fire-
works and other chemicals) caught fire, causing the ammonium nitrate 
to detonate.12 The subsequent explosion caused severe damage to civil-
ian homes, key military and civilian installations, and infrastructure 
in the vicinity of the port.
The incident itself left at least 218 people dead, 7,000 people injured, 
300,000 displaced, and most of the country’s grain supplies destroyed; 
the overall cost of the blast is estimated at $10–15 billion.13 The politi-
cal fallout from the explosion was almost immediate, resulting in 
widespread rioting and significant increases in major security inci-
dents across the country. Through increased pressure by the public, 
MAG completed the full-scale construction of a new purpose-
built ammunition storage area (ASA) in December 2020 that has four 
explosive storehouses to secure the LAF’s more valuable, larger caliber 
munitions at a strategically important location. The facility meets all 
requirements within the IATGs. 
it eventually led to the collapse of the Lebanese government and 
resulted in several senior members of the port customs and immigra-
tion going to jail for their failures leading up to the event.
While this event was not related to either weapons or ammuni-
tion, the devastation the blast caused highlighted the need for the 
LAF higher command to seriously look at existing LAF ammunition 
storage facilities and start working towards removing all ammunition 
stockpiles outside of populated areas.
Following the explosion, on 4 August 2020, LAF G4 Logistics 
requested MAG’s assistance to conduct post-blast assessments of sev-
eral military facilities near the port that suffered heavy blast damage 
and resulted in LAF personnel being killed and injured. MAG, sup-
ported by LAF military engineers, made emergency security repairs at 
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these military installations and received additional emergency funds 
from the US government to conduct this work.
The LAF G4 and the Ammunition Directorate were tasked with 
moving all unserviceable ammunition identified during the site assess-
ments by MAG and ammunition previously earmarked for destruction 
by the LAF to various holding locations ready for destruction, pending 
final approval from LAF higher command.
The General Commander of the LAF ordered the Ammunition 
Directorate to deploy immediately and conduct risk assessments of all 
military facilities to ensure all known risks were being managed cor-
rectly and report back on any new risks identified or non-conformities. 
Next Steps 
MAG Lebanon14 has secured an additional $3.5 million from the 
U.S. Department of State and will assist the LAF with the development 
of the strategic plan, which is seen as essential for the LAF to ensure 
its fit for purpose. Moreover, MAG will continue to foster its relation-
ship with the LAF and assist both in the development of its personnel’s 
technical skills and with improving existing standard operating pro-
cedures to ensure compliance with the IATGs. 
MAG will also provide additional WAM technical training to a 
further forty-five LAF personnel and provide munition safety plan-
ning (MSP) workshops to higher levels of the Lebanese military to 
ensure everyone is aware of their roles and responsibilities regarding 
the safety and security of the national ammunition stockpiles and the 
citizens of Lebanon. In addition to the capacity development of LAF 
personnel, technical field assessments will also be conducted at thirty 
locations identified by the LAF. These locations are still being deter-
mined as part of the strategic planning discussions.
Technical interventions at six locations previously assessed by MAG 
have also been agreed by LAF and approved by the donor. These inter-
ventions range in complexity from improving basic security measures 
to the complete construction of a new purpose-built ammunition stor-
age facility. When completed, this will be a significant improvement 
to both the LAF’s existing technical capacity and overall capability 
to securely store their ammunition stockpiles. All planned activities 
mentioned will be completed by January 2023.
LAF are the de facto entity when it comes to having the trust of the 
civilian population, who look to the LAF to maintain security, conduct 
damage assessments of all buildings impacted by the blast, and deliver 
food aid packs to all households affected by the blast. Not only did they 
manage the situation, the LAF has accelerated all planned ammunition 
destruction operations, and discussions are taking place between LAF 
and MAG regarding upgrading the existing central demolition site 
assessed in September 2020 to allow for larger ammunition destruc-
tion operations to take place.
Jamie McGhee
WAM Technical Manager
Mines Advisory Group (MAG)
Jamie McGhee is a former British Armed 
Forces EOD Specialist who began working 
in humanitarian mine action in 2009. He 
has previously held technical roles for The 
HALO Trust in Afghanistan, Ivory Coast, 
South Sudan, Angola, Georgia, and 
Cambodia; and the Danish Demining 
Group (DDG), where he was responsible 
for all SALW activities in the Horn of Africa 
and Yemen. He started working with MAG 
in 2015 as Technical Operations Manager and then Country 
Director in Somalia before moving to the Operations 
Development Team (ODT) at MAG HQ in 2018. He is responsible 
for technical oversight of WAM activities in Somalia, Ecuador, 
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While there is still a long way to go in achieving the required stan-
dards, current progress can be attributed to the LAF’s proactive nature 
and transparency at all levels with MAG. The WAM program in 
Lebanon has already made significant progress in this regard, and the 
author would like to personally thank the donor and all members of 
the LAF with whom MAG is working for, helping these vital PSSM 
interventions to take place. 
See endnotes page 153
Image 3 and 4. (Left) One of the external roller shutter access doors to the ammunition depot. (Right) A large ammunition 
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Yemen
By Elise Becker and Tamara Klingsheim [ Marshall Legacy Institute ]
Over the past ten years, with funding from the U.S. Department of State, the Marshall Legacy Institute’s (MLI) Mine Victim’s Assistance Program (MVA) has helped over 800 male, female, and child landmine survivors in Yemen. MLI and our in-country program partner have worked 
to identify survivors and provide them with the assistance they require, including prosthetic services, 
vocational training, and self-employment opportunities, to improve their lives and increase their pros-
pects for a brighter future. 
Abeer Mabkhot is a thirty-year-old Yemeni landmine survivor. 
Ten years ago, she stepped on a landmine and lost her left leg. Abeer 
shares “I knew that the area had been contaminated by mines recently 
as a result of the war between Al Qaeda groups and the army, but 
because of the shortage of our fuel (gas, electricity, and diesel), I had 
to collect wood (fuel) for cooking. The mines were planted around a 
military camp, but the trees were also located in the same contami-
nated area. I was afraid of the mines, and this was the second time 
for me to collect wood from this area.” Abeer laughs, saying “the 
third time didn’t happen because I had my accident the second time.” 
Soldiers from the military camp heard the explosion and immediately 
took Abeer to the military hospital, but she lost her left leg. 
Qasem Al Surabil is a young man living with his mother, father, 
wife, and children in Yemen. He works hard to support both his family 
and his parents. Qasem is also a landmine survivor. “I was going to 
work as usual in agriculture with my brother when I saw a strange 
object on the ground and I thought it is a game. My brother told me 
to ignore it, but I took it and started playing with it, then it exploded. 
My brother, with some villagers who heard the explosion, took me 
to the Revolution Hospital in Sana’a, and there my hand was ampu-
tated.” After his accident, Qasem searched for a job but employers did 
not want to hire him due to his disability. He took out a business loan, 
but still went into debt. “Unfortunately, because of the bad situation 
of Yemen, which increases every day, my small business failed with 
no return…I lost everything.”
 Program Overview
Qasem (left) in his new minimarket.
All photos courtesy of Yemeni Association
for Landmine Survivors (YALS).
As of 2017, the Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor1 indicates 
9,118 known casualties from landmines and other explosive remnants 
of war (ERW) in Yemen; however, there is no differentiation between 
those injured or killed. The cumulative figure of landmine survivors is 
undoubtedly much higher. Ongoing conflicts since March 2015 have 
likely added additional landmine and ERW contamination,2 and have 
hindered data collection of casualties, which has “prevented the opera-
tion of a national casualty surveillance mechanism.”1 
Wanting to help address the physical, vocational, and financial 
needs of landmine survivors in Yemen, MLI launched the MVA pro-
gram in Yemen in 2011, with funding from the US Department of 
State. To date, MLI’s MVA Yemen program has provided prosthetic 
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The joint MLI-YALS project provides the following:
1. Prosthetic services and other medical care to Yemeni landmine survivors, including both adults and children
2. Vocational training to enhance the employment opportunities and social integration of adult Yemeni landmine survivors 
3. Self-employment opportunities for select graduates of the vocational training programs through competitive micro-grants
Basher Al Wesaby working in the vocational training carpentry 
course offered through MLI’s MVA Yemen program.
limbs, vocational training, and/or micro-grants to 822 landmine 
survivors in Yemen. The Yemeni Association of Landmine Survivors 
(YALS) serves as MLI’s in-country partner, assisting with identifying 
survivors as well as arranging transportation and accommodation for 
survivors as needed.
 The program has provided real, tangible results for landmine sur-
vivors in Yemen. In 2016, five years after her accident, MLI and YALS 
identified Abeer to receive a prosthetic leg, which allowed her to regain 
some of her mobility. Abeer says her prosthetic provides her “with a 
lot of hope for the future.” Through the program, she participated 
in a vocational sewing training course And, in 2019, applied for and 
received a micro-grant through MLI’s MVA program, which provided 
funding for her budding sewing business. Some of Abeer’s handmade 
items were sold at the Silent Auction during MLI’s 2018 Clearing the 
Path Gala Event held in Washington, D.C. In 2020, Abeer was selected 
to receive MLI’s “Survivor of the Year Award” at the annual Gala 
event, held virtually due to the COVID-19 pandemic. She continues 
her studies in literacy at the local university, paying for her schooling 
with money that she earned through her sewing business. 
Comparatively, Qasem participated in the carpentry vocational 
training course offered by MLI through the program. In 2019, he 
received a micro-grant to open a mini-market in his village, stating “I 
became happy that I will have work, which will help me and my family 
and allow me to take care of them.”
Medical Assistance: Providing Prosthetic Limbs 
To provide medical assistance to Yemeni landmine survivors, MLI 
and YALS first identify survivors from governorates throughout 
Yemen that are under elected government control. YALS coordina-
tors living in these governorates and districts collect information on 
survivors from local authorities, then meet the survivors in person to 
determine their needs and to create survivor profiles. The YALS coor-
dinators send the profiles to the YALS central office and to MLI for 
review and the group then creates a plan of care. The survivors selected 
for medical assistance receive prosthetic limbs and other required 
rehabilitative care. The majority of survivors receive their support 
at prosthetic centers in Aden, Taiz, or Al Hudaydah, although there 
have been special arrangements made for certain survivors to be fitted 
and receive their new prosthetic limbs at home, as some are unable to 
travel comfortably and/or safely to the medical facilities. The program 
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previously used a prosthetic center located in Sana’a; however as the 
city is no longer under the control of the elected government of Yemen, 
the program no longer uses this facility. 
Most of the survivors are from rural areas, so it is necessary to 
provide them with transportation to the prosthetic facility as well as 
accommodations. The fitting of a prosthetic limb occurs over a num-
ber of appointments before the final prosthetic product is finished and 
ready for wear. Transportation is provided from their villages to the 
prosthetic centers, and the accommodations selected are hotels in safe 
neighborhoods near the medical facility. At least one parent accom-
panies child landmine survivors receiving artificial limbs. YALS staff 
members are present to monitor and document the process, and to 
ensure that the survivor recipients are satisfied with their care. Since 
the program began in 2011, 386 men, women, and child landmine sur-
vivors have received medical care through MLI’s program. 
The impact of the medical care, typically prosthetic limbs, is huge 
for the Yemeni survivor beneficiaries. MLI has observed, and YALS 
confirms, that landmine survivors with limited mobility face immense 
difficulties in their daily lives, particularly in rural areas where resi-
dents often must walk a long way to collect firewood, tend to animals, 
and perform daily chores. Children landmine survivors are often 
unable to attend school due to inaccessible buildings and also face 
stigmas surrounding their physical disabilities. The prosthetic limbs 
that MLI and YALS provide to the survivors are designed to be durable 
and low-tech, accounting for rough terrain and limited repair facilities 
and local technology. The vast majority of the survivor beneficiaries 
report a high level of satisfaction with their new limbs, as they report 
improved mobility and independence. 
Vocational Training and Micro-Grants
Vocational training. Similar to medical assistance, the process 
of identifying landmine survivors desiring and needing vocational 
training begins in the governorates, where the YALS coordinators 
collect data, meet the survivors, and share their profiles with the in-
country program manager, YALS, and MLI. Once MLI approves the 
selection of trainees, YALS arranges the vocational training courses, 
typically one course for women and one course for men each quar-
ter. Coordination with local authorities is often required to ensure 
that MLI and YALS have permission to conduct the training and, at 
times, to allow survivors and YALS teams to travel from one gover-
norate to another. 
MLI’s MVA program has funded a variety of training topics through-
out the years. The survivors themselves often suggest the vocational 
training subject, as they identify the 
skill they prefer and have the physi-
cal capacity to perform. The train-
ing topics have included beekeeping, 
carpentry, computer/typing skills, 
sewing, and weaving. All courses are 
offered to enhance employment and 
income generation opportunities and 
to assist survivors in their reintegra-
tion into society. 
The training courses each take 
place five days a week over the course 
of one month. Participating survivors are provided transportation 
from their homes to the vocational facility, as well as accommodation 
in hotels near the vocational facility and a modest stipend. The training 
courses vary in size, with sewing classes having ten to fifteen students 
per class, and weaving classes usually having six to eight students per 
class. The training courses are segregated by gender due to cultural con-
siderations and norms. Most of the vocational courses are held at rental 
facilities chosen based on their proximity to the survivor participants 
as well as the safety of the general area. 
Sewing courses for women have proven to be quite successful. The 
majority of recent female survivors participating in these courses have 
been from Aden, Al Hudaydah, Lahij, and Taiz Governorates. Each 
graduate of the sewing course receives a sewing machine, fabric, and 
items such as thread, scissors, buttons etc., to take home upon course 
completion to employ their newly learned skills and provide support 
for their families. A sewing room has been created at the YALS Center 
to provide successful trainees with materials to produce items for bar-
ter or sale in their villages. The sewing room also gives participants the 
chance to sell their work from the Center. 
A computer training lab with high-speed internet connectivity 
was established in 2011 at the YALS Center and equipped with state-
of-the-art computers and software for selected survivors to receive 
instruction from a certified teacher. 
This computer training course was 
suspended in 2013 due to internet 
instability; however, it provided 
valuable training to survivor partici-
pants who continue to have access to 
computers. Labibah Abdo Saif is a 
thirty-one-year-old female landmine 
survivor who lost her right leg and 
right eye due to a landmine explosion 
at the age of nine. In 2013, Labibah 
received computer training through 
the MVA program. With her computer training, Labibah acquired a 
government job and also serves as a team leader in mine risk educa-
tion (MRE) at YALS.
MLI has offered beekeeping, carpentry, and weaving courses to adult 
male landmine survivors. The carpentry participants built ramps for 
wheelchairs at many schools and homes of other survivor amputees, 
greatly improving access and mobility. Unfortunately, high lumber 
prices and scarcity of materials have limited the carpentry training 
course in recent years. Beekeeping also became difficult, as the course 
Hend is a thirty-three-year-old Yemeni landmine 
survivor, married, and lives in a small village. In 2002, 
Hend was caring for her sheep near her village when 
she was injured by a mine explosion, losing both of 
her legs. Hend received medical assistance through 
MLI’s MVA Yemen program in 2013. She later success-
fully completed the training course and received a 
sewing machine, which she now uses to provide for 
her family. Hend says the monthly income derived 
from sewing helps cover her monthly rent. 
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Vocational training in beekeeping offered 
Mogbel Ali Hajeeb the opportunity to learn 
a skill and provide for his family.
providers and graduates frequently had to move their hives to new 
locations for security purposes. In recent years, vocational training in 
weaving has proven the most viable training course for men, and the 
loom work is a good fit for survivors who have lost a leg, as weaving 
allows them to work while sitting. Basheer Al Wesaby was injured by 
an anti-personnel mine while caring for his sheep. Basheer participated 
in the vocational training carpentry course, graduated, and went on to 
assist the course instructor in the next course iteration, helping new 
trainees understand the skills of the trade. He now has a carpentry job 
and makes an income that allows him to cover expenses for his wife and 
five children. Basheer also works with YALS’s MRE team. 
Micro-grants. For the past three years, MLI and YALS have awarded 
ten competitive micro-grants annually to vocational training course 
graduates, enabling them to grow and expand their businesses in the 
fields of sewing, beekeeping, and mini-markets. Survivors who have 
previously completed a vocational training course are eligible to apply 
for a competitive micro-grant. Survivors submit their business plan to 
YALS, and a selection committee reviews all applicants and determines 
who is best qualified to receive funds to grow their business. One micro-
grant recipient is Qaryah Mohammed Al Amry, a twenty-two-year-old 
female survivor who lost her right leg to a landmine explosion. Qaryah, 
who participated in the sewing course and received a micro-grant in 
2019, says that “sewing for women is the best vocational job and the best 
social relationship. I have a lot of women customers. Last month, the 
income was between $200 and $250, but this month I expect my income 
will be double that because of the feast season.”
To date (2011–present), 436 adult male and adult female landmine 
survivors have participated in the MLI vocational training courses, and 
most participants have gone on to use their skills to earn a living, but 
there are additional, intangible benefits to the training as well. YALS 
coordinator Ahmed Alawi says, “the friendships made during training 
is one of the important things they do. They make good friendships and 
I know a lot of them stay in touch with one another and also with YALS 
staff after training.” 
Program Challenges
Providing medical assistance and vocational training to land-
mine survivors in rural areas is challenging, particularly at this time 
in Yemen’s history. The primary challenge is security. The ongoing 
conflict between government and Houthi forces has limited the geo-
graphic scope of the project, and the MLI and YALS team are work-
ing only in areas under government control. Nevertheless, security 
concerns remain, and the movement of landmine survivors to pros-
thetic centers and training centers requires careful consideration 
and planning. The program takes special care to not move survi-
vors through dangerous roads or battle areas. When the YALS team 
and the local authorities determined that there would be a risk to 
move survivors, which occurred in the previous two quarters, MLI 
and YALS arranged to provide the prosthetics to survivors in their 
homes. While there was a risk to the YALS team and prosthetic 
technician to reach the survivors, the team developed safety proce-
dures to minimize the danger of travelling through perilous areas. 
The majority of survivor beneficiaries live in rural, mine-affected 
areas. MLI and YALS specifically have chosen to reach these survi-
vors because very limited health services are available to this pop-
ulation. Arranging transportation, security aside, is challenging, 
and logistics can be difficult, but MLI and YALS feel strongly about 
reaching the populations that may otherwise be missed. Program 
implementers have found that detailed coordination with local 
officials is essential to facilitating the logistical and transportation 
requirements of survivor beneficiaries. 
Additionally, the COVID-19 pandemic continues to present 
challenges in the implementation of programs, such as maintain-
ing social distancing and promoting mask wearing. At the time of 
this writing, the World Heath Organization reports 7,625 confirmed 
cases of COVID-19 in Yemen, with 1,438 deaths and 311,483 vac-
cinations administered to date. In 2020, MLI awarded micro-grants 
to two survivor graduates of the sewing course to create masks 
for fellow survivors and YALS staff and to distribute the masks 
throughout their communities. The team is adapting and taking the 
precautions necessary to limit the spread of COVID-19 while striving 
to meet program goals.
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Conclusion
Landmine survivors sewing 
face masks during the 
COVID-19 pandemic.
successful model to provide prosthetic, vocational, and income-gener-
ating support to Yemeni landmine survivors. Tamara Klingsheim, who 
is the MLI Program Manager for Yemen, summarizes the program, 
saying that: Working with MLI and overseeing the Yemen program 
for the past ten years has been a wonderful experience as I’ve seen 
so many lives being transformed…landmine survivors being given 
the opportunity to once again become productive citizens within 
their communities. These individuals, single, as well as, mothers and 
fathers, have been given hope, the tools, and the training to provide 
for themselves and their families. 
See endnotes page 154
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Elise Becker is the Vice President for 
Operations at the Marshall Legacy Institute, 
where she manages many of the organiza-
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Tamara Klingsheim works out of her home in 
the Smokey Mountains near the Blue Ridge 
Parkway in North Carolina. Working with the 
Marshall Legacy Institute for the past eleven 
years, Klingsheim has had the opportunity to 
oversee the CHAMPS Program (Children 
Against Mines Program) and Mine Victims’ 
Assistance in several war-torn countries, to 
include Yemen. She connects school children 
across the United States and abroad in service-learning opportuni-
ties and works with in-country managers of mine-affected coun-
tries, helping survivors with both medical and vocational assistance.
With the mountain of challenges present in Yemen today—war, 
famine, widespread poverty and disease, landmines, and now COVID-
19—MLI and YALS have been able to provide prosthetic limbs, voca-
tional training, and/or micro-grants to more than 800 male, female, 
and child landmine survivors. The overarching goal of the program is 
to improve the lives of Yemeni landmine survivors, particularly those 
living in rural, heavily-contaminated areas, and we are humbled to help 
survivors like Abeer, Qasem, and countless others to have opportuni-
ties for a better life. With ongoing support from the U.S. Department of 
State, MLI, in partnership with YALS, will continue the MVA program 
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Remote sensing and artificial intelligence (AI) technologies are included in discussions of how tech-nology and innovation can improve humanitarian action and international peacekeeping. These technologies have the potential to improve the capacity to assess needs and to monitor changes 
on the ground and can be useful for both the mine action (MA) and broader humanitarian sectors. Even 
though remote sensing and AI are not the silver bullet in MA and come with several challenges (e.g., 
operational and data protection), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Geneva 
International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) believe that the integration of remote sensing 
and AI into the MA sector will enhance evidence-based decision making, aiding in determining priorities 
for surveying and clearance of contaminated areas and enabling the scarce recourses available for MA 
activities worldwide to be appropriately directed and used as efficiently as possible. On the 20th and 
22nd of April, ICRC and GICHD co-hosted a webinar on remote sensing and AI in the mine action sector. 
The following is a review of the key benefits and challenges discussed during the two days. 
In humanitarian mine action (HMA), research and innovation 
have led to the development and deployment of several alternative 
methods to identify contaminated areas and for detection. However, 
these innovations have come with some limitations (cost, training 
methodologies, limited applicability depending on environmental 
conditions) and can therefore only be considered as one component 
of a tool-box approach. The use of high-resolution remote imagery 
has been tested and evaluated as a valuable supplementary tool for 
MA teams that require accurate, up-to-date imagery of suspected 
hazardous areas (SHAs) and confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs); 
however, past tests and research have been limited.As many coun-
tries near the completion of their MA programs, many of the remain-
ing SHAs and CHAs are becoming harder to process and release as 
they are remote and cover large areas, often with challenging terrain. 
Recent papers1–5 have shown the potential benefits of using air-
borne remote sensing to detect explosive ordnance (EO). These 
tests indicate that even though remote sensing may not be a perfect 
solution, it may be a valuable addition to the efforts to detect EO in 
certain environments and improve the pace of non-technical sur-
veys (NTS) and other activities. Some of these findings were also 
presented at the GICHD mine action technology workshop held in 
Basel, Switzerland, in 2019.
In addition to remote sensing, AI and machine learning are 
increasingly prominent technologies that can increase the prob-
ability of detection while simultaneously decreasing the false alarm 
rate. AI has the ability to identify objects, analyze big data6 at an 
extremely fast pace, and recognize patterns invisible to the human 
eye. Coupled with remote sensing, AI can quickly transition an MA 
operation from time-consuming analysis to decision making and 
By Martin Jebens [ International Committee of the Red Cross ] 
and Rob White [ Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining ]
in the Mine Action Sector
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presenters to discuss recent developments, highlight lessons learned, 
and discuss several key challenges: 
• cross-sectorial work
• data needs and data protection
• region-specific contexts 
action. Additional benefits include better situational awareness on the 
ground, improved safety for clearance personnel, and more effective 
planning, prioritization, and tasking of MA assets. 
On the 20 April and 22 April 2021, the ICRC and the GICHD 
cohosted a webinar on the use of remote sensing and AI, enabling 
Key Challenges: Cross-Sectorial Work
Even though HMA is a niche field with unique resource constraints 
and highly specific operating requirements, it should not remain siloed 
in its innovative endeavors, but rather open to technical advancements 
from other sectors.
The interlinked nature of MA calls for an approach that is holis-
tic, coherent, and includes a diverse set of stakeholders. Remote sens-
ing and AI have been developed and implemented among the private 
sector, academia, and other parts of the humanitarian sector, includ-
ing the ICRC—who for several decades have employed AI for dam-
age assessments, crop monitoring, and to analyze satellite images. 
Therefore, considerable knowledge is already available and can be 
transferred to the broader MA sector. Whereas the private sector is 
investing in new start-ups and technology companies that can handle 
the big data generated from crowd sourcing and is developing AI algo-
rithms so that self-driven cars can detect objects in real time, academia 
is conducting research on how to improve these techniques. In con-
trast, the MA sector is in the start-up phase of exploiting the potential 
of big data to improve decision-making. One of the factors contribut-
ing to the slow institutional uptake of these methods within MA is a 
lack of capacity to apply these methods in operational settings due to 
lack of funding, cooperation, and support. Nevertheless, partnerships 
between governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), aca-
demia, civil society, and the private sector are critical to obtaining the 
expertise and resources necessary to integrate remote sensing and AI 
into survey and clearance activities in a more efficient, cost-effective 
way that lowers the risk for those involved.
Key Challenge: Data Needs and Data Protection
There is a wealth of opportunities to use remote sensing and AI 
methods when detecting EO or identifying ground contaminator 
indicators. However, several presenters at the webinar recalled that to 
benefit from remote sensing data, the sector also needs platforms that 
can analyze and exploit large amounts of data (e.g., IMSMA7 or other 
GIS-software). 
To use the potential of AI effectively, computer algorithms need 
datasets to train the system. In the future, resources for gathering and 
training AI should be based on real-world data that might account 
for EO that has been exposed to the elements for a long time and has 
aged/decayed. In addition, different types of quantitative and qualita-
tive data from crowd sourcing, baseline studies, and conflict history 
can provide higher-quality data. Moreover, human experience and 
expertise should be used for analysis, as well as to train systems and 
validate results. 
While important to obtain different types of images of the envi-
ronment suspected to be contaminated with EO—including areas not 
known to be contaminated and SHAs—practitioners note images can 
also contain information on individuals or communities. Therefore, 
the MA sector must recognize the potential for harm that can result 
from misused data and determine general ethical principles and guide-
lines8 for data use. Whereas the benefits will depend on the nature 
of the crisis, so too will potential risks and harms. In 2002, after an 
unplanned explosion at a munitions site (UEMS) in Lagos, Nigeria, 
the socioeconomic impact was profound because of the thousands of 
people who were affected. In such circumstances, where metropolitan 
areas need to function for the millions of people who live within, the 
use of remote sensing may outweigh the risks of data being misused.
However, data might also be used to target populations and cause 
more damage than good. If MA is taking place in areas populated by 
internally displaced persons, compromised data could be misused by 
nonstate actors, which can occur if drones crash or via data hacking. 
Nevertheless, each project should be assessed individually
Furthermore, when using AI, users should note that the results 
will potentially be biased by the data used to train the machine. 
Awareness of the data source is crucial as well as the need to use 
data that best targets region-specific areas, for example, EO will 
deteriorate differently in different environments, which needs to be 
ref lected in the training of AI. 
Although there is a tendency to continually seek better or more data 
on a range of issues, the wish for better data could be caused by the 
lack of our ability to cope with big data. Currently, there are plenty of 
evidence-based datasets that could advance survey techniques when 
identifying SHAs via airplane or satellite imagery, as well as remote 
Although there is a tendency to continually seek better or more data 
on a range of issues, the wish for better data could be caused by the lack 
of our ability to cope with big data.
135
JMU: The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Issue 25.1
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2021
THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION136
Key Challenge: Region-Specific Contexts
Different types of remote sensing such as true color/RGB (Red, 
Green, Blue) images, thermal images, and ground penetrating radar, 
etc., will produce varying advantages in different environments. 
The potential benefit for using remote sensing therefore needs to be 
addressed in each individual case. Whereas some types might work 
better in deserts, others might work better in snowy or cold conditions, 
or in areas with vegetation. The consensus among practitioners is that 
more testing is needed. 
The market for remote sensing platforms is increasing, as many of 
these solutions are cost-effective and sustainable. Modern unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAVs) can be easy to repair in the field, are relatively 
easy to acquire, and do not need to have a huge impact on resources. 
However, operators must also consider legal aspects of using UAV ś 
in their respective regions or countries. Being able to communicate 
the pros and cons of using remote sensing with national authorities 
and local communities is therefore necessary. In addition to leveraging 
UAV imagery, mine action can also employ satellite imagery to gener-
ate useful remote sensing data, even though satellite imagery tends to 
have a lower resolution and is more easily impacted by weather (cloud 
cover) compared to UAV ś.
Outlook
The ICRC and GICHD firmly believe that the integration of remote 
sensing and AI (either used individually or together) into MA activi-
ties could enhance evidence-based decision making. This will improve 
prioritization for surveying and clearance activities in SHAs/CHAs 
and enable operators to better and more efficiently direct the scarce 
resources available for MA activities worldwide. Remote sensing and 
AI will also support the MA sector in articulating the positive impact 
of the work by identifying the development of rural activities such 
as farming or urban access to infrastructure and services in released 
areas.9 Combining increasingly complex MA datasets (i.e., remote 
sensing imagery) with socioeconomic data will present opportunities 
to evaluate the risk for individual contaminated areas, which should be 
used when prioritizing clearance activities. 
Although recent hype can oversimplify what can and cannot be 
done with remote sensing data and AI, these are fundamentally new 
additions to the mine action toolbox that can improve survey activi-
ties. To ensure that we don’t spend resources duplicating work or take 
resources away from getting EO out of the ground, the collaboration 
between the wider humanitarian and MA sector, academia, and the 
private sector will be crucial in the future. For this reason, the need 
for information sharing among the organizations working to main-
stream these technologies cannot be underestimated. The “Use of 
Remote Sensing and AI in the Mine Action Sector” webinar was not a 
standalone event, as the ICRC and the GICHD are currently develop-
ing a platform on which ideas and lessons learned can be shared. In 
addition, the GICHD plan to use the next GICHD technology work-
shop, scheduled for November 2021, as an opportunity to continue the 
important dialogue and exchange of information on remote sensing 
and AI in MA. 
See endnotes page 154
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sensing data from satellites. Moreover, by using machine learning on 
white papers and reports from the humanitarian sector, these tech-
niques can help validate findings and identify previously unknown 
contaminated areas and improve desk assessments or NTS in general. 
AI demonstrates potential in making a valuable contribution to help 
the MA sector analyze the data that is already available.
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How to Implement Drones and 
Machine Learning to Reduce Time, 
Costs, and Dangers Associated 
with Landmine Detection
By Jasper Baur,i,ii* Gabriel Steinberg,i* Alex Nikulin, Ph.D.,i Kenneth Chiu, Ph.D.,i and Timothy S. de Smet, Ph.D.i 
i [ Binghamton University - The State University of New York ]
ii [ Columbia University - Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory ]
* Equal contribution 
Two rapidly emerging technologies revolutionizing scientific problem solving are unpiloted aerial systems (UAS), commonly referred to as drones, and deep learning algorithms.1 Our study combines these two technologies to provide a powerful auxiliary tool for scatterable land-
mine detection. These munitions are traditionally challenging for clearance operations due to their 
wide area of impact upon deployment, small size, and random minefield orientation. Our past work 
focused on developing a reliable UAS capable of detecting and identifying individual elements of 
PFM-1 minefields to rapidly assess wide areas for landmine contamination, minefield orientation, 
and possible minefield overlap. In our most recent proof-of-concept study we designed and deployed 
a machine learning workflow involving a region-based convolutional neural network (R-CNN) to auto-
mate the detection and classification process, achieving a 71.5% rate of successful detection.2 In 
subsequent trials, we expanded our dataset and improved the accuracy of the CNN to detect PFM-1 
anti-personnel mines from visual (RGB) UAS-based imagery to 91.8%. In this paper, we intend to 
familiarize the demining community with the strengths and limitations of UAS and machine learn-
ing and suggest a fit of this technology as a key auxiliary first look area reduction technique in 
humanitarian demining operations. As part of this effort, we seek to provide detailed guidance on 
how to implement this technique for non-technical survey (NTS) support and area reduction of con-
firmed and suspected hazardous areas with minimal resources and funding. 
Introduction
Explosive remnants of war (ERW), including unexploded ordnance 
(UXO) and landmines, resulted in a recorded 5,554 casualties in 2019 
with nearly half (43%) of the civilian victims—for whom the age was 
known—being children.3 In 2019, an estimated 164,000 emplaced anti-
personnel mines were destroyed globally, but completely clearing the 
world of anti-personnel mines is still decades away as there are tens of 
millions of mines estimated to reside in place worldwide, assuming no 
new landmines are deployed.4 As of 2007, experts estimated that ten to 
twenty landmines were laid for every mine cleared, considerably exac-
erbating the landmine crisis.5 However, since the recent success of the 
implementation of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (APMBC), 
this number may be less but is unknown. In the last decade, anti-per-
sonnel landmines have been used in active conflicts in at least fifteen 
countries, including but likely not limited to Afghanistan, Colombia, 
India, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Myanmar, Nigeria, North Korea, Pakistan, 
Syria, Thailand, Tunisia, Ukraine, and Yemen.6 The pace of mine clear-
ance is largely driven by operator experience, the technological capac-
ity of mine-detection technology, and environmental difficulty, which 
can be quantified by survey area and ratio of successful detection rela-
tive to false flags. Recent studies demonstrated that preliminary rapid 
wide-area surveys conducted by unpiloted aerial systems (UAS) may 
be utilized to initially constrain search areas, ultimately decreasing the 
time and cost associated with humanitarian mine action (HMA) while 
reducing the safety risk to clearance operators.7–12
Terrestria l electromagnetic-induction (EMI) methods are 
current ly one of the main standard approaches to HMA.13 While 
hand-held EMI detector surveys have proven themselves as one of the 
most reliable geophysical techniques for HMA, their implementation 
137
JMU: The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Issue 25.1
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2021
THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION138
has a number of shortcomings: (1) they have high false-positive alarm 
rates in the presence of metallic clutter; (2) they are are time and labor 
intensive, especially in difficult terrain; and (3) they entail operator risk. 
Some of these shortcomings can be mitigated if suspected hazardous 
areas (SHAs) are constrained by autonomous surveys providing an ini-
tial assessment of mine presence and subsequently expanded to clas-
sify mine type, mine condition, minefield density and orientation, soil 
type, and other environmental parameters. Modern unpiloted aerial 
vehicle (UAV) platforms capable of flying at low altitudes and collecting 
autonomous surveys, coupled with sensitive and compact visual, ther-
mal, multispectral, and magnetic sensors, often allow operators to rap-
idly identify small anthropogenic targets previously identifiable only in 
ground surveys in certain situations.14
Over the last decade UAVs have become more reliable, and their 
push into the consumer market considerably decreased their costs. 
In parallel with the advancement of UAV technology, modern min-
iaturized optical and geophysical sensors became smaller, more sensi-
tive, less costly, and mountable on UAV platforms. Advances in UAV 
and sensor technologies enabled the development of reliable UAS for 
wide-area, high-resolution remote sensing and geophysical surveys to 
address some of the most pressing humanitarian challenges.8–12 With 
recent developments in small autonomous UAVs, advanced sensors 
have the potential to significantly contribute to the field of HMA, as 
this allows for rapid low-cost data acquisition over wide areas in a safe 
and time-efficient manner. However, the emergence of UAS surveying 
has led to the new problem of analyzing these large (both in terms of 
area covered and file size) and prohibitively complex datasets, requir-
ing advances in machine learning to aid interpretation. As we have 
learned firsthand, manual analysis of these large surveys is operation-
ally difficult, subjective, and sometimes inconsistent. The application 
of deep learning to remotely collect wide-area surveys (greater than 15 
m2) improves the reliability of NTS and provides stakeholders with the 
quantitative data necessary to plan HMA activities. This area reduc-
tion methodology may ultimately be used to help guide ground dem-
ining activities to reduce search area size and drive down HMA costs 
while reducing operational risks.
We present a machine learning case study focused on initial detec-
tion and identification of the widely-used PFM-1 anti-personnel 
Figure 1. Diagram of individual PFM-1 anti-personnel landmine alongside KSF-1 
dispersal cassette (adapted from de Smet et al. 2018).
All figures courtesy of the authors.
landmine (also known as the butterfly mine) as an index example 
of a small, low-metallic scatterable landmine. This type of mine is 
emblematic of a wide-area aerial-mining strategy responsible for both 
a legacy landmine concern and a looming threat of future contamina-
tion, as variants of these mines and their deployment systems remain 
in active service. The PFM-1 is composed of polyethylene plastic that 
presents a particularly difficult challenge to HMA operations.15,16 
Other plastic anti-personnel mines have historically been composed 
of Type IV plastic, differing from the f lexible polyethylene used for 
the PFM-1,15 which was notoriously widely used during the Soviet-
Afghan War (1979–1989). Although some of these mines have dete-
riorated over time, many of the nearly ten million mines remain an 
active threat today due to cold climate preservation.17 These anti-
personnel mines are designed to be ballistically dispersed from 
aluminum KSF-1S cartridges that contain four dispenser racks of 
eighteen mines with seventy-two mines in total (Figure 1). Guided 
by their stabilizing wings, the mines fall gently to the surface where 
they remain scattered in ellipsoidal minefields of 8–10 m x 18–20 
m. While the original PFM-1 design was subsequently updated to 
include a self-destruction timer, modernized PFM-1S type mines fall 
short of the self-destruction criteria in Protocol II of the Convention 
on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 
Weapons,18 as studies show that nearly half of PFM-1S mines fail to 
self-detonate upon deployment.19 Many of the original PFM-1 stock-
piles were destroyed by signatories of the APMBC, but considerable 
stockpiles of variants of the PFM-1 mines are thought to remain in 
arsenals of multiple countries.20 Today, Russia hosts the world’s larg-
est stockpile of anti-personnel mines with an estimated 26.5 mil-
lion.21 Moreover, as recently as 2019, the Russian army introduced 
the UMZ-G multipurpose tracked vehicle with minelaying capabili-
ties compatible with PFM-1 bearing cassettes capable of dispersing 
nearly 20,000 PFM-1 type mines per hour.22
Previous drone flights collected over inert PFM-1 mines in proxy 
environments in New York provided a critical proof of concept on the 
use of drones to aerially identify small plastic PFM-1 anti-personnel 
mines from visual, thermal, and multispectral imagery. Baur et al. 
2020 presented a case study where a machine learning workflow was 
developed to automate the detection of these landmines for the first 
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time, resulting in a 71.5% accuracy rate in identifying and locating 
PFM-1 mines from a drone survey.23 This study greatly improves upon 
the previous model by increasing the detection accuracy by over 20%. 
This was accomplished by increasing the volume of training data more 
than three-fold, now including twenty-five 10 x 20 m minefield ortho-
photos in four environments (rubble, sand, and two types of grass 
settings) with a total of 590 PFM-1 mines and 136 KSF casings photo-
graphed, adding negative samples, and a more customizable method of 
splitting orthomosaics.
In this study, we demonstrate that our convolutional neural net-
work (CNN)-based results can be improved with the addition of new 
information from ground verification surveys or the addition of more 
imagery data. We present a specialized tool for detection of the PFM-1 
anti-personnel landmine from RGB (visual) imagery, while providing 
Background
Algorithm 1. Coordinate computation
1: size = 700 (size of each cropped image)
2: overlap = 70 (overlap of cropped images in pixels)
3: cropped_image_name = ‘Grass_RGB_Split1205.tif ’
4: split_x, split_y = 370, 360 (pxl position of obj in cropped image)
5: ortho_easting, ortho_northing = 420000, 4600000 (UTM coords of ortho)
6: x_res, y_res = 0.00644, -0.00644 (m/pxl of orthophoto)
7:
8: (Get col and row of cropped image in ortho)
9: row = two ints following “Split” in cropped_image_name = 12
10: col = two ints following row in cropped_image_name = 5
11:
12: (Get pxl position of obj in respective orthomosaic)
13: ortho_x = split_x + (col *(size-overlap))
14: ortho_y = split_y + (row *(size-overlap))
15:
16: (Get easting and northing coords of obj)
17: obj_casting = ortho_casting + (ortho_x*x_res)
18: obj_northing = ortho_northing + (ortho_y*y_res)
19:
20: (Get latitude and longitude coords of obj - python utm package)
21: obj_lat, obj_lon = utm.to_latlon(obj_easting, obj_northing)
Algorithm 1. Pseudocode outlining coordinate computation of 
object.
proof of concept and laying the foundation for other researchers to 
develop similar deep learning models for detection of other types of 
landmines, UXO, and ERW. In order to expand the capabilities of 
this particular CNN for automated detection of landmines or ERW 
other than the PFM-1, additional datasets of novel minefields would 
be required. With these data, our CNN has the potential to be gener-
alized for automated detection and coordinate return of small objects 
in any raster dataset, including geophysical, RGB, thermal, and mul-
tispectral orthomosaics. Because of the self-learning capability of the 
neural network approach to detection and classification, it is impor-
tant that researchers and field operators work together to develop 
methods for data sharing of aerial images, so the HMA community 
can continue to collectively refine and improve the reliability of deep 
learning methods that are rapidly gaining traction.24
Object Detection. The branch of machine learning used in this 
paper—object detection—involves the general goal of detecting and 
locating predetermined objects in often dynamic and complex envi-
ronments. We used supervised object detection, which involves train-
ing an algorithm (a CNN in our case) to recognize objects by showing 
it a large number of images containing those objects (landmines in 
our case). The algorithm uses this set of images, the training set, to 
learn the distinguishing characteristics of the objects and form a gen-
eralized model in order to detect the objects in different images in the 
future. The algorithm is trained in epochs (rounds), where every image 
in the training set is analyzed and where the algorithm is tuned to be 
able to recognize images like it in the future. After the training of the 
algorithm is complete, a pre-trained model is created with the general-
ized model of the objects encoded in it. The accuracy of this model 
is evaluated using the testing set, containing images that were com-
pletely withheld from the training set. The lack of overlap in the train-
ing and testing sets is designed to ensure that the testing set provides 
an unbiased evaluation of the model, as it will not be trained to detect 
the objects as they appear in the testing set; it will have to rely on the 
generalized model of the objects it obtained from the training set.
The model is evaluated using three relative accuracy scores: preci-
sion (positive predictive value), recall (sensitivity), and F1 (harmonic 
mean). These scores are calculated from our raw evaluation metrics: 
true positives, false positives, and false negatives. Precision is a mea-
sure of the relative amount of positively labeled objects that were cor-
rectly labeled and is calculated using the following formula: 
Formula 1: prec = 
true positive
true positive + false positive
Recall is a measure of the relative number of desired objects that were 
positively labeled and is calculated using the following formula: 
Formula 2: rec = 
true positive
true positive + false negative
The F1 score is the harmonic mean of precision and recall; it is calcu-
lated using the following formula:25 Formula 3: F1 = 2* 
prec*rec
prec+rec
For our implementation of object detection, we used an actively-
maintained, open-source GitHub repository called Faster region-based 
convolutional neural network (R-CNN).26 An important component of 
the Faster R-CNN architecture, which we modified to achieve a higher 
accuracy with our dataset, is the anchor box. These make it possible 
for the network to locate objects of different scales and different aspect 
ratios quickly and effectively. Instead of scanning an entire image 
using a sliding window of a set size and aspect ratio, nine anchor boxes 
are centered around every sixteenth pixel in the image. The default 
anchor boxes consist of all nine combinations of boxes with a ½:1, 1:1, 
and 2:2 aspect ratio, and boxes with a scale of 8, 16, and 32 multiplied 
by the default base anchor: 16.27
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Methodology
Remote sensing methodology. Additional training and testing 
data were acquired on the Binghamton University campus of an inert 
grass minefield and an inert sand training minefield. In both instances, 
the training minefields consisted of fifteen to thirty PFM-1 landmines 
and their KSF casings scattered throughout a 10 x 20 m region. We 
collected aerial images of the minefield with the DJI Phantom 4 Pro 
drone at a 10 m height and 2 m/s speed with an 80% overlap. The flights 
were planned using the Pix4D capture mission planner. In the grassy 
terrain, the mines were randomly dispersed so that their orientation 
was left to chance. In the sandy terrain, however, we specifically placed 
the mines in six different orientations to increase the robustness of 
our model: horizontal body up, horizontal body down, vertical cap 
up, vertical cap down, horizontal body buried (partial occlusion), and 
horizontal wing buried. We also collected control data over the sandy 
area with no mines to add negative samples (often called negative tem-
plates in remote sensing literature).28 Additional orthomosaic simu-
lated minefield data from rubble, grass, and snowy environments was 
used for this project and had previously been collected with the same 
Figure 2. Illustration of how the CNN assigns coordinates to suspect mines. 
acquisition methods as presented here.23 The addition of more data and 
negative samples greatly improves the accuracy of machine learning 
algorithms, critically decreasing false positives. 
CNN improvements and adjustments. Since the previous 
implementation of a Faster R-CNN to detect PFM-1 landmines, our 
methods have changed and improved dramatically. Baur et al. 2020 
describes the use of Impy to create non-overlapping crops of our 
orthomosaics with at least one object in each photo and correspond-
ing XML files containing the bounding boxes around each object.29 
As in Baur et al. 2020, the Faster R-CNN begins the processing by 
resizing the inputted images to a maximum of 700 px for each axis. 
Therefore, we continue to employ the method of splitting orthomosa-
ics but employ this method very differently, using a script we created 
called ImageSplitter.30 This shift allows for the inclusion of negative 
samples (images with no objects) in our training and testing sets to 
improve our accuracy, provide more precise evaluation metrics, and 
most importantly, easily locate the predicted objects with latitude and 
longitude coordinates.
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Impy, our previous splitting tool, split an image into non-overlap-
ping 1032 x 1032 px crops each containing at least one bounding box. 
The two major limitations of this tool were the difficulty in label-
ing our predicted objects with latitude and longitude coordinates 
and the inability to create negative samples, which were not possible 
using Impy because of the requirement that there must be at least 
one object within each split image. It was difficult for us to locate 
our predicted landmines with coordinates using this tool, because 
the orthomosaics were split in a non-uniform way without the abil-
ity to output the offsets with which the split images relate to the 
orthomosaic as a whole. The location of the split images was created 
based on the location of randomly scattered landmines instead of on 
constant, predetermined offsets.
ImageSplitter solves both of these problems by splitting an image 
into square crops of a predetermined size (we chose 700 x 700 px, as 
larger images would be downsampled by the CNN) with a predeter-
mined percent overlap (we chose 10%) and creating corresponding 
XML annotations. This method allows us to input negative samples as 
training and testing data to boost our accuracy and to obtain a more 
precise evaluation of our model. The predetermined crop size and 
overlap also allows us to determine where each image crop would lie 
in the larger orthomosaic, and therefore allows us to locate the pre-
dicted objects with latitude and longitude as well as easting and north-
ing coordinates. This process is outlined in Algorithm 1 and Figure 2.
After the calculations, the following data are written to a CSV 
(comma separated values) file, which can be read by Google Earth Pro 
or other geographic information systems (GIS) via the object name; 
the corresponding orthomosaic; its predicted confidence score (from 
0 to 1; and its corresponding latitude, longitude, easting, and northing 
coordinates.
All training sessions were conducted over 50 epochs, with the 
Resnet-101 pre-trained model and an 8 px base anchor size with all 
other parameters set to the default values. The train-test splits that 
were used are outlined in the following results section.
Results
The experiments described in the methodology were done on a Dual 
Socket Intel® Xeon® Silver 4114 CPU at 2.20 GHz with 128 GB of RAM 
with a Titan V GPU with 12 GB of RAM. Thirteen experiments were 
executed by manipulating four variables. 
We found that the highest mean F1 scores, regardless of train-test 
split, were achieved with a 700 x 700 px image size with a 10% over-
lap, 8 px base anchor size, and negative samples included. With these 
parameter values, we tested seven different train-test splits. These 
seven splits can be categorized in two ways: randomized splits and 
orthomosaic withholdings. The results from the experiments in each 
categorization give us unique insights. The randomized splits involved 
randomly selecting a percentage of images for the training set, while 
the withheld remainder are used for testing. This type of splitting gives 
us insight into how the model will perform when generating predic-
tions on environments that have been partially included in the train-
ing set in the form of simulated minefields or negative samples. The 
Materials needed to detect and map PFM-1 anti-personnel mines using this method 
include a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) drone, an RGB visual camera mounted 
on the drone, orthomosaic generation software, and GIS software to analyze and 
visually inspect drone imagery. 
orthomosaic withholdings involve selecting an entire session of drone 
flights to make up the testing set, while the remainder are used for 
training. This train-test split gives us more accurate insight into how 
the model will perform when generating predictions on an environ-
ment that was completely excluded from the training set, but similar 
environments were present. The best randomized split obtained was 
an 80/20 train-test split (80% training, 20% testing) yielding a 0.95 F1 
score for PFM-1 landmines, a 0.89 F1 score for KSF casings, and a 0.92 
mean F1 score. This split is often standard, striking a balance between 
obtaining a robust model through training and a complete evaluation 
of the performance of the model during testing. The best orthomo-
saic withholding was obtained by withholding three orthomosaics we 
collected from a simulated rubble minefield in Chenango Valley State 
Park, NY. This split yielded a 0.86 F1 score for PFM-1 landmines, a 
0.98 F1 score for KSF casings, and a 0.92 mean F1 score.
Using the Pre-Trained Model for PFM-1 Detection
Materials. Materials needed to detect and map PFM-1 anti-per-
sonnel mines using this method include a commercial off-the-shelf 
(COTS) drone, an RGB visual camera mounted on the drone, ortho-
mosaic generation software, and GIS software to analyze and visually 
inspect drone imagery. 
Steps. The first step to implementing our pre-trained model for 
automated detection of PFM-1 anti-personnel mines is collecting UAS 
flight data. Optimal data acquisition involves flying a UAS at a 10 m 
height (the chosen height for optimal resolution and ground cover-
age) with 80% overlap coverage between consecutive traverses and at 
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a slow speed (we used 2 m/s) to minimize blur in the images. Our 
survey size was 10 x 20 m in correspondence with the approximate 
dimensions of PFM-1 minefields, but this variable is up to the discre-
tion of the operator and is often region specific. As the survey size 
increases, the processing time for constructing orthomosaics will also 
increase. The UAV must be equipped with an RGB-capturing camera 
such as the built-in camera on the DJI Phantom 4 or an external sen-
sor such as the Parrot Sequoia multispectral sensor. Additional wave-
lengths, such as thermal or multispectral bands, may also be collected 
and used to cross-reference with visual imagery providing a multipa-
rameter approach to confirm areas of potential surface-laid mines.23 
A multiparameter sensor system would help reduce false positives 
and provide additional physical information (such as temperature 
anomalies for thermal infrared imaging) of suspect mines, adding to 
the robustness of the technique. At this point, while these additional 
wavelengths are useful for cross-referencing with visual imagery, they 
are not suitable for input into the CNN as it is only trained on RGB 
images and is not currently able to recognize PFM-1 landmines in 
other types of imagery.
After data acquisition, the collected photos must be uploaded into 
photogrammetry software for orthomosaic generation. We used 
Pix4DMapper,31 but other software such as DroneDeploy, Agisoft 
Photoscan, and ESRI Drone2Map for ArcGIS are also capable of this 
task. For our trials, the Phantom 4 Pro camera at a 10 m height pro-
duced a resolution of 0.27 cm/px in the orthomosaic with the internal 
drone GPS with the use of ground control points to further improve 
location accuracy. 
The resulting orthomosaic will produce a TIFF file and a corre-
sponding TFW file containing important locational metadata. This 
metadata must include the x and y meters or centimeters per pixel 
resolutions (ours yielded 0.27 cm/px) and the easting and northing 
value of the top-left pixel of the orthomosaic. After the orthomosaics 
have been created, they must be split in order to be input to the CNN 
to generate PFM-1 and KSF-casing coordinate predictions. This will 
be accomplished using the ImageSplitter tool. Once a directory with 
the split orthomosaic has been created, follow the directions in the 
Faster R-CNN repository to execute predictions and output CSV files 
with the predicted coordinates in latitude and longitude, and UTM 
(Universal Transverse Mercator) formats. Notably, the zone for the 
outputted easting and northing coordinates will be the same zone 
present in the TFW files corresponding to the orthomosaics.
After the CNN outputs the coordinates of suspect mines, it is rec-
ommended to convert the CSV file to a shapefile (SHP) and overlay 
the SHP onto the original minefield orthomosaic. This can be accom-
plished using most GIS software and can be done for free using open-
source software like QGIS or Google Earth Pro. An added benefit is 
that these maps may be downloaded for offline use in the field. Next, 
the operator can reduce the number of false negatives and false posi-
tives by visually inspecting the orthomosaic with the overlaid coordi-
nate predictions to confirm or reject the location of the suspect mines, 
and to add any additional unidentified mines (Figure 3). More detailed 
directions on editing the CSV with predicted mines can be found at 
the Demining Research Community’s website (de-mine.com) under 
the Open Source->Instructionals tab. 
While this methodology has a 91.8% accuracy for visible PFM-1 mines in sand, 
grass, and rubble proxy environments, it is important to note the limitations 
in real world situations that would complicate detection using the CNN and RGB 
imagery. 
Figure 3. Edited shapefile overlaid on original orthomosaic with corresponding CSV file.
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Limitations
While this methodology has a 91.8% accuracy for visible PFM-1 
mines in sand, grass, and rubble proxy environments, it is important 
to note the limitations in real world situations that would complicate 
detection using the CNN and RGB imagery. Firstly, PFM-1 mines that 
have been buried by earth surface processes or are completely covered 
in vegetation/obscured from an aerial view are not detectable with 
this algorithm or optical imagery of any kind. Detecting buried mines 
is outside the scope of this paper, but recent studies show other UAS-
based techniques such as thermal sensing show promise for detecting 
shallowly buried mines in dry environments.32,33 Furthermore, there 
may be some visible landmines that the CNN fails to detect, as our 
algorithm is not 100% accurate. Because of this, it is important for 
an operator to double check the orthomosaic for mines. Additionally, 
our algorithm was trained on non-deteriorated model PFM-1 mines, 
so this may introduce a bias in the CNN, and is an avenue for future 
work to include images of decade-old, in-situ PFM-1 mines. Many of 
the mines we trained on were exposed to the outdoors or previously 
buried, being caked with mud or sand as we would expect in nature. 
Safety. Detecting PFM-1 mines remotely from drones 
can reduce the uncertainty associated with finding previously 
unidentified minefields on the ground. Additionally, ortho-
mosaics with identified suspect PFM-1s (Figure 3) will allow 
deminers to visualize where these mines may be before stepping 
onto the minefield and provide them with better situational 
awareness.35 This method acts as an NTS for area reduction to 
assess SHAs or CHAs quickly and safely before investing more 
time and resources with a technical survey.
Cost. One of the major advantages of this method is its 
ability to reduce costs associated with mine detection by con-
straining the SHAs. The software required for this method 
includes our open-source CNN (freely available at de-mine.
com), GIS software for making maps (QGIS software and Google 
Earth Pro software, both free), and orthomosaic generation soft-
ware. For the orthomosaic generation software applications, we 
used Pix4D costing US$4,990 for a lifetime license, or $3,500 
per year with free trial available, but other software applications 
available on the market include ArcGIS Drone2Map, costing 
$1,500 per year (requires ArcGIS). Additionally, open-source 
(free) orthomosaic generation software options exist includ-
ing Meshlab, MicMac, and VisualSFM. The hardware required 
includes a COTS drone with an RGB camera (we used the DJI 
Phantom 4 Pro costing ~$1,600) and a commercial laptop on 
which to run predictions. We used a Lenovo Yoga C740 with a 
10th Generation Intel® Core i5-10210U Processor and 8 GB of 
RAM, which is sufficient to execute predictions, costing ~$850. 
The lowest estimated cost for the materials of this method is 
$2,000 to the highest estimated cost of $20,000. The lowest cost 
assumes using a COTS drone with a built-in camera, relying on 
open-source freeware or free software trials, and excluding the 
cost of purchasing a sufficiently powerful computer on which to 
run the software. The highest cost assumes the operator is buying 
a professional specialized drone and camera while purchasing a 
lifetime license for a photogrammetry software application.
Time. Collection of aerial drone footage takes approxi-
mately 3.5 minutes for a 200 m2 minefield, covering roughly 
1,143 m2 in 20 minutes before the battery needs to be replaced 
or recharged for a typical DJI Phantom 3, assuming the 
drone is f lying at a 10 m height, at 2 m/s, with 80% overlap.16 
Orthomosaic generation takes about 1 hour and 17 minutes 
for a 200 m2 area on a 2.7 GHz Dual-Core Intel® Core i5 pro-
cessor with 8 GB of RAM. Generating predictions using the 
CNN takes about 0.04 seconds per cropped image on a Dual 
Socket Intel® Xeon® Silver 4114 CPU at 2.20 GHz with 128 GB 
of RAM with a Titan V GPU with 12 GB of RAM. Generating 
predictions takes about 6 seconds per cropped image using 
the Lenovo® Yoga C740 with a 10th Generation Intel® Core 
i5-10210U Processor and 8 GB of RAM. Manually verifying the 
CNN mine predictions and labeling any false negatives in QGIS 
takes approximately 10 minutes for 30 objects in a 10 x 20 m 
minefield. In total, the estimated time required for this meth-
odology from start to producing field maps is 2 days. The first 
day will be used for data acquisition and drone operation, 
while the second day will be used for orthophoto generation, 
CNN predictions, and creating field-ready maps.
Accessibility. Our method allows for remote assess-
ment in regions that can be physically inaccessible to survey, but 
we suggest the operator retains line of sight of the UAS at all times. 
In rugged terrain with large elevation shifts, mission planning 
software is necessary to preprogram global naviation satellite sys-
tem (GNSS)-guided autonomous missions where waypoints are 
used in navigation to maintain constant altitude above ground 
level (AGL); alternatively, a laser altimeter can be used to maintain 
constant altitude AGL. Our method will have limited success in 
highly-vegetated regions and in detecting mines that are occluded 
in the RGB wavelengths of light, including buried minefields. 
How will pairing drones and this CNN
improve demining practices?
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Bigger Picture
Additionally, over time, as the PFM-1 mines become more deterio-
rated, the probability that these mines will have either already det-
onated due to reaching their cumulative triggering pressure or will 
have experienced a casing breach resulting in neutralization or dis-
armament increases.34 However, some PFM-1 mines from the Soviet-
Afghan War remain active and present a particularly difficult target to 
identify, since our algorithm is tailored to identify more recently-laid 
mines. In regard to detecting half-buried or half exposed mines, this 
CNN was provided minimal training data for these types of images 
and was only able to detect one of twenty-six half buried mines in the 
testing orthomosaic. While this number is low, it is also promising 
in that the CNN was able to successfully extrapolate from the fully 
exposed mines and is an avenue for future work that will dramatically 
improve as the training images of partially buried mines increases. 
Overall, the main limitations of this method are in detecting PFM-1 
mines that are not visible on the surface, and lack of training data 
from real world minefields which is logistically difficult to obtain and 
an avenue for future work. 
Our methodology is intended to assist and augment current mine 
detection practices, not replace them. However, employing this meth-
odology can improve the safety of operators; increase the efficiency, 
speed, and accuracy of detection; and reduce costs for conditions 
where this method is effective.
This method has potential applications for detecting PFM-1 anti-
personnel mines in confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and SHAs con-
tributing to a NTS for area reduction and partial detection without 
deploying personnel on the ground. Using our method in this fash-
ion can be extremely helpful, as even detecting a single landmine in a 
region will provide critical information for mapping areas of contami-
nation and help decision makers prioritize areas based on the contami-
nation density. 
Conclusion
Recent advances in machine learning, miniaturization of sen-
sors, and the commercialization of drones are paving the way for the 
future of automated mine detection. This study couples these pow-
erful technologies by training a CNN on UAV-based minefield data, 
producing a model that can identify the PFM-1 anti-personnel mine 
from a drone survey with 91.8% accuracy and can provide demin-
ers field-ready maps with identified mine locations. By following the 
steps outlined in this paper, deminers can successfully implement 
this CNN to automate detection of PFM-1 anti-personnel mines. This 
CNN can be adapted to automate detection of a range of landmines, 
cluster munitions, and other ERW, given adequate training and test-
ing data. Our future work will involve field testing this method in 
active minefields to better understand the environmental parameters 
that may influence this methodology. While this methodology is not 
meant to replace current demining practices, it is capable of augment-
ing these practices by providing a safe, low-cost, time-efficient, and 
accurate detection method to add to the demining toolbox for CHAs 
and SHAs. 
Our methodology is intended to assist and augment current mine detection practices, not 
replace them. However, employing this methodology can improve the safety of operators, 
increase the efficiency, speed, and accuracy of detection, and reduce costs for conditions 
where this method is effective.
This method has potential applications for detecting PFM-1 anti-personnel mines in both 
confirmed hazardous areas (CHAs) and SHAs contributing to a NTS for area reduction and 
partial detection without deploying personnel on the ground. Using our method in this 
fashion can be extremely helpful as even detecting a single landmine in a region will 
provide critical information for mapping areas of contamination and help decision makers 
prioritize areas based on the contamination density.
Data availability statement. The Demining Research Com-
munity is a group of interdisciplinary scientists with backgrounds in 
remote sensing, geophysics, computer science, and archaeology whose 
mission is to research, develop, and field test cutting-edge sensors and 
platforms to improve current demining technologies. We support 
open-access research and data for the betterment of the mine action 
community. Our minefield datasets (around 160 MB each), source 
code, and previous publications on mine detection are available at the 
Demining Research Community’s website and at the Open Repository 
at Binghamton University.36–38 
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Past, Present, Future: Mine Action in Motion by Ambassador Stefano Toscano [ from page 8 ]
1. Reference Sri Lanka Strategy.  
2. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, much of the detection R&D and trials were related to metal detectors. The hopes at that time were that the Ground 
Compensation and Large Loop detection were going to be the silver bullet, which wasn’t the case. In the 2010s, R&D moved towards the dual and 
double sensor detection (metal detection and GPR). While this advancement did enhance the efficiency of work, it by no means provided the silver 
bullet (for many reasons) that the sector was (is) seeking. However, through this R&D work, progress has been made and its undeniable that efficien-
cy and safety of operations has improved as a result.
3. The foundation behind the Humanitarian-Development-Peace-Nexus (HDPN), also known as the triple nexus, is based on the need for stronger 
collaboration, coherence, and complementarity towards the delivery of collective outcomes. By leveraging the comparative advantages of its three 
dimensions, the nexus has the potential to reduce vulnerabilities and decrease the number of appeals that remain unanswered, while strengthening 
risk management capacities and tackling the root causes of conflict. In addition, this approach has been at the center of multilateral efforts to fulfil the 
commitments made at the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit and accelerate progress towards the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. The 
triple nexus promotes a change in the way activities are planned, implemented, monitored, reported, and financed in order to more effectively and 
coherently meet needs, reduce risks, and build resiliency in the short, medium, and long term.
Mine Action: The Early Years by Ian Mansfield [ from page 11 ]
1. Cambodia, The Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capacities, page 21, The Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1997.
2. To Walk the Earth in Safety, US Department of State, 1999. https://bit.ly/3z4FWkx. 
3. The Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capacity, The Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1997.
4. Afghanistan – The Development of Indigenous Mine Action Capacity, page 41, The Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1997.
5. United Nations General Assembly resolution A/RES/49/215 Assistance in Mine Clearance of 23 December 1994.
6. Summary – UNGA Resolution A/RES/49/215 Assistance in Mine Clearance of 23 December 1994.
7. Mine Action and Effective Coordination; The United Nations Policy, UNMAS/1998/08/vers.1.6.
8. After the Guns Fall Silent; The Enduring Legacy of Landmines, Shawn Roberts and Jody Williams, VVAF, 1995.
9. “The Mine Action Support Group (MASG).” E-Mine, UN Mine Action. https://www.mineaction.org/en/mine-action-support-group-masg
10. Details of MASG meetings can be found on the website at: “MASG Meeting Notes,” E-Mine, UN Mine Action. https://bit.ly/3z55DkT. 
11. International Mine Action Standards, GICHD. https://www.mineactionstandards.org/
Applying “All Reasonable Effort” in the Falkland Islands Mine Clearance Programme: Encouraging Efficient, Confident, and Timely 
Evidence-Based Land Release Decision Making by David Hewitson and Guy Marot [ from page 16 ]
1. Previous incarnations of the LRC, responsible for work in earlier phases of the programme included Bactec International Ltd and Dynasafe Bactec 
Ltd. 
2. From Phase 5 project contractual documentation, Section 4 – Statement of Service Requirement.
3. IMAS 07.11 Land Release, Edition 1, Amendment 5, February 2019, includes broad guidance on the process elements influencing ARE. The recently 
released TNMA 07.11/03 All Reasonable Effort (ARE), Version 1.0, March 2021, provides more detailed advice on what constitutes ARE and how to 
demonstrate its application. Sources such as https://www.hse.gov.uk/managing/theory/alarpglance.htm explain the concept and practice of ALARP.
4. IMAS 07.14 Risk Management in Mine Action, First Edition, February 2019, section 3 Terms, definitions and abbreviations.
5. In some case over 40cm of peat had ‘grown’ over the 1982 mine layer surface level, and on beach areas 11m of sand had accumulated.
6. Suspected hazardous areas (SHAs) in the Falkland Islands were likely to contain other forms of ERW as well as mines.  Mine clearance procedures 
were targeted only on those parts of the SHA where mines were expected until the LRC and DPO were confident that they had all been found and 
dealt with.  At that point the remaining area within the fenced boundary of the SHA could be searched for non-landmine UXO (mortar rounds, gre-
nades, etc.) using the much faster BAC techniques. At some SHAs less than 5 percent of the total SHA area was subject to mine clearance procedures, 
but the entire area needed to be checked for other UXO hazards.
Linking Mine Action and Development: The Case of Komyshuvakha by Nick Vovk [ from page 28 ]
1. G. Rist, The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global Faith, London, Zed Books, 2008.
2. McGrath, R. (2000), Landmines and Unexploded Ordnance, A Resource Book, London, Pluto Press, p. 17.
3. PRIO, (2004) Reclaiming the Fields of War: Mainstreaming Mine Action in Development (p. 10): https://bit.ly/2McoXdn. 
4. IMAS 4.10 (Amendment 10, February 2019), p. 29: https://bit.ly/3juebM5.
5. Barlevi, Hanoch (2003) “The Mine Action/Mine Risk Education Integrated Approach,” Journal of Mine Action: Vol. 7 : Iss. 1, Article 38. https://bit.
ly/3htHWhk.
6. GICHD, Linking Mine Action and Development: Humanitarian and Development NGOs, 2008, p. 72. https://bit.ly/369kQps. 
7. Gasser, Russell (2008) “Linking Mine Action and Development: Local-level Benefits and Challenges,” The Journal of ERW and Mine Action: Vol. 12 : 
Iss. 2, Article 1. https://bit.ly/2Y7wj4C.
8. Paterson, Ted and Filippino, Eric (2006) “The Road to Mine Action and Development: The Life-Cycle Perspective of Mine Action,” Journal of Mine 
Action: Vol. 9: Iss. 2, Article 23. https://bit.ly/3c5cPWt. 
9. Van Der Linden, Filip (2006) “Mine Action and the Millennium Development Goals,” Journal of Mine Action: Vol. 9: Iss. 2, Article 24. https://bit.
ly/3644uPa. 
10. Hofmann, Ursign and Juergensen, Olaf (2017) “Preparing for the Future: How the SDGs Impact Mine Action,” The Journal of Conventional Weapons 
Destruction: Vol. 21: Iss. 3, Article 12. https://bit.ly/39Z3c8Z. 
11. Humanitarian Demining, Geneva International Centre for and Programme, United Nations Development, “Leaving no one Behind: Mine Action and 
the Sustainable Development Goals” (2017). https://bit.ly/2KFQZxq. 
12. Downs, Charles (2010) “Linking Mine Action and Economic Development,” The Journal of ERW and Mine Action: Vol. 14 : Iss. 1, Article 19. https://
bit.ly/3qHZMOT. 
13. Lundberg, John (2006) “Humanitarian Demining as a Precursor to Economic Development,” Journal of Mine Action: Vol. 9  Iss. 2, Article 22. https://
bit.ly/36aI4f3. 
14. Bogdanov N. and Nikolic A. 2013. Area Based Development Approach – Evidence from Border Rural Region Drina-Sava. Book of Proceedings from 
the Seminar Agriculture and Rural Development – Challenges of Transition and Integration Processes. Ed. N. Bogdanov and S. Stevanovic. Serbia, 
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Belgrade. https://bit.ly/2OvnwI3.
15. Santini F., S.S. Matus, G. Louwagie et al. 2012. Facilitating an Area-Based Development Approach in Rural Regions in the Western Balkans. Volume 1: 
Main Report. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union; Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. https://bit.
ly/37g8qNl. 
16. Pearce, C.J. (1999) “The Operational Implementation of the International Humanitarian Demining Development Concept,” Journal of Mine Action: 
Vol. 3: Iss. 1, Article 14. https://bit.ly/362jcpN. 
17. Harfst J. 2006. A Practitioner’s Guide to Area-Based Development Programming. p. 9-13. UNDP Regional Bureau for Europe & CIS. https://bit.
ly/2NxVnQ3. 
18. DG ECHO, Forgotten Crisis Assessment 2019: https://bit.ly/36GYn3P. 
19. Government of Ukraine, 2020, Mine Ban Treaty Article 5 Deadline Extension Request: https://bit.ly/2NBP51U. 
20. Landmine Monitor 2020 (p. 2; 36): https://bit.ly/3osj4GN. 
21. Due to the fact that Ukraine does not possess a state-run EO incident database DRC-DDG has been tracking EO accidents by collating open resource 
data since 2014: https://bit.ly/33K3QVg.
22. Crowther, Edward (2019) “Contamination in Eastern Ukraine: Observations by OSCE,” The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction: Vol. 2: Iss. 
1, Article 9. https://bit.ly/39efICx. 
23. Robinson, Toby and O’Keeffe, Rosanna (2019) “The Challenges of Humanitarian Mine Clearance in Ukraine,” The Journal of Conventional Weapons 
Destruction: Vol. 23: Iss. 1, Article 8. https://bit.ly/367DK08.
24. International Crisis Group. 2020. Peace in Ukraine (III): The Costs of War in Donbas. Europe Report No. 261. https://bit.ly/3fsmPJh.
25. Humanitarian Needs Overview: Ukraine. 2020. p. 24-25. https://bit.ly/3piX9CM. 
26. REACH, Protection Assessment of Isolated Settlements in Government-Controlled Areas Along the Contact Line, p. 33, (Ukraine: REACH, 2019), 
https://bit.ly/3kf8NMe. 
27. IMPACT. 2020. Area Based Risk Assessment: Popasna Raion, Luhansk Oblast, Eastern Ukraine. https://bit.ly/369d3rU. 
28. REACH, 2019, Economic Security Assessment: Government-Controlled Areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts Within 20km of the Contact Line. p. 
2. https://bit.ly/3odwRAG.  
29. Luhansk Oblast Development Strategy (2021-2027): https://bit.ly/2OJVLvL. 
30. These include Ukrainians (52%), Russians (40%), Belarusians (5%), and Moldovans (3%). Many are pensioners (40%) with some children (10%). 
Employed represent 30% of the settlement, mostly as farmers as well as miners, pharmacists, teachers, etc.
31. Data collected through DRC-DDG needs assessments between 2018 and 2021 through (phone and in-person) key informant interviews, focus group 
discussions, and participant observations.
32. By June 2021, DRC-DDG demining teams released 66,417 sq m of land and permanently marked 23,119 sq m of contamination in Komyshuvakha; 
their work will continue until autumn 2021.
33. In doing so, DRC-DDG EORE team reached 619 residents of Komyshuvakha by June 2021 (or 20% of the entire population): 42.3% male, 57.7% 
female; 14.7% children (between six and 11 years old), 14.2% adolescent (12 to 17 years old), 38.5% adults (18 to 59 years of age), and 32.6% elderly 
(60 years old and above).
34. The M&E system was designed to be both formative (field monitoring visits, programme quality checks, quality assurance and quality control, etc.) 
and summative (focusing on outcomes and capturing lessons learned). Moreover, participatory methodologies are being used, inclusive of needs as-
sessments, community meetings, collection and analyzes of feedback and concerns shared by beneficiaries via complains and reporting mechanism as 
well as through focus group discussions and key informant interviews.
35. Chiovelli, Giorgio, Michalopoulos, Stelios, and Papaioannou, Elias (2018) “Landmines and Spatial Development,” Working Paper 24758, National 
Bureau of Economic Research. https://bit.ly/3bvwii2.
36. Rasmussen, Ph.D., Lewis (2020) “Whither HMA Policy: Linking HMA and Development Assistance,” The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruc-
tion: Vol. 24: Iss. 1, Article 3. https://bit.ly/2M16YqA.
37. As seen at two events organized in 2021 by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (i.e., ‘Beyond Square Meters Cleared: Mine Ac-
tion and Development’: https://bit.ly/33Me4V5) and GICHD (i.e., ‘The Sustainable Development Outcomes of Mine Action in Jordan’: https://bit.
ly/3ynK8wT).
38. Due to delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the consequent quarantines as well as the winter stand-down period (with cold and snowy 
weather conditions preventing demining in eastern Ukraine) clearance continues until present day.
39. DRC-DDG legal assistance team was funded under a different donor.
Developing National Landmine Clearance Capacity in Ukraine by Tobias Hewitt and Ronan Shenhav [ from page 35 ]
1. Landmine Monitor, Annual Report 2020, p. 36–38, http://www.the-monitor.org/media/3168934/LM2020.pdf.
2. The most heavily contaminated areas are thought to be around Vinnytsia, Ternopil, Zhytomyr, Dnipro, Kyiv, Odesa and Kharkiv. The Crimean penin-
sula remains one of the areas most affected by ERW contamination from WWII. Landmine Monitor, Ukraine 1999, http://archives.the-monitor.org/
index.php/publications/display?act=submit&pqs_year=1999&pqs_type=lm&pqs_report=ukraine&pqs_section.
3. Until 2012 the called the Ministry of Emergency Situations.
4. Through the SES Department of Pyrotechnic Works and Humanitarian Demining.
5. Landmine Monitor, Ukraine 2014, http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2014/ukraine/mine-action.aspx.
6. Government of Ukraine, Official website of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, ‘Coordination of mine action activities’ (visited on 23 February 
2021), https://www.mil.gov.ua/diyalnist/protiminna-diyalnist/koordinacziya-protiminnoi-diyalnosti.html.
7. An inter-ministerial working group was up for this purpose in 2006. The Cabinet of Ministers Decree No. 131 of 18 February 2009 adopted the State 
Program for Demining by the Ministry of Emergency Situations for 2009–2014, foreseeing clearance of 15 km2 over five years with the destruction of 
500,000 items of ERW. In 2010, relevant ministries were tasked to forward proposals by to establish of a national body for demining and a presidential 
decree established a NMAA in 2013. Landmine Monitor, Ukraine 2014, http://www.the-monitor.org/en-gb/reports/2014/ukraine/mine-action.aspx.
8. Geneva International Center for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), United National Development Programme (UNDP), Organization for Security 
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), Danish Demining Group (DDG), Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD).
9. The Ukrainian Institute of Standardization order № 511 ‘On the adoption of national standards’ of December 19, 2018, adopted the national standard 
DSTU P 8820-1:2018 ‘Mine action. Management Processes. Basic Provisions,’ which entered into force on April 1, 2019. However these have not been 
operationalised. Government of Ukraine, Official website of the Ministry of Defence of Ukraine, ‘Coordination of mine action activities’ (visited on 
147
JMU: The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Issue 25.1
Published by JMU Scholarly Commons, 2021
THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION148
23 February 2021), https://www.mil.gov.ua/diyalnist/protiminna-diyalnist/koordinacziya-protiminnoi-diyalnosti.html.
Saving Lives in Eastern Ukraine: Alternative EORE Approaches by Olena Kryvova [ from page 43 ] 
1. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE PLAN UKRAINE, AT A GLANCE,” 25 No-
vember 2020, https://bit.ly/2OKDbDF.
2. United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “Ukraine Situation Report,” last updated 25 January 2021, https://bit.
ly/2NxQkzm.
3. The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, Review of New Technologies and Methodologies for Explosive Ordnance Risk Education 
(EORE) in Challenging Contexts, August 2020, https://bit.ly/3qqH12x.
4. БезМин,” Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/BezMin.info.
5. БезМин,” VKontakte, https://vk.com/bezmininfo.
Explosive Ordnance Risk Education in Ukraine during the COVID-19 Pandemic by Andro Mathewson and Asya Bolotova [ from page 
49 ]
1. Council on Foreign Relations. Conflict in Ukraine. Accessed May 21, 2021. https://on.cfr.org/3h4r53C  
2. UNOCHA. Humanitarian Needs Overview Ukraine. United Nations. February, 2021. https://bit.ly/3jJWfyS 
3. UNOCHA. Humanitarian Needs Overview Ukraine. United Nations, June, 2020. https://bit.ly/38IWJyT 
4. WHO. Ukraine: WHO Coronavirus Disease Dashboard. May 9. 2021. Accessed May 21, 2021. https://covid19.who.int/region/euro/country/ua.
5. UNMAS. Explosive Ordnance Risk Education (EORE). 2020. New York: United Nations 
6. The official definition of EORE is “activities which seek to reduce the risk of injury from EO by raising awareness of women, girls, boys, and men in 
accordance with their different vulnerabilities, roles, and needs, and promoting behavioral change. Core activities include public information dis-
semination, education, and training.”
7. “New Tech for Schools in Ukraine Lets Children Tap into Education.” UNICEF European Union, December 29, 2020. https://uni.cf/3kYVt0f  
8. UNICEF has been providing laptops to schools and children across Ukraine during the COVID-19 pandemic to help minimize the negative effects of 
the pandemic on education.
9. For further examples and an in-depth discussion of virtual reality as a tool for EORE, please see: GICHD. Review of New Technologies and Methodolo-
gies for EORE in Challenging Contexts. September 2020. 37-41. https://bit.ly/2WZ8MG6
Landmine Clearance and Socio-economic Development: A Study in Colombia by Oliver Ford, Amasia Zargarian, and Eric Keefer [ from 
page 53 ]
1. A department is the Colombian equivalent of a state in the United States.
2. AICMA downloadable spreadsheets, accessed May 2021.
3. “Clearing the Legacy of Conflict in Colombia.” The HALO Trust. https://bit.ly/3lBe431. 
4. A vereda is an administrative division within a municipality. It represents an important geographical demarcation for humanitarian mine action in 
Colombia.
Impact Caused by the COVID-19 Pandemic on Humanitarian Demining in Colombia by Salomé Valencia Aguirre, Angela De Santis, 
Ph.D., and Sebastián Tovar Jaramillo [ from page 60 ]
1. Johns Hopkins University, “COVID-19 Map - Johns Hopkins Coronavirus Resource Center Coronavirus,” day accessed 28 April, 2021, https://bit.
ly/3wzV9Jx.
2. Urrea-Ríos, Ivan Leonardo and Piraján, Jackeline, “Impacto de la pandemia covid-19 sobre la economía colombiana. Una pandemia temporal con 
efectos permanentes (Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the Colombian Economy. A Temporary Pandemic with Permanent Effects),” SSRN, 20 
August 2020, https://bit.ly/34mZ93X.
3. ONUMUJERES COLOMBIA, “Dimensiones de Género en la crisis del COVID-19 en Colombia: Impactos e implicaciones son diferentes para mu-
jeres y hombres,” https://bit.ly/2TlP8Sz.
4. Bindseil, Wolfgang and Mansfield, Ian (2020) “Mine Action in the Time of COVID-19: A Donor’s Perspective,” The Journal of Conventional Weapons 
Destruction 24, no. 2 (December 2020): 9–11, https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol24/iss2/4.
5. Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor 2020, https://bit.ly/3fkPNw6.
6. Tablero de Desminado Humanitario - OFICINA DEL ALTO COMISIONADO PARA LA PAZ - DESCONTAMINA COLOMBIA, Información de 
operaciones monitoreadas y aprobadas por el CEM con corte 2007 a 31 enero 2021, https://bit.ly/2RNaW9c.
7. ACAPS, COVID-19 Impact on humanitarian operations, April 2020.
8. Three international organizations (The HALO Trust, Humanity & Inclusion, Danish Demining Group), plus two national organizations.
9. Descontamina Colombia, https://bit.ly/3vvwaHq.
Moving the Story Forward: Utilizing Deminer Narratives to Increase Women’s Empowerment in Mine Action and Beyond by Brenna 
Matlock [ from page 64 ]
1. The study utilized the definition provided by John Creswell in Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches, “Phenom-
enological research is a design of inquiry…in which the researcher describes the lived experiences of individuals about a phenomenon as described 
by participants. This description culminates in the essence of the experiences for several individuals who have all experienced the phenomenon.” In 
this case, the lived experience of women who are deminers is examined in the study. 
2. According to The SAFE Encyclopedia of Communication Research Methods, “Rhetorical theory is fundamentally concerned with composition, forms, 
functions, means, venues, producers, audiences, effects, and criticism of discourse.” Rhetorical strategies and theories are utilized to examine the texts 
of both the public-facing documents and the women’s survey responses. 
3. The exception being South/Central America due to 1) the lesser number of demining operations in the region and the newness of the current demin-
ing programs such as those in Colombia.
4. Handling of all surveys and responses followed James Madison University Internal Review Board approved protocols to protect respondents’ data and 
anonymity. 
5. Calza Bini, Arianna; Janssen, Nyske; and Jones, Abigail (2014) “Effects of Mixed Teams on Land Release,” The Journal of ERW and Mine Action, 18:1, 
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Digital Rehabilitation Technologies Deliver Hope for Survivors by Abder Banoune [ from page 68 ]
1. “Landmine Monitor 2020, The Impact,” Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor, https://bit.ly/3iCpD8e.
2. Cieza A, Causey K, Kamenov K, Wulf Hanson S, Global estimates of the need for rehabilitation based on the Global Burden of Disease study 2019: a 
systematic analysis for the Global Burden of Disease Study 2019.
3. ATscale, “The Case for Investing in Assistive Technology,” 2020, https://bit.ly/3kJ93GK.
4. Canicave, Jerome, Danielle Tan, “Pilot Testing of 3D Printing Technology for Transtibial Prothesis in Complex Contexts (Togo, Madagascar, and 
Syria),” May 2017, https://bit.ly/3yCS79p. 
5. WHO, “Rehabilitation 2030: A Call for Action, The need to scale up rehabilitation,” 2018, https://bit.ly/34gFrqJ.
6. As it is shown by the Landmine and Cluster Munition Reports 2020, over the previous year casualties from cluster munition attacks were reported 
in Syria and Libya, while casualties due to cluster munition remnants were recorded in ten countries and other areas: Afghanistan, Iraq, Lao PDR, 
Lebanon, Serbia, South Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, as well as Nagorno-Karabakh and Western Sahara. Similarly, mine casualties in 2019 were identi-
fied in fifty-five states and other areas, of which thirty-six are States Parties to the Mine Ban Treaty. Action 38 of the OAP. Available here: https://bit.
ly/36TzNMk.
Mental Health: Taking a Proactive Approach to Support Staff in Mine Action by Laura Biscaglia, Abigail Jones, and Robert White [ 
from page 75 ]
1. This article uses the term “staff ” to refer to full-time, part-time, national, international, paid, voluntary, professional, technical, non-professional, and 
clerical staff. 
2. Semi-structured interviews were carried out with stakeholders from the mine action sector and experts on occupational health, mental health, and 
well-being in aid work. 
3. Working Well? Aid worker well-being and how to improve it, CHS Alliance, January 2020
4. Mental Health: Strengthening Our Response, World Health Organization, 30 March 2018
5. The authors recognize that the above definition of mental health frames gender identity in binary terms, which suggests the need for an update.
6. Mental Disorders, World Health Organizations, 28 November 2019
7. Factors associated with common mental health problems of humanitarian workers in South Sudan, H. Strohmeier et al., 2018; The Mental Health of 
Expatriate and Kosovar Albanian Humanitarian Aid Workers, B.L. Cardozo et al., 2005; Factors Associated With Adverse Mental Health Outcomes in 
Locally Recruited Aid Workers Assisting Iraqi Refugees in Jordan, C.B. Eriksson et al., 2013.
8. Resilience of Humanitarian Workers, P. Blanchetiere, 2006
9. Men’s Mental Health: Beyond Victim-Blaming, Rob Whitley, 2018 
10. Jachens, Liza (Research Associate, Psychology and Counseling Department, Webster University Geneva), interviewed by the authors on 26 April 
2021.
11. UNHCR’s Mental Health and Psychosocial Support for Staff, Courtney E. Welton et al., 2013
12. Ibid.
13. NGOs & Risk Manging Uncertainty in Local-International Partnership, Humantarian Outcomes, 2019. 
14. Gender-Based Violence and the Humanitarian Community, L. Wagener, Senior Consulting Psychologist, Headington Institute (https://bit.
ly/3hrZARM.) 
15. Managing Stress in Humanitarian Aid Workers: Guidelines for Good Practice, 3rd edition, Antares Foundation, 2012.
16. Managing the Security of Aid Workers with Diverse Profiles, European Interagency Security Forum, 2018.
17. LGBTQ Mental Health: International Perspectives and Experiences. N. Nakamura and C.H. Logie (Eds.), 2020.
18. Managing the Security of Aid Workers with Diverse Profiles, European Interagency Security Forum, 2018.
19. Gender Differences in PTSD: Susceptibility and Resilience, J. Hu, B. Feng, Y. Zhu, W. Wang, J. Xie and X. Zheng, 2016; Gender Differences in Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder, M. Olff, W. Langeland, N. Draijer, and B.P.R. Gersons, 2007
20. Gender Differences in Depression in Representative National Samples: Meta-Analyses of Diagnoses and Symptoms, R.H. Salk, J.S. Hyde, and L.Y. 
Abramson, 2017; Why Is Depression More Prevalent in Women?, Paul R. Albert, 2015
21. Gender Differences in Anxiety Disorders: Prevalence, Course of Illness, Comorbidity and Burden of Illness, C.P. McLean, A. Asnaani, B.T. Litz and 
S.G. Hofmann, 2011; Sex differences in depression and anxiety disorders: Potential biological determinants, M. Altemus, 2006
22. Gender-Based Differences in Burnout: Issues Faced by Women Physicians, Kim Templeton et al., 2019
23. Mental Health and Substance Use: Gender and Women’s Mental Health, World Health Organization, 2015
24. According to Humanitarian Outcomes’ Aid Worker Security Database, major attacks against humanitarian workers in 2019 surpassed all previous 
years on record, with national staff bearing the brunt of these attacks. “UNMAS Afghanistan and DMAC Strongly Condemn Brutal Murder of an 
Afghan Deminer in Nangarhar – Afghanistan,” Reliefweb, 12 September 2017. https://bit.ly/3xmmPSf
25. UNMAS Afghanistan and DMAC Strongly Condemn Brutal Murder of an Afghan Deminer in Nangarhar – Afghanistan,” Reliefweb, 12 September 
2017. https://bit.ly/3xmmPSf
26. Landmine Monitor 2019, Casualties. Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor, https://bit.ly/37h5cZg.
27. Explosive ordnance disposal personnel in the U.S. military have higher risk of insomnia and post-traumatic stress disorder: a large retrospective 
cohort study, Lin Otto, Smolenski, Stewart, Workman, Kincaid, Belsher, Bush, Evatt, 2021
28. A survey conducted by Mines Action Canada in 2019 concluding that approximately 80% of field operations or national staff are men and 19% are 
women. https://www.minesactioncanada.org/bythenumbers. 
29. The Impact of Masculinity on Mental Health, Ross, Bozynski, Johnson, Abraham, Human Journals Case Study, January 2020 Vol.:14, Issue:3 
30. Men’s Mental Health: Beyond Victim-Blaming, Rob Whitley, 2018.
31. A proactive approach: Examples for integrating disaster risk reduction and mental health and psychosocial support programming, Brandon Gray, 
Julian Eaton, Jayakumar Christy, Joshua Duncan, Fahmy Hanna, & Sekar Kasi, International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 54, 2021 
32. IMAS 07.14, Risk Management in Mine Action
33. IMAS 10.10 Safety & occupational health - General requirements
34. Ibid.
35. Humanitarian Aid Workers Mental Health and Duty of Care, Liza Jachens, 2019.
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36. Presenteeism refers to the lost productivity that occurs when employees are not fully functioning in the workplace because of an illness, injury, or 
other condition. Even though the employee may be physically at work, they may not be able to fully perform their duties and are more likely to make 
mistakes on the job. Although not tracked like absenteeism, the costs of presenteeism have been estimated to be larger in real terms as employees 
suffering from longer-term conditions see persistent drops in productivity. It is important to note that employees contributing to presenteeism are, 
by definition, trying to give their best efforts but are physically or mentally unable to do so. Definition taken from ‘Presenteeism A review of current 
thinking’, Garrow Valerie, 2016
37. “Leading Well: Aid leader perspectives on staff well-being and organisational culture,” CHS Alliance, ICVA, April 2021, https://bit.ly/3jpZhai. 
38. Oscar Kilo, home of the national police wellbeing service. https://oscarkilo.org.uk/
39. Blue Light Wellbeing Framework, College of Policing, 2020
40. Mental health services in Cambodia: an overview, Sarah J Parry and Ewan Wilkinson, 2019.
41. Mental Health & Psychosocial Support, Humanity and Inclusion, https://bit.ly/3fOn3Mp.
An Innovative Approach to the Mental Health Needs of Humanitarian Mine Action Personnel by Ken Falke, Bret A. Moore, Psy.D., 
ABPP, and Richard Tedeschi, Ph.D. [ from page 81]
1. Institute of Medicine. (2014). Treatment for posttraumatic stress disorder in military and veteran populations: Final assessment. The National Acad-
emies Press. 
2. Lewis-Schroeder, N., Kathryn, K., Murphy, B., Wolff, J., Robinson, M., & Kaufman, M. (2018). Conceptualization, Assessment, and Treatment of 
Traumatic Stress in First Responders: A Review of Critical Issues. Harvard Review of Psychiatry, 26, 216-227. 
3. Wisco, B. E., Marx, B. P., Wolf, E. J., Miller, M. W., Southwick, S. M., & Pietrzak, R. H. (2014). Posttraumatic stress disorder in the U.S. veteran popu-
lation: Results from the national health and resilience in veterans study. The Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, 75(12), 1338–1346
4. Moore, B. A., & Penk, W. E. (2019). Treating PTSD in military personnel: A clinical handbook (2nd ed.). Guilford Press.
5. Kehle-Forbes, S. M., Meis, L. A., Spoont, M. R., & Polusny, M. A. (2016). Initiation and dropout from prolonged exposure and cognitive processing 
therapy in a VA outpatient clinic. Psychological Trauma: Theory, Research, Practice, and Policy, 8(1), 107–114. 
6. Schnurr, P. P., Friedman, M. J., Engel, C. C., Foa, E. B., Shea, M. T., Chow, B. K., Resick, P. A., Thurston, V., Orsillo, S. M., Haug, R., Turner, C., & 
Bernardy, N. (2007). Cognitive behavioral therapy for posttraumatic stress disorder in women: A randomized controlled trial. Journal of the American 
Medical Association, 297(8), 820–823.
7. Steenkamp, M. M., Litz, B. T., Hoge, C. W., & Marmar, C. R. (2015). Psychotherapy for military-related PTSD: A review of randomized clinical trials. 
Journal of the American Medical Association, 314(5), 489–500. 
8. Tedeschi, R. G., & Calhoun, L. G. (1996). The posttraumatic growth inventory: Measuring the positive legacy of trauma. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 9, 
455– 471.
9. Tedeschi, R. G., & Moore, B. A. (2020). Posttraumatic growth as an integrative therapeutic philosophy. Journal of Psychotherapy Integration. Advance 
online publication. https://doi.org/10.1037/int0000250.
10. Moore, B. A., Tedeschi, R. G., & Greene, T. C. (2021). A preliminary examination of a posttraumatic growth-based program for veteran mental 
health. Practice Innovations, 6(1), 42–54.
Data Driven Decision Making in Southeast Asia by Mikael Bold and David Avenell [ from page 85 ]
1. “About ESRI | The Science of Where,” ESRI, last modified 27 November 2020, https://bit.ly/2NyFpFJ. 
2. “Bombing Missions of the Vietnam War, A visual record of the largest aerial bombardment in history,” ESRI, https://bit.ly/38N3Wyn.
3. “Data Stories: An Overview of THOR,” https://bit.ly/3qIPb6C.
4. Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, A Study of Manual Mine Clearance, August 2005, https://bit.ly/3kA13pv.
5. “IMAS 07.12 Quality Management in Mine Action,” International Mine Action Standards, July 2016, https://bit.ly/3pYKgxl.
6. “IMAS 07.14 Risk Management in Mine Action,” International Mine Action Standards, February 2019, https://bit.ly/2MqziTo.
7. “IMAS 05.10 Information Management in Mine Action,” International Mine Action Standards, February 2020, https://bit.ly/3kpzEpS.
8. Mine Action Review, Clearing the Mines 2018, October 2018, https://bit.ly/37Pa74r.
9. “Humanitarian Demining Research and Development Program Home,” United States Department of Defense Humanitarian Demining R&D Pro-
gram, https://bit.ly/3uHWpKG.
10. “IMSMA Core | Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining,” https://bit.ly/3dIFEZL.
Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for Land Release and Stockpile Destruction Operations – Notes on a New Technical Note for Mine 
Action by Roly Evans and David Hewitson [ from page 91 ] 
1. Minutes of the IMAS Review Board. March 2021. Available at: https://bit.ly/3gODVCF.
2. Minutes of the IMAS Review Board. February 2020. Available at: https://bit.ly/3mO9LmV.
3. Danish Church Aid (DCA), Danish Demining Group (DDG), Swiss Foundation for Mine Action (FSD), The HALO Trust, Mines Advisory Group 
(MAG), Mine Action Review, Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA), Handicap and Inclusion (HI), United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS).
4. Technical Note for Mine Action. 07.11/02. Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for Land Release and Stockpile Destruction Operations. Edition 01. 
February 2021. pp.13-15. Available at: https://bit.ly/2WAY1cs.
5. Technical Note for Mine Action. 07.11/02. Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for Land Release and Stockpile Destruction Operations. Edition 01. 
February 2021. p9. Available at: https://bit.ly/38sHaeD.
6. International Mine Action Standard 07.11. Land Release. Edition 01. Amendment 05. March 2019. Available at: https://bit.ly/3gOoWsJ.
150
The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 25, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 1
https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol25/iss1/1
25TH ANNIVERSARY ISSUE @ SUMMER 2021 151
7. Suspected Hazardous Area. Confirmed Hazardous Area.
8. The wording for the CANCELLED common counting rule tries to take into account scenarios where an initial misjudgement as to the minefield loca-
tion has been made, the mine rows are found outside of the original SHA or CHA.
9. Technical Note for Mine Action. 07.11/02. Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for Land Release and Stockpile Destruction Operations. Edition 01. 
February 2021. p.12. Available at: https://bit.ly/3yy0tOi.
10. Technical Note for Mine Action. 07.11/02. Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for Land Release and Stockpile Destruction Operations. Edition 01. 
February 2021. p.12. Available at: https://bit.ly/3mNw10h.
11. Technical Note for Mine Action. 07.11/02. Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for Land Release and Stockpile Destruction Operations. Edition 01. 
February 2021. p.12. Available at: https://bit.ly/38tkT0e.
12. “The term ‘Common Counting Rules‘ (CCRs) refers to a standardised way of defining and counting a given unit of mine action operational data. Use 
of CCRs minimises the risk of outputs being reported in an inconsistent way. CCRs allow data comparison through the application of a ‘like-for-like’ 
principle. CCRs exist for cancelled, reduced and cleared m².” Technical Note for Mine Action. 07.11/02. Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) for Land 
Release and Stockpile Destruction Operations. Edition 01. February 2021. p.7. Available at: https://bit.ly/3zwWD9p.
13. International Mine Action Standard 07.11. Land Release. Edition 01. Amendment 05. March 2019. Available at: https://bit.ly/3gQVH8r.
14. International Mine Action Standard 08.10. Non-Technical Survey.  Edition 01. Amendment 04. February 2019. Available at: https://bit.ly/3ta3fZ2.
15. International Mine Action Standard 08.20. Technical Survey. Edition 01. Amendment 05. 19 March 2019. Available at: https://bit.ly/3gQivW1.
16. International Mine Action Standard 04.10. Glossary of mine action terms, definitions and abbreviations. Edition 02. Amendment 10. 19 March 2019. 
Available at: https://bit.ly/3tf5PwZ.
17. ECORYS Nederland BV. Advice for Donors on Setting up and Running mine action programmes Lot No 4 -Sectorial and project evaluations – CON-
TRACT FOR SERVICES No. 2006/128168Version 1. p.31. Available at: https://bit.ly/3yrukI4.
18. E. Filippino and T. Paterson. Mine Action Lessons and Challenges: Is Mine Action Making A Difference or Avoiding the Question? Journal of Mine 
Action. Volume 09. Issue 1. 2005. pp.23-24. Available at: https://bit.ly/3gO6rVe.
19. Oslo Action Plan. Fourth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention Oslo 25-29 November 2019. Available 
at: https://bit.ly/3yvidtx.
A Virtual Reality Application for the Training of Deminers by Lynn Al Khansa, Elias Bou Saada, Rachid Maalouf, 
Mohammed Al-Husseini, Ph.D., Ali El-Hajj, Ph.D., Mohammed Baydoun, Ph.D., and Hassan Ghaziri, Ph.D. [ from page 97 ]
1. Gladstone, Niel. “VR is making medical training cheaper, better, and more accessible than ever,” Digital Trends, 1 March 2020, https://bit.ly/2Wojc1S.
2. “Oculus Quest 2: Our Most Advanced New All-in-One VR Headset,” Oculus Quest, https://ocul.us/3Dq9gFJ.
3. “MIL-D1 Ground Search Metal Detector,” CEIA USA demonstration video, https://bit.ly/3jobpK8.
4. “VR Demining,” YouTube video announcing the VRDT and showing some of its working aspects, 13 April 2020, https://bit.ly/3ytzymQ, accessed 27 
August 2021.
Recognizing and Reducing Risks From Ammunition and Explosives by Martina Salini and Samuel Paunila [ from page 102 ]
1. “Ammunition Safety Management: Preventing loss of life and property, and diversion from stockpiles,” Counter-IED Report, 2016; characterization of 
explosive weapons (Explosive Weapon Effects: Final Report, GICHD, 2017); the policy and political environment (“Increasing Efforts in SSMA: What 
Does It Take?” The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, 2018); available good practice guidance (Critical Path Guide to the International 
Ammunition Technical Guidelines, UN SaferGuard, 2018); guidance with national standards and norms (A Guide to Developing National Standards 
for Ammunition Management, UN SaferGuard, 2018); and international cooperation and assistance (“Ammunition Stockpile Management: A Global 
Challenge Requiring Global Responses,” The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, 2019.
2. The International Ammunition Technical Guidelines define explosive ordnance as ”all munitions containing explosives, nuclear fission or fusion 
materials and biological and chemical agents. This includes bombs and warheads; guided and ballistic missiles; artillery, mortar, rocket and small 
arms ammunition; all mines, torpedoes and depth charges; pyrotechnics; clusters and dispensers; cartridge and propellant actuated devices; electro-
explosive devices; clandestine and improvised explosive devices; and all similar or related items or components explosive in nature.”
3. Bevan, J. (2008), Ammunition-related Political Developments, In Conventional Ammunition in Surplus: A Reference Guide. Small Arms Survey, Gradu-
ate Institute of International Studies p. 12
4. https://unsaferguard.org/
5. Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (2018) Towards Security, Peace and Sustainable Development: The State of Play and Secure 
Management of Ammunition, Geneva, pp. 27-30.
6. National Reports on the implementation of the Programme of Action on small arms and light weapons (PoA) and the International Tracing Instru-
ment (ITI): Albania (2020), Bosnia and Herzegovina (2020), Central African Republic (2020), Colombia (2020), Côte d’Ivoire (2020), Jamaica (2020), 
Kenya (2020), Madagascar (2020), Montenegro (2020), Namibia (2020)
7. Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (2018) Towards Security, Peace and Sustainable Development: The State of Play and Secure 
Management of Ammunition, Geneva, pp. 8-9
8. UNGA (2017), Countering the threat posed by improvised explosive devices, UN Doc. A/RES/72/36, pp. 1-2
9. The Small Arms Survey (SAS) recorded 242 UEMs incidents over the period 2010-2019, out of which 39 took place in Africa, 16 in the Americas, 116 
in Asia, 70 in Europe, and 1 in Oceania. See: Small Arms Survey, UEMS in Residential Areas, Fact Sheet, March 2020. Available at http://www.smal-
larmssurvey.org/fileadmin/docs/V-Fact-sheets/SAS-Fact-Sheet-UEMS.pdf
10. Conflict Armament Research (2018), Conventional Ammunition Diversion, Conflict Armament Research Ltd., London. Available at https://www.
conflictarm.com/download-file/?report_id=3070&file_id=3072)/, p. 27
11. Action on Armed Violence (2018), Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Monitor 2018 (London: AOAV), pp. 27-28. Available at https://aoav.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2019/05/Explosive-Violence-Monitor-2018-v5.pdf. Last accessed 24 May 2021
12. United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (2015), IATG: Introduction to risk management principles and processes, mod. 02.10. Available at https://
s3.amazonaws.com/unoda-web/wp-content/uploads/2019/05/IATG-02-10-Introduction-to-Risk-Management-Principles-V.2.pdf
13. Paunila, S. and Hoole, A. (2016), Ammunition Safety Management | Preventing loss of life and property and diversion from stockpiles. Global CWD 
Repository. 131, p. 2 
14. GICHD Strategy 2019-2022
15. United Nations Office of Disarmament Affairs (2015), IATG: Introduction to risk management principles and processes, mod. 02.10. https://bit.
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ly/3lkGTjV. 
16. United Nations Saferguard Programme (2019), A Guide to Developing National Standards, p. 16, https://bit.ly/39126cL.  
17. AMAT advice and services are triggered with a request for assistance from a state or an organization. The analysis of the request often warrants desk 
research and a risk assessment, resulting in the design of a response package or a programme for the state to reduce risks from ammunition and 
explosives in the short and long term
18. The course covered the following modules of the IATG: IATG 01.10 Introduction to the IATG; Ammunition Safety Management – Theory of Explo-
sives and Ammunition Classification, Causes of Explosions; IATG 01.50 UN Hazard Classification System; IATG 02.10 Introduction to Risk Manage-
ment Principles and Processes; IATG 03.20 Lotting and Batching; IATG 02.20 NEQ Quantity Distance calculation exercises; IATG 02.30 Explosive 
Limit Licensing; IATG 09.10 Security of Ammunition Storage Areas; IATG 06.20/30 Storage and Handling; and IATG 05.30 Barricades. 
19. As per the feedback compiled to date 27 May 2021, from sixty-two trained army officers ranked from lieutenant to general (fourteen women, forty-
eight men).
20. The PNDHD is the national authority responsible for ammunition management in Mauritania.
21. The countries supporting Moldova were organised under the Multinational Small Arms and Ammunition Group (MSAG) and include Austria, Cana-
da, Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United States.
22. Approximately 1,900 metric tons of ammunition have been destroyed since 2004.
23. Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives (CBRNE).
24. OCHA/UNDAC (United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination team), unpublished daily situation reports, 20-25 March 2021.
25. Contact AMAT via amat.gichd.org or UNSaferGuard.org
26. For example; Arms Trade Treaty Voluntary Trust Fund (ATT VTF), The Saving Lives Entity (SALIENT), UN Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation 
on Arms Regulation (UNSCAR), etc.
Alternatives to Open Burning and Open Detonation: The Disparity Between HMA and Commercial Best Practices by Linsey 
Cottrell and Kendra Dupuy [ from page 107 ]
1. USEPA (2017a). Technical fact sheet – 2,4,6-trinitrotoluene (TNT), https://bit.ly/3dhNARo.
2. USEPA (2017b). Technical fact sheet hexahydro-1,3,5-trinitro-1,3,5-triazine (RDX), https://bit.ly/2NcAuKt.
3. USEPA (2017c). Technical fact sheet – dinitrotoluene (DNT), https://bit.ly/2N0FnXf.
4. NATO, Environmental Impact of Munition and Propellant Disposal, Final Report of Task Group AVT-115, February 2010, Research and Technology 
Organisation North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, https://bit.ly/2ZgpHBA.
5. In accordance with Section 1421 of the National Defence Authorisation Act for Fiscal Year 2017, National Academies of Sciences study on conven-
tional munitions demilitarization alternative technologies.
6. National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, Alternatives for the Demilitarization of Conventional Munitions, (Washington, DC: The 
National Academies Press, 2019. https://bit.ly/2Ny3xIb.
7. Under contract frameworks let through the NATO Support and Procurement Agency (NSPA)
8. IMAS 09.60 Underwater Survey and Clearance of Explosive Ordnance, First Edition, December 2014, https://bit.ly/3bapd5y. 
9. Sei-Him Cheong et al., National Physics Laboratory, Final report: Characterisation of acoustic fields generated by UXO removal, June 2020, https://bit.
ly/2Zg3mUC.
10. “Dumped Munitions,” Quality Status Report 2010, OSPAR Commission, https://bit.ly/2ZkIlrS.
11. “KBA Data,” Key Biodiversity Areas, https://bit.ly/3rVojR9. 
12. International Ammunition Technical Guideline, IATG 10.10, Demilitarization and destruction of conventional ammunition, 2nd edition, February 
2015. https://bit.ly/2ZheJvp.
13. For example, scrap steel prices rose from US$367 per tonne in Jan. 2018 to US$420 in January 2021, figures from London Metal Exchange, https://bit.
ly/3jSUEVH.
14. USEPA, Alternative Treatment Technologies to Open Burning and Open Detonation of Energetic Hazardous Wastes, December 2019, https://bit.
ly/3qrMcPR.
15. “Explosive Harvesting Program,” Golden West Humanitarian Foundation, updated 8 January, 2021, https://bit.ly/2N7JrVv.
First Steps to Limiting Conflict Pollution in Central Vietnam by Allan Vosburgh [ from page 112 ]
1. Vosburgh, Allan, “Providing IMAS Training to Local Military Forces and Mitigating Long-Term ERW Risks in Vietnam,” The Journal of Conventional 
Weapons Destruction, Feb 2020, https://bit.ly/3nsxbyB. 
2. Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, “Developing Policies for Management of Residual Explosive Remnants of War (MORE),” 
Geneva, Switzerland, Page 3.
Measuring Explosive Munitions Use with Open Source Data: A New Tool for Enhancing Humanitarian Mine Action by Jonathan 
Robinson and Christoph Baade [ from page 116 ]
1. Human Rights Watch (HRW), Explosive Weapons Devastating Civilians: International Action Needed to Curtail Deaths, Long-Term Harm in Populated 
Areas (Feb 2020). Accessed from https://bit.ly/3k8WuUu. on 1 May 2020.
2. Geneva International Center for Humanitarian De-mining (GICHD), Explosive Remnants of War (ERW) Definitions (Nov 2001). Accessed from 
https://bit.ly/3z7MhM0. 
3. Action on Armed Violence (AOAV), The Reverberating Effects of Explosive Weapon Use in Syria (Jan 2019), Page 4. Accessed from https://bit.
ly/2YTXiUY.  
4. The Carter Center is a nongovernmental organization guided by the principles of Founders Jimmy and Rosalynn Carter. Founded in partnership with 
Emory University, on a fundamental commitment to human rights and the alleviation of human suffering, The Carter Center has helped to improve 
the lives of people in more than eighty countries by resolving conflicts, advancing democracy and human rights, preventing diseases, and improving 
mental health.
5. The Explosive Munitions Use in Syria Project is run by the Syria Conflict Mapping Project, part of The Carter Center’s Conflict Resolution Program on 
Supporting Peace in Syria.
6. As opposed to the common practice of counting the conflict event itself, which can contain multiple explosive munition uses.
7. The Carter Center, Explosive Weapons Contamination in Syria, Report 1; Southern Syria: As Sweida, Daraa and Quneitra Governorates (Nov 2019), 
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The Carter Center, Explosive Weapons Contamination in Syria, Report 2; Damascus and Rural Damascus (Jan 2020), The Carter Center, Explosive 
Weapons Contamination in Syria, Report 3: Northwest Syria: Aleppo, Idleb, and Latakia Governorates (Aug 2020), and The Carter Center, Explosive 
Weapons Contamination in Syria, Report 4: Northeast Syria: Al Hassakeh, Ar Raqqa, and Deir Ez Zor Governorates (November 2020). Accessed from 
https://bit.ly/3Ecb05G and 
8. Although it is understood that the data study alone cannot fully predict explosive weapons contamination as a variety of conditions are needed for the 
formation of this such as firing conditions, weather, ground type and age of munitions (to name some).
9. These weapons types are general such as air launched, ground launched shelling, rather than specific weapons manufacturers. It is also understood 
that a variety of factors contribute to the formation of explosive weapons contamination, not just where high levels of bombardments have occurred.
10. The advantage of the study being that the distribution of explosive munitions is focused on rather than the exact number of items in it.
11. Given that it takes considerable time and effort to verify or confirm an event or munition use.
12. For example, the data from the project could identify and establish suspected hazardous areas (SHA) polygons which could then later be entered in 
IMSMA and followed up by non-technical surveys.
13. As the project helps; 1) assist in raising awareness and prioritization of potential high risk areas of UXO contamination in Syria for risk education, 2) 
assist with prioritizing areas for on the risk mitigation activities and ground surveys as part of the initial stage of mine action, 3) support advocacy 
efforts in the de-mining sector and donor levels, 4) bring together key decision makers from all sides of a conflict, 5) highlight the need for an effec-
tive long term policy response and 6) contribute to reducing the threat posed by explosive munitions and the lasting impact it has to people living in 
affected areas. 
14. For example, IMMAP, The Mosul Dashboard: Explosive Incidents (Oct 2016). Accessed from https://bit.ly/3huWZGt.  
15. For example, Humanity and Inclusion (HI), The Use of Explosive Weapons in Syria; A Time Bomb in the Making (May 2015). Accessed from https://bit.
ly/3ljXJPT . 
16. The Carter Center’s reports explain more about the data used. See The Carter Center, Explosive Weapons Contamination in Syria, Report 2; Damascus 
and Rural Damascus (Jan 2020), Page 3. Accessed from https://bit.ly/2YIOhOk . 
17. For more details about this method, see The Carter Center, Explosive Weapons Contamination in Syria, Report 2; Damascus and Rural Damascus (Jan 
2020), Page 3 - 4. Accessed from https://bit.ly/3CapDF0 . 
18. Such as with the limited accuracy and trust of open source data, and the method likely under-counting the number of explosive munitions in a given 
conflict event, especially if no exact number of munitions was given.
19. This is as detailed as the study goes. It does not specify the exact weapon type used or manufacturer. For more information please see the aforemen-
tioned Carter Center reports.
20. The study was presented to members of the UNMAS Humanitarian Mine Action Syria Working Group in Amman on 15 September 2019 after be-
ing invited to do so. This built on a proof of concept study focused on Eastern Ghouta and in Yemen in 2018 conducted by one of the authors.  In 
addition, at least 8 HMA actors focused on Syria have expressed interest in using the findings and method of the project for their work in Syria. Two 
HMA actors are currently testing the validity of the findings in their activities on the ground, while one has built in the method outlined in this proj-
ect to enhance their own desk assessment process. 
21. The advantage of the study being that the distribution of explosive munitions is focused on rather than the exact number of items in it.
22. Map from The Carter Center, Explosive Weapons Contamination in Syria, Report 1; Southern Syria: As Sweida, Daraa and Quneitra Governorates (Nov 
2019), Accessed from https://bit.ly/2XcJvbH.  
23. A reasonable assumption based on previous studies such as RAND Corporation, Unexploded Ordnance Clean Up Costs; Implications of Alternative 
Protocols, (2005), Accessed from https://bit.ly/3npvIZX.  
24. With this count likely much higher given the limitations of the data, methodology and way UXO is formed.
25. Partly available from open sources.
26. This is in addition to various issues such as lack of international appetite for funding in government areas of Syria, sanctions and terrorism laws ap-
plied to Syria, and limited access into the country and within for entities that conduct de-mining.
27. Such as Ukraine, Libya or in Yemen, where one of the authors conducted a pilot version of the explosive munitions project with Halo Trust in late 
2018.
28. As The Carter Center did in January 2020 and mentioned in the following source The Carter Center, Using Conflict Data to Help Demining Efforts in 
Syria (Aug 2020), Accessed from https://www.cartercenter.org/news/features/p/conflict_resolution/using-conflict-data-for-demining-in-syria.html 
on 30 January 2021.
29. This often underutilized field was developed in the early 2000s from contexts in the 1990s, before being further enhanced in the mid 2010s. Two key 
reports on this topic that contains numerous examples of HMA being used in peacebuilding are 1) Geneva International Center for Humanitarian 
De-mining (GICHD), Mine Action and Mediation (Oct 2016). Accessed from https://bit.ly/3ht2s0m  2) International Peace Research Institute (PIRO), 
Preparing the Ground for Peace – Mine Action in Support of Peace Building (Feb 2004). Accessed from https://bit.ly/3lkFUAb.  
30. The completed project will span five reports and visualize and analyze a dataset of hundreds of thousands of explosive munitions uses extrapolated 
from tens of thousands of conflict events. This will cover thousands of communities in the 14 governorates of Syria from July 2013 until the present 
day. This data will be freely available from The Carter Center Syria Program on request. The Carter Center is expected to regularly update the dataset 
in the future as part of a routine maintenance of the project to keep it relevant.
31. They are currently seeking to develop a pilot project in Ukraine, develop other information layers to be used in the project as well as its wider use in 
the peacebuilding sector.
Management in Iraq by Mark Wilkinson, Ph.D. [ from page 120 ]
1. “IEDs and Urban Clearance Variables in Mosul:  Defining Complex Environments,” The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 23, Issue 
2, pp. 13-20, July, 2019, https://bit.ly/3k8cbLs.  
2. “IED Threat Consistency, Predictability Suggest a ‘Simple’ Model for Clearance,” The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 23, Issue 2, 
pp. 7-12, July, 2019, https://bit.ly/3C7aMLf.  
3. UNMAS data current as of June 7, 2021.
4. “The Lethality Index: Re-Conceptualizing IED Clearance Planning and Delivery in Iraq,” The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 24, 
Issue 1, pp. 38-44, https://bit.ly/390izy9.  
5. “Connecting the Dots: The Pace of IED Clearance Seen as Key Factor to Safe Return of 1.67 Million Displaced Iraqis,” Counter IED Report, Autumn, 
2019, pp. 17-22, https://bit.ly/3k5p1dm. 
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6. Author’s note:  The term “effects based operations” originated in a military context and is attributed to Lt General David A. Deptula, USAF (Ret), 
principal author of the first Gulf War air campaign.  In generic terms, the concept effects-based operations emphasizes end-state goals first, and then 
focuses on the means available to achieve those goals, recognizing that these means can vary.  
7. The Lethality Index: Re-Conceptualizing IED Clearance Planning and Delivery in Iraq,” The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Vol. 24, 
Issue 1, pp. 38-44, https://bit.ly/2XjATQg.  
8. Ibid., pp. 38-40.
Managing Risk Through Transparency and Cooperation: Improving Lebanon’s PSSM Capacity by Jamie McGhee [ from page 125 ] 
1. “SAS-Fact-Sheet-UEMS.pdf,” Small Arms Survey, https://bit.ly/3zoIU4s.
2. “Risk Reduction Checklist,” UN SaferGuard, https://bit.ly/3sQm8Qm.
3. “Safety standards for electrical installations,” IATG 05.40, https://bit.ly/38lcFHj.
4. The term “compatibility group” refers to a grouping identified by a letter which, when referenced to a compatibility table, shows those explosives 
which may be stored or transported together without significantly increasing the probability of an accident or, for a given quantity, the magnitude of 
the effects of such an accident. Codes are used to indicate which natures may be safely stored together.
5. “UN explosive hazard classification system and codes,” IATG 01.50, https://bit.ly/3yqsVBs.
6. “Types of buildings for explosives facilities,” IATG 05.20, https://bit.ly/38fBswF.
7. The term “hazard class” refers to the UN recommended system of nine classes for identifying dangerous goods. Class 1 identifies explosives.
8. The term “hazard division” refers to the UN classification system that identifies hazardous substances.
9. “UN explosive hazard classification system and codes,” IATG 01.50, https://bit.ly/3jm9Mwj.
10. “Quantity Distance Calculator,” UNSaferGuard, https://bit.ly/2WpHys2.
11. A PES is any stock of explosives, however or wherever stored (building, stack, vehicle, railway wagon, berth, transit shed etc), the explosion of which 
will affect an exposed site. “Quantity Distances and Licensing Criteria, JSP 482 Edition 4, Chapter 10,” https://bit.ly/3gFueXb. 
12. “The Beirut Port Explosion,” Forensic Architecture, https://bit.ly/3DpXXgL.
13. Morris, Loveday, “Beirut needs billions of dollars it doesn’t have to rebuild after massive blast,” The Washington Post, 21 August 2020, https://wapo.
st/3mBLaS7.
14. “MAG’s mission to keep explosives safe in Lebanon,” MAG International, 29 March 2021, https://bit.ly/3ymEbig.
Assisting Landmine Survivors in Yemen by Elise Becker and Tamara Klingsheim [ from page 129 ]
1. “Yemen: Casualties,” Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor, https://bit.ly/37WJ4UF
2. “Yemen: Mine Action,” Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor, https://bit.ly/3j5onvO
Remote Sensing and Artificial Intelligence in the Mine Action Sector
by Martin Jebens and Rob White [ from page 134 ]
1. Baur, Jasper, Gabriel Steinberg, Alex Nikulin, Kenneth Chiu, and Timothy S. de Smet 2020. “Applying Deep Learning to Automate UAV-Based Detec-
tion of Scatterable Landmines” Remote Sensing 12, no. 5: 859. https://bit.ly/3t3c7iQ.
2. Nikulin, Alex, Timothy S. De Smet, Jasper Baur, William D. Frazer, and Jacob C. Abramowitz 2018. “Detection and Identification of Remnant PFM-1 
‘Butterfly Mines’ with a UAV-Based Thermal-Imaging Protocol” Remote Sensing 10, no. 11: 1672. https://bit.ly/3DEmy1q.
3. Smet, Timothy & Nikulin, Alex. (2018). “Catching ‘butterflies’ in the morning: A new methodology for rapid detection of aerially deployed plastic 
land mines from UAVs.” 37. 10.1190/tle37050306.1. https://bit.ly/3BAOm51.
4. Jebens, Martin; Sawada, Ph.D., Hideyuki; Shen, Junjie; and Tollefsen, Erik (2020) “To What Extent Could the Development of an Airborne Thermal 
Imaging Detection System Contribute to Enhance Detection?,” The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction: Vol. 24 : Iss. 1, Article 14. 
https://bit.ly/3yvHvaR.
5. “#Drones for Good,” ARPAS Magazine, April 2020, Iss. 11, https://bit.ly/2WKxIRp.
6. Big data is a concept in computer science that broadly covers the collection, storage, analysis, processing and interpretation of enormous amounts of 
different data (in MA context this could be data collected during NTS; satellite images, remote sensing data, white papers, positions of different ob-
jects) The data-sets are too large or complex to be dealt with by traditional data processing software’s.
7. “History of Information Management System for Mine Action,” Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining, https://bit.ly/2WK6IBF.
8. “Handbook on data protection in humanitarian action,” International Committee of the Red Cross,” https://bit.ly/3zAzbId.
9. The Use of Remote Sensing and Artificial Intelligence in the Mine Action Sector, 20th and 22nd April 2021, Geneva (Online Webinar), report, May 
2021.
How to Implement Drones and Machine Learning to Reduce Time, Costs, and Dangers Associated with Landmine DetectionbBy 
Jasper Baur, Gabriel Steinberg, Alex Nikulin, Ph.D., Kenneth Chiu, Ph.D., and Timothy S. de Smet, Ph.D.
[ from page 137 ]
1. Deep learning is a subfield of machine learning based on the use of deep neural networks. Machine learning is a subfield of artificial intelligence 
wherein a computer uses algorithms to improve at a task on its own only through experience. Artificial intelligence describes any program designed 
to imitate human perception. 
2. A region-based convolutional neural network (R-CNN) is a method introduced in 2014 to perform fast and accurate object detection using deep 
neural networks.
3. International Campaign to Ban Landmines. (2020). 22nd annual Landmine Monitor Report.  Human Rights Watch.
4. Mine Action Review. (2020, October 1). CLEARING THE MINES 2020. Retrieved from https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/907_
NPA_Clearing_the_Mines_2020_WEB.pdf
5. Habib, M. K. (2007). Humanitarian demining: reality and the challenge of technology–the state of the arts. International Journal of Advanced Robotic 
Systems, 4(2), 19.
6. Landmine Monitor 2020, (2020), p 1, http://www.the-monitor.org/media/3168934/LM2020.pdf. 
7. UAV refers solely to the aerial platform (drone), whereas UAS refers to the drone along with the attached sensors, the ground control station, and the 
remote pilot controlling the autonomous flight.
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8. de Smet, T., & Nikulin, A., (2018) Catching “butterflies” in the morning: A new methodology for rapid detection of aerially deployed plastic land 
mines from UAVs. The Leading Edge,  37(5), 367-371.
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NANCE. Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, 24(1), 13. 
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14. Nikulin, A., & de Smet, T., (2018).  A UAV-based magnetic survey method to detect and identify orphaned oil and gas wells. The Leading Edge 38 (6), 
447-452.
15. Harmon, R. S., DeLucia, F. C., LaPointe, A., Winkel, R. J., & Miziolek, A. W. (2006). LIBS for landmine detection and discrimination. Analytical and 
bioanalytical chemistry, 385(6), 1140-1148.
16. Coath, J.A.; Richardson, M.A. (2000). Regions of high contrast for the detection of scatterable land mines. Proceedings of the Detection and Reme-
diation Technologies for Mines and Mine-like Targets V, Orlando, FL, USA, 24–28. Volume 4038, pp. 232–240.
17. Urban, M. (1990). Nine: 1986. In War in Afghanistan (pp. 186-211). Palgrave Macmillan, London.
18. United Nations. (1998, December 3). Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices. Available online: 
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/MTDSG/Volume%20II/Chapter%20XXVI/XXVI-2-b.en.pdf (accessed on October 10, 2020).
19. Dolgov, R. (2001). Landmines in Russia and the former Soviet Union: A lethal epidemic. Medicine & Global Survival, 7(1), 38-42.
20. “AP Mine Ban Convention: Destroying Stockpiled Mines”. (2017) Apminebanconvention.org (accessed 10 October 2017). https://web.archive.org/
web/20170826034242/https:/www.apminebanconvention.org/background-status-of-the-convention/destroying-stockpiled-mines/.
21. Landmine Monitor. (2019). International Campaign to Ban Landmines - Cluster Munition Coalition. http://www.the-monitor.org/media/3074086/
Landmine-Monitor-2019-Report-Final.pdf
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them in the training data can often decrease the number of false positives by allowing the computer to clearly distinguish between background and 
objects of interest.
29. Github. Lozuwa/Impy. Available online: https://github.com/lozuwa/impy#images-are-too-big (accessed on 4 October 2020).
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